2-plus-2 talks: In US courtship of India and separation from Pakistan, a lesson from Cold War and revenge of history

At the height of the Cold War, when Pakistan was busy shopping for the ‘Islamic Bomb’ in Europe’s retail nuclear market and had managed to enrich a small amount of uranium, the US had turned a blind eye to Islamabad’s nuclear weapons programme. As former R&AW chief Vikram Sood writes in his book The Unending Game, Ronald Reagan, the then US President, had said: “I just don’t think it’s any of our business”. Despite full knowledge of the programme, Reagan “used the ambiguously-worded Pressler Amendment to continue to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear bomb to get Congressional clearance for funds of the jihad” (in Afghanistan against Soviet troops), former spymaster Sood recounts in his book on espionage. India’s concerns didn’t matter. Pakistan was the blue-eyed boy who could do no wrong. That tactic of arming insurgents to fight America’s war in Afghanistan has come full circle. As the US fights an unwinnable 17-year war in Afghanistan and struggles with Pakistan’s double game , nothing captures the changed bilateral equation more than US secretary of state dropping by in Islamabad to meet the newly elected Pakistani government during a stopover before arriving in India for the inaugural 2+2 dialogue. Pakistan’s military-controlled media tried to find consolation that Mike Pompeo will be accompanied by the US military chief. General Joseph F. Dunford’s “inclusion in the delegation dispels the impression that this was not a proper visit but just a stopover,” wrote Dawn, which like its peers seems to have fallen in line after Pakistan’s powerful military ran a “campaign of fear” against media in the run-up to general elections. [caption id=“attachment_5107941” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] File image of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with US President Donald Trump. Reuters[/caption] Pakistan’s delusion stems from a congenital need to pursue parity with India at all times and on all fronts. Back in 1965, prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had vowed that “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of our own.” This need for parity is borne out of an existential crisis that leads Pakistan to define own existence in relation to India and, to quote Husain Haqqani , look “at the whole world through the prism of antipathy towards India.” The inaugural 2+2 dialogue between India and the US, for instance, has generated insecurity in Islamabad that its arch-rival is institutionalizing the progress in bilateral ties with its Cold War ally. The US tilt away from Pakistan towards India — a process that has sped up during the Donald Trump administration — also reminds Islamabad (or more accurately the military generals in Rawalpindi) that it went a tad too far in the double game and oversold its strategic advantage to the US. If there is insecurity in Pakistan over India’s growing ties with the US, the Donald Trump administration would view it as a success. It is fashionable to think of Trump as the emperor of chaos. On Pakistan, he has implemented a much-needed policy correction. The Trump administration has ended US strategic altruism towards a deceptive and treacherous ally and introduced a penalty-and-reward system that raises the cost of Pakistan’s perfidies. It isn’t a replacement of carrots with sticks. If Pakistan is getting more of US cosh than cash of late, the fault lies with its behavior. It is pointless to blame Washington for trying to secure its interests. In scheduling Pompeo’s Pakistan trip almost as an ‘add-on’ to the historic 2+2 talks with India, the Trump administration is sending a message to Pakistan that geopolitical necessities cannot solely determine the course of diplomacy. It is more rewarding to display responsible behavior than trying to encash duplicity. This isn’t to say that India-US relationship is not without its share of irritants. India and the US will have to navigate road bumps and reconcile seemingly irreconcilable positions arising out of US sanctions against Russia and Iran, but when both sides meet the focus is on maximizing achievements than managing threats — a condition that defines recent US ties with Pakistan. This is a fundamental shift, exemplified and reinforced in myriad ways. The Trump administration has taken a blunt approach to diplomacy instead of relying on tacit sleights and implied admonitions. It has made clear that in meeting the new Pakistan government, the Pompeo-led delegation would be discussing “meeting our common foe, the terrorists… and make that a primary part of the discussion,” as Mattis told reporters during Tuesday’s briefing at Pentagon. The focus on terror being “the primary part of discussion” is aimed at heightening Pakistan government’s self-created embarrassment over the controversy that arose from Pompeo’s congratulatory call to Imran Khan on 23 August. Following the telephonic conversation, the US Department of State released a statement that “Pompeo raised the importance of Pakistan taking decisive action against all terrorists operating in Pakistan and its vital role in promoting the Afghan peace process.” What followed reveals the denial that has set inside Pakistan establishment . Pakistan rejected the statement. Its foreign office claimed that the US readout that mentioned terrorists operating in Pakistan “is not representative of the facts”. The US stood by its statement , shared a transcript of the statement with Islamabad and Pakistan government was finally forced to climb down from the denial, and sought to “bury” the issue. In this backdrop, US Department of Defense’s decision on Tuesday to cancel the $300 million aid to Pakistan over its ostensible failure to crack down on terrorists have added to the friction. It adds to the impression that Trump administration is more willing than its predecessors to employ coercive tools against Pakistan to modify its behavior. The fact that the announcement was timed with Pompeo’s visit (where he is expected to focus on terror) should tell us that Trump administration is becoming impatient with Pakistan’s recalcitrance. “Due to a lack of Pakistani decisive actions in support of the South Asia Strategy the remaining $300 (million) was reprogrammed,” Pentagon spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Kone Faulkner said . The Pentagon will reportedly spend the $300 million on “other urgent priorities” if approved by Congress. This amount is in addition to the $500 million from Coalition Support Funds (CSF) already withheld earlier this year, taking Pakistan’s net loss to $800 million. Pakistan has bristled at the cancellation of funds, claiming that it was not an aid but reimbursement for its role in US war on terror. “The $300 million is neither aid nor assistance – it is the money Pakistan spent from its resources against militants and in the war against terrorism. This is the money they (US) are supposed to reimburse, but now either they are not willing or unable to pay back,” Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi told the media . This breakdown isn’t a sudden development. In May, the US slapped travel restrictions on Pakistan diplomats working at the embassy in Washington. Pakistan took stricter retaliatory steps. . In June, the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) grey-listed Pakistan over its role in financing global terror. The move was pushed by the US. In August, the US started scrapping Pakistani officers from a coveted training and educational program that have been a hallmark of bilateral military relations for more than a decade. These are calibrated steps, aimed at maximising pressure on Pakistan’s security establishment. The Trump administration understands that it needs Pakistan’s help. During a recent think tank event in Washington, a top Pentagon diplomat admitted that “there is no question we need Pakistan’s help in encouraging, persuading, pressuring Taliban to come to the negotiating table.” But Randall Schriver was quick to add that the Trump administration’s “decisions on curbing assistance and putting constraints on our relationship with Pakistan” were a “means to try to persuade them to adopt that course and use their influence on the Taliban.” This strategy will work only if Pakistan perceives non-compliance with US objectives to be riskier than rewarding. It may reflexively tilt even more towards China. Yet Beijing’s grand strategy of a connected Eurasia through BRI is incumbent on a peaceful resolution of Afghanistan war. This outcome sits at odds with Pakistan that equates peace in Afghanistan with an erosion of its geopolitical advantage. As the theatre unfolds, Pakistan might be pushed to make some hard choices, especially if it is forced to approach the IMF (where the US wields disproportionate influence) for funds to save its failing economy. It depends on whether Trump is able to stay the course. For the US, a lesson from Cold War is evident. Stable diplomatic ties are forged through mutual interests, shared values and honest adjustments. Marriages of convenience rarely work, more so if fractures within ties remain unaddressed and glossed over.