Seventeen years after 10 Pakistani jihadists began a days-long campaign of terror in Mumbai, India continues its pursuit of justice — one plotter at a time.
Earlier this month, the Bombay High Court ruled that the trial of Abu Jundal, a man accused of training these terrorists and teaching them Hindi, could resume. The trial had been stalled since 2018 because of procedural issues.
Previously, in April, Tahawwur Rana was extradited to India after years of efforts. His trial for facilitating the 26/11 attacks is ongoing.
In the past 17 years, an entire generation has come of age, but India has not moved on. Instead, it has continued to seek and prosecute those behind the attack, though several remain beyond India’s reach — Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) co-founders Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Hafiz Saeed, senior LeT operative Sajid Mir, the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) shadowy ‘Major Iqbal’, who are all at large in Pakistan, and David Coleman Headley, who is jailed in the United States.
The pursuit of justice has not been without flaws. Two men tried for being part of the 26/11 plot, Fahim Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed, were acquitted. They were, however, convicted in the case of a terrorist attack on a CRPF camp in 2007. But they were acquitted in that case as well by a higher court this year.
Noting the defective investigation in the CRPF attack case, the Allahabad High Court said the “case would have met a different result had the investigation and prosecution been conducted by more trained police”.
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View AllThe fact that Ansari and Ahmed were charged in two cases by different courts —and subsequently acquitted by different courts— has made their cases among the most controversial in India’s counter-terrorism history.
From Kasab to Abu Jundal and Tahawwur Rana — India’s pursuit of justice
Pakistan’s conspiracy began to unravel when Ajmal Amir Kasab was captured alive.
According to former Mumbai Police Commissioner Rakesh Maria, who ran the control room when the attack began, the terrorists were meant to present themselves as Hindus — hiding their links to Pakistan.
In his book ‘Let Me Say It Now’, Maria wrote, “If all had gone well, he [Kasab] would have been dead with a red string tied around his wrist like a Hindu. We would have found an identity card on his person with a fictitious name: Samir Dinesh Chaudhari, student of Arunodaya degree and PG college… Bengaluru… There would have been screaming headlines on newspapers claiming how Hindu terrorists had attacked Mumbai. Over the top TV journalists would have made a beeline for Bengaluru to interview his family and neighbours. But alas, it had not worked that way and here he was, Ajmal Amir Kasab of Faridkot in Pakistan.”
Kasab was tried, convicted, and hanged till death in 2012.
India then landed in its net Abu Jundal, whose real name is Zabiuddin Ansari. He is believed to have trained Kasab and the other terrorists.
Abu Jundal was extradited to India in 2012 from Saudi Arabia, where he had moved after spending years in Pakistan. But his case stalled in 2018 over allegations of improper procedures involved in the extradition. The Bombay High Court ruled earlier this month that his trial could resume.
Abu Jundal is understood to have been present in the LeT’s control room in Karachi, Pakistan, which oversaw the 26/11 attacks. This makes him the only person in Indian custody who was at the nerve centre of the entire operation.
Beyond the 26/11 attacks, Ansari has been serving a life term in the 2006 Aurangabad arms haul case.
Previously, in April, India landed in its net Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian jihadist who facilitated the attacks. The extradition came after years of efforts.
Rana deserted the Pakistan Army, where he was a captain, and moved to Canada where he became a citizen. He then moved to the United States and settled in Chicago where he opened several businesses. One of these businesses, an immigration consultancy, was part of the LeT’s plot to strike Mumbai.
Rana is tied to another accused in the case, David Coleman Headley, who used the consultancy as cover to travel to India and plan the Mumbai attacks.
Headley has testified that he scouted locations in Mumbai and that Rana helped him obtain a visa and allowed him to open a Mumbai-based office using the name of Rana’s company —First World Immigration Services Inc— while knowing his true purpose of planning a terrorist attack. As per the testimony, Rana facilitated the 26/11 attacks by arranging the scouting and helping Headley, a member of the plot.
Rana was also in touch with another accused in the case, Major Iqbal, who remains at large in Pakistan.
Those who remain at large
LeT co-founders Lakhvi and Saeed along with ISI’s Major Iqbal and senior LeT operative Sajid Mir remain at large in Pakistan.
Major Iqbal’s real name is Chaudhry Khan, according to Headley.
At points, Mir has been described as one of the main planners of the attack. Both he and Iqbal are believed to be regular officers of the Pakistan Army who either joined the ISI or the LeT. In any case, they are believed to have worked for and with both the organisations. Considering the close cooperation between the ISI and Pakistan-based jihadist groups, the lines between the two sides are, in any case, blurry.
Lakhvi and Saeed have been leading a jihadist campaign for decades. After their latest attack on India in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam in April, India struck LeT’s headquarters, among several jihadist sites in Pakistan, under Operation Sindoor.
While Lakhvi and Saeed survived, Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Masood Azhar lost several family members in another strike on Jaish’s headquarters as part of the operation. Azhar’s Jaish was behind the Pulwama bombing that killed 49 CRPF personnel in 2019.
The curious case of Headley — and a missed opportunity
Headley has admitted he was part of the 26/11 plot. He has admitted receiving training and operational directions from Iqbal and Mir, and that the ISI was centrally involved in planning and executing the attack.
Headley also admitted that he visited Mumbai for reconnaissance and scouted the Taj and Oberoi hotels, Leopold Cafe, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, and Nariman House at the instructions of his Pakistani handlers. Kasab and his fellow terrorists attacked all of these locations.
However, as part of his plea agreement with the US government, Headley cannot be extradited to India.
But Headley’s case has revealed a damning missed opportunity. It emerged that US agencies had information suggesting he was plotting a terrorist attack in India. Whether these inputs were shared with India on time could be up for questions. But these inputs were indeed shared, whether early or late, and what’s a proven fact is that Indian agencies could not prevent the attacks despite repeated warnings.
A ProPublica investigation reported that Headley’s wife had warned US agencies three times in 2007 and 2008 that he was plotting a terrorist attack in Mumbai.
Separately, in their book ‘The Siege: The Attack On The Taj’, Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark wrote that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had shared 26 intelligence alerts with India and some of these inputs were very specific, such as the CIA informing India about the use of “fidayeen, meaning guerrillas armed with grenades and AK-47s who fought to the death, inflicting heavy casualties before being overcome”.
“Eleven warnings suggested the plan would involve multiple simultaneous attacks. Six warnings pointed to a sea-borne infiltration, which would be a first in India,” wrote Levy and Scott-Clark.
And this exactly how the attack was carried out. Indian agencies were informed and the attack could not be prevented.
Referring to these inputs, ProPublica’s investigative journalist Sebastian Rotella noted that “US agencies learned enough about him [Headley] to glean fragments of intelligence” that went into these warnings.
“US and foreign officials say his role as an informant or ex-informant helped him elude detection as he was training in Pakistani terror camps and travelling back and forth to Mumbai to scout targets. And three counterterror sources say US agencies learned enough about him to glean fragments of intelligence that contributed to the warnings to India about a developing plot against Mumbai,” noted Rotella.
I am a chief sub-editor at Firstpost. I primarily cover international affairs and India's foreign policy. I am a habitual reader, occasional book reviewer, and an aspiring tea connoisseur. You can follow me at @madhur_mrt on X and can reach out to me at madhur.sharma@nw18.com for tips, feedback, or Netflix recommendations. I was previously at Outlook magazine where I primarily covered national affairs at the intersection of policy, politics, and law.
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