The confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv has reached a tipping point. Iranian forces launched dozens of missiles toward Israel on Friday night, killing at least one person and injuring 40 others. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said his country “will inflict heavy blows” after Israel “launched war”.
Iran’s missile attack comes in retaliation for Israel’s broad military operations against Iranian sites it claimed were linked to nuclear facilities, ballistic missile manufacturing and senior commanders. Israeli officials described the assault as the beginning of a longer campaign to curb Tehran’s atomic ambitions.
As Iran hits back, we take a look at its missile and nuclear capablities.
What are Iran’s missile capabilities?
In addition to its nuclear programme, Iran’s missile arsenal presents a significant strategic challenge in the region. The country possesses the region’s largest inventory of ballistic missiles, according to US intelligence, with some reports suggesting Tehran had over 3,000 such missiles.
These missiles — capable of reaching distances of up to 2,000 kilometres — can strike targets throughout West Asia and parts of Europe. Iran has also used these systems to devastating effect during recent strikes, including its retaliation against Israel in 2024.
Ballistic missiles, with their high speeds and parabolic flight paths, are notably harder to intercept than drones or cruise missiles.
Defence analysts have warned that large conventional warheads, such as those carried by Iran’s medium and long-range missiles, could cause mass casualties in populated areas.
Comparisons have been drawn to similar payloads used by Russia in Ukraine and by Israel in Gaza, which reportedly left craters more than 12 metres wide.
Iran also continues to supply drones and short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, enhancing military ties with Moscow amid the war in Ukraine. The provision of these systems has further alarmed Western powers, concerned about Tehran’s expanding military-industrial reach.
Does Iran have a nuclear weapon?
Despite speculation, Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon. However, international analysts widely agree that it has both the technological expertise and industrial infrastructure necessary to produce one relatively quickly if its leadership decides to proceed.
Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), acknowledged in last month that “the [Iranian] programme runs wide and deep.”
Iran’s enrichment of uranium — used to fuel nuclear reactors or, at higher levels, nuclear weapons — has reached near-weapons grade at 60 per cent, according to IAEA reports and US officials.
Then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated in June 2024 that Iran could potentially produce weapons-grade fissile material within “one or two weeks.”
Some intelligence reports suggest a covert group of Iranian scientists may be pursuing a more rapid, albeit rudimentary, path to weaponisation.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which initially aimed to restrict Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon, was abandoned by the US under the first Trump administration in 2018.
Since then, Iran has accelerated its nuclear enrichment activities while curtailing international inspections, particularly since 2021.
In its most recent evaluations, the IAEA concluded that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium surged by approximately 50 per cent in the three months preceding May — reportedly enough to produce material for up to ten nuclear bombs.
Where does Iran house its nuclear facilities?
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure spans over a dozen known locations. The Natanz facility is its primary enrichment centre, while Bushehr hosts its only civilian nuclear power plant on the Persian Gulf coast.
A May 2025 IAEA report also identified three additional sites — Lavisan-Shian, Turquzabad and Varamin — where undeclared nuclear-related activities took place, allegedly involving the use of unreported nuclear material.
The same IAEA report found that three of the four examined locations had been part of a clandestine nuclear programme that existed until the early 2000s.
While Iran denies ever pursuing nuclear weapons, these findings support longstanding IAEA and US intelligence assessments that Tehran had a structured weapons programme up until 2003, followed by intermittent experimentation.
On June 6, 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors, comprising 35 nations, passed a resolution formally declaring Iran in breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The resolution, supported by the US, UK, France and Germany, cited Iran’s failure to cooperate with the agency and its inability to explain uranium traces at undeclared sites.
Rafael Grossi stated that the agency’s concerns were consistent with past suspicions. Iran rejected the censure and announced plans to construct a new uranium enrichment facility.
Diplomatic sources noted that while the resolution hinted at referring Iran to the UN Security Council, that would require a separate resolution — much like in 2006, the last time Iran was declared non-compliant and formally referred.
What about the US-Iran nuclear talks?
The reelection of Donald Trump reopened the possibility of US-Iran negotiations, with bilateral talks having resumed in Oman early this year. However, after Israeli strikes on Friday, Tehran officially announced its withdrawal from nuclear negotiations with the US.
Past talks have remained stagnant, with Iran demanding sanctions relief and Washington pushing for deeper dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Trump has stated his administration will apply “maximum pressure” while seeking a deal “stronger” than the 2015 agreement.
The May 2025 IAEA revelations injected new urgency into the talks.
Many foreign policy analysts argue that if Iran achieveed nuclear weapons capability, it could alter the region’s strategic balance, embolden Tehran’s foreign policy and prompt neighbouring powers like Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear arms, leading to a proliferation spiral in the region.
Experts also note that Israel’s repeated strikes on nuclear sites in Iraq (1981), Syria (2007) and now Iran, reflect a clear doctrine of pre-emptive action to prevent hostile states from acquiring nuclear arms.
However, some warn that further strikes could push Iran into a decisive race toward weaponisation or even provoke withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Earlier this month, IAEA’s Grossi cautioned that continued escalation could backfire. “An Israeli strike could solidify Iran’s resolve to build its own nuclear weapon,” he warned.
Also Watch:
With inputs from agencies


)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
