Over 1,000 personnel dead in 10 years: Is Chhattisgarh's battle against Maoists a failure?

Raipur: Over a thousand armed forces personnel have died in Maoist attacks since 2005. It’s perhaps time we asked the question: to what end?  The sacrifice of personnel would be justified if there’s some gain for the state. Every operation ought to have a long-term purpose built upon short-term targets. But what has the Chhattisgarh government achieved so far in concrete terms in its long, continuing war against Maoists? The latest attacks on paramilitary and police personnel bring out one thing clearly: despite the heavy flow of funds and armed forces’ personnel into the Maoist-hit areas over the last decade, nothing has changed substantially. Every resolve of the central and the state government to ‘eliminate’ the problem, and every consequent action has, on the ground, resulted in turning the situation in favour of the ’enemy’ of the state. [caption id=“attachment_2197662” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] PTI image[/caption] The populous and urbanised centres of the region are where the government ‘exists and functions’. The left ultras have strengthened their grip on the area – comparatively less populated and more forested – that has been called the ‘liberated zone’. Heavily armed forces move into the area under the ‘enemy’s’ control for a few days of what they call ‘area dominance’. The Maoists retreat. The forces then return to their bases and the Maoists to their strongholds. The game of hide-and-seek has been on for years. Here are a few observations on the government’s anti-Maoist operation so far: Heavy deployment, small returns: Every resolve of the polity to eliminate the Maoist menace has militarized areas. Rajnath Singh took charge of the Home ministry in May 2014. In his very first meeting with Chief Minister Raman Singh, he discussed the possibility of deploying Indian Army units to fight the rebels. The idea was watered down and on 8 June 2014, he officially approved the deployment of ‘another’ 10,000 troops from the paramilitary forces for anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh. Initially in 2009, the government of India had decided to move 80,000 central paramilitary personnel to wage an offensive against the Maoists, strengthened by a fleet of 10 armed helicopters from the Indian Air Force. By mid-2012, about 100,000 paramilitary personnel were deployed by the Indian government in its anti-Maoist operations. They were from the CRPF, Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and CoBRA. On 3 January 2013, the government of India announced the deployment of 10,000 ‘more’ central paramilitary personnel in Bastar, Odisha and some parts of Jharkhand. By May 2013, about 84,000 troops from the CRPF had been stationed in the ‘Red Corridor’ to strengthen the offensive. Apart from the paramilitary personnel, the  SAPF  personnel deployed in operations against the Maoists are estimated to number around 200,000. The Indian Army has also been stationed in the ‘Red Corridor’. The army, however, claims that it is present to train the paramilitary personnel in its fight against the Maoists and denied a direct role in operations. The Chief of the Army Staff and the 7 army commanders in mid-2011 had assessed that, if required, about 60,000-65,000 troops from the Indian Army would need to be induced in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,  Madhya Pradesh , Maharashtra, Odisha and West Bengal to battle Naxals. The Indian Air Force is operating MI-17 helicopters, along with the recently inducted fleet of MI-17 V5 helicopters, to “provide full support” to anti-Naxal operations. Funds for construction works being frittered away: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in May 2010 famously called Naxalism the biggest internal security challenge to the country. His follow-up meeting two months later with the chief ministers of the affected states resulted in decisions that have altered the rules of the battle. The concept of the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) was introduced for the Naxal-affected districts and blocks. Generous funds were released to take care of works like the construction of school buildings, anganwadi centres, drinking water facilities, godowns, panchayat bhawans, public distribution service shops, playgrounds and a host of other facilities. But most of the areas in the affected districts are off-limits for the government. The funds released for construction works have benefited Maoists the most. Those who won contracts passed on a major chunk of the funds for the projects to the ultras, claimed on paper that the road or bridge that was required had been  ‘constructed’ and settled the bills. The Maoists dutifully blew up the road or bridge before anyone could contemplate visiting the project for physical verification. If the IAP funds weren’t enough, there was a separate ‘Road Requirement Plan’. The records claim 2750 km of roads have been built at an expenditure of Rs 3,479 crore till 31 December 2013. What happened to the money is anybody’s guess given the quality of the roads. Education and health services hit: Ensuring education and health could be the best way for the state to reach out to people in the Maoist-controlled areas. However, these two services have been the worst-hit. Maoists blow up school buildings and health service buildings where the forces set up their camps. They never allow the buildings to be rebuilt. However, on the positive side, the generous flow of money from the Centre has inadvertently helped the government tighten its grip on the areas still under its control, which in turn has helped health and education services bloom. The story is entirely the opposite in the ‘liberated zone’. The only gain from the heavy deployment of forces in Maoist-controlled areas has perhaps been a halt to their march beyond their safe zone. But isn’t it too small a gain for the price the state has to pay in terms of dead personnel?