Operation Sindoor debate: What is the Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting that Jaishankar, Rajnath Singh are attacking?

The Sharm-el-Sheikh summit — long considered one of the most contentious chapters in India’s post-26/11 diplomacy — is back in the spotlight during the Monsoon session of the Lok Sabha.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, invoked the July 2009 meeting while discussing Operation Sindoor, sharply criticising the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) for its handling of relations with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks.

Their interventions have revived the criticism of a joint statement issued after talks between then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh on July 16, 2009, a document that not only altered the framing of dialogue between the two countries but also made an unprecedented mention of Balochistan.

Sharm-el-Sheikh was a strategic error: Rajnath Singh

Speaking on Monday in the Lok Sabha, Singh launched a pointed critique of the previous UPA government, accusing it of blunting India’s position on cross-border terrorism at a time when international momentum was building against Pakistan after the 26/11 attacks.

“In 2009, the government back then made a mistake in the Sharm-el-Sheikh agreement,” Singh told the House, opening the Operation Sindoor discussion.

He argued that the joint statement, issued after the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit meeting in Egypt, weakened India’s insistence that any dialogue with Islamabad would hinge on a demonstrable commitment to curb terrorism emanating from its territory.

“This diluted the terms set that Pakistan will not be allowed to use its land for terrorism,” Singh said, drawing a contrast with the earlier stance of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who, he recalled, made it “unequivocally clear that any dialogue with Pakistan would be contingent upon a commitment to end terror originating from its soil.”

Singh said the UPA missed an opportunity to mount decisive pressure on Islamabad after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, which killed over 160 people and shocked the world.

Quoting directly from the memoir of former President and UPA-era External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, The Coalition Years, Singh read: “Pranab Mukherjee has written in his book ‘The Coalition Years’ that when the Mumbai attacks happened, India had evidence that the terrorists came from Karachi port. No one in the world believed the excuse of Pakistan’s ‘non-state actors’. He has written, and I quote – ‘Amid heated debates within the Cabinet, there was a demand for military intervention which I rejected’.”

Singh also recounted a meeting documented by a senior Indian Foreign Service officer, in which then Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon proposed a cruise missile strike on the Lashkar-e-Taiba headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan.

“Hearing this, Mukherjee took off his glasses, cleaned them, and thanked all the officers before concluding the meeting,” Singh narrated in Parliament — a vignette that, in his view, captured the indecision of the time.

Singh’s critique extended beyond military restraint. He argued that the government’s response to 26/11 had long-term diplomatic costs.

“Just take a look at the documents of the Brics summit held after that incident; there is no mention of the Mumbai terrorist attacks anywhere,” he said, suggesting that India failed to rally global condemnation against Pakistan.

He contrasted that with what he described as the more “forceful” actions of the NDA government after later attacks, referencing the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 air strikes: “I believe that if the government back then had taken decisive and tough steps like the 2016 (surgical strike) and 2019 (air strike), Pakistan’s strategic calculus could have been altered. A powerful and decisive action could have proven to be a significant disincentive for Pakistan and its army-sponsored terrorist organisations.”

‘People who did nothing are questioning those who acted’: Jaishankar

Jaishankar challenged critics of the government’s handling of Operation Sindoor and turning the spotlight on the UPA’s response to earlier crises.

“We were asked, why did you stop at this time? Why did you not go further? This question is being asked by people who, after 26/11, felt that the best action was inaction,” Jaishankar remarked.

In his sharpest attack, he pointed to the reference to Balochistan in the Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement:

“In Sharm-el-Sheikh, the then government and the Pakistani Prime Minister agreed that terrorism is a main threat to both countries. Now, today, people are saying America is hyphenating you, Russia is hyphenating you — that is what I heard Deepender Hooda ji say. You are hyphenating yourself. You did not need a foreign country to say please link India to Pakistan… And worst of all, they accepted a reference to Balochistan in that.”

For Jaishankar, this amounted to a damaging equivalence between victim and perpetrator: “Now, here is a country reeling after 26/11, and you are equating Balochistan and 26/11, what happened in Mumbai, and you are saying that the perpetrator and the victim have both got a problem. And then, now you are asking me, why didn’t you go further? People who did nothing are asking the Government that did so much, why didn’t you do more?”

Jaishankar noted that the current government had succeeded in bringing down Bahawalpur and Muridke terror sites, declaring: “Who thought that terror sites in Bahawalpur and Muridke would be brought down the way they were?”

He also traced a pattern back further, citing the UPA government’s actions after the July 2006 Mumbai train bombings: “Some years ago, if you remember Sir, the Mumbai train bombing. The Mumbai train bombing happened in the July of 2006. In September of 2006, three months after the Mumbai train bombing, at Havana, the UPA Government with its Pakistani counterpart condemns all acts of terrorism – as though we were both again equal, and agrees that it is a scourge that we need to effectively deal with together. And then they directed again, the resumption of dialogue. So, what I want to highlight is, for the people who did nothing, to have that temerity, that gumption today, to ask a Government which did so much, which brought down Bahawalpur and Muridke, to say why didn’t you do more – I think it’s extraordinary.”

What happened at Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2009

The Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting took place on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in July 2009, only eight months after the Mumbai attacks.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani held discussions that led to the issuance of a joint statement — a document that became one of the most controversial diplomatic texts in India’s recent history.

The statement declared terrorism “the main threat to both countries,” and included an assurance from Gilani that Pakistan would “do everything in its power” to bring those responsible for 26/11 to justice.

It also recorded that “Pakistan had provided an updated status dossier on the investigations of the Mumbai attacks and had sought additional information/evidence,” which Singh said was being reviewed by India.

“Both Prime Ministers recognised that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues,” the joint statement said.

However, two elements triggered outrage back home. First, the statement explicitly noted that “action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed.”

This effectively delinked dialogue from Pakistan’s progress on curbing terror — a shift from India’s post-26/11 stance that talks could only proceed after credible action against perpetrators.

Second, Gilani’s mention of Balochistan — recorded in the statement — provided Islamabad with an opening to publicly accuse India of meddling in its insurgency-plagued province.

Returning home, Gilani used the reference to claim that India had tacitly acknowledged involvement, a claim India denied but one that added to the political backlash.

“Both leaders agreed that the two countries will share real time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats,” the statement read.

“Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas.”

“Both Prime Ministers recognised that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.”

The fallout in India was immediate and intense. Opposition parties branded the joint statement a “sell-out” and accused the UPA government of compromising India’s position.

The BJP declared in Parliament at the time: “Waters of the seven seas will not be able to wash the shame.”

Congress launched a damage-control effort, with senior figures arguing that continued engagement with Pakistan was unavoidable despite the 26/11 attacks.

Manmohan Singh defended his stance in Parliament at the time, delivering a statement that framed dialogue as a strategic necessity: “We do not dilute our positions or our resolve to defeat terrorism by talking to any country. Other major powers affected by Pakistan-based terrorism are also engaging with Pakistan. Unless we talk directly to Pakistan, we will have to rely on third parties to do so. That route, I submit to this August House, has very severe limitations as to its effectiveness, and for the longer term the involvement of foreign powers in South Asia is not something to our liking. I say with strength and conviction that dialogue and engagement is the best way forward.”

For the current NDA government, it is a case study in what it portrays as UPA-era indecision — a moment when India, in its view, squandered the opportunity to decisively confront Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks.

Also Watch:

With inputs from agencies