Is Xi Jinping's dream of being China's 'president for life' unravelling?

Chinese President Xi Jinping is beginning to relinquish some of his long-held control over the operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

For the first time in his leadership, key responsibilities are being passed down to Party institutions and senior colleagues, a move that experts see as significant given Xi’s history of centralising power.

In late June, the Politburo — China’s core political decision-making body — examined a new framework regulating Party-affiliated organs. These bodies, known as central commissions and leading groups, have played a growing role in Chinese governance throughout Xi’s tenure.

According to Xinhua, these groups are expected to focus on “planning, discussing and checking on major matters.”

This redefinition of duties aims to strengthen coordination across Party institutions, which have increasingly taken on functions that were once the domain of state agencies.

Most of these organisations were either created or given expanded authority under Xi, especially in sensitive sectors such as finance, science and technology, cybersecurity and national security.

Some of these entities have already begun operating under the leadership of figures other than Xi, including Premier Li Qiang, Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, and Cai Qi, Xi’s chief of staff.

CCP devolves under Xi Jinping

Over the last decade, the CCP has overhauled several state functions by transferring authority to Party-led mechanisms. During Xi’s rule, the creation or elevation of “leading small groups” into “central commissions” has become a recurring strategy to assert direct Party oversight.

This transformation has affected multiple policy areas, including economic reform, religious affairs, and overseas Chinese relations.

A notable example is the transformation of the group overseeing Hong Kong and Macau. Initially a modest entity, it was upgraded to a Party commission in 2020 and took control from the previously dominant State Council-based office.

Similar structural changes were implemented in 2023, where commissions on finance and science were placed under Li Qiang and Ding Xuexiang, respectively.

The cyberspace commission, a critical agency for China’s internet governance and data regulation, is now chaired by Cai Qi.

Xi’s muted visibility

Xi Jinping’s recent absences from major international events have also drawn attention. For the first time since assuming the presidency, he did not attend the Brics summit, held this year in Rio de Janeiro.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang led the Chinese delegation. This followed a similar pattern in 2023, when Xi skipped the G20 summit in India.

Between May 21 and June 5, Xi did not appear in public for 14 consecutive days. This unusually long silence, uncharacteristic for the Chinese president, added to questions about shifts in his leadership style.

Additionally, a new Revolutionary Memorial Hall opened in Shaanxi Province was not named after Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, despite expectations to the contrary.

Xi Zhongxun was a senior figure in the Party, and the absence of his name from the hall stood out amid Xi Jinping’s otherwise consistent emphasis on his revolutionary lineage.

Xi Jinping, China’s ‘president for life’

Xi Jinping’s current authority stems from a series of institutional reforms and leadership consolidations that began when he assumed power in 2012.

He rapidly ascended through the ranks, simultaneously holding the top three positions in China’s political structure: General Secretary of the Communist Party, President of the country, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Soon after taking office, Xi launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that penalised over a million Party members and removed several high-ranking military officers. This effort bolstered his standing as an uncompromising reformer and helped dismantle potential opposition.

During his second term, Xi’s political clout was further cemented when he was formally designated as the “core leader” of the CCP — a title previously reserved for Mao Zedong.

In 2018, the National People’s Congress approved a constitutional amendment eliminating the two-term limit for the presidency. This cleared the way for Xi to pursue a third term, which he secured in 2022 as General Secretary, followed by re-election as president in 2023.

With this shift, Xi diverged from all his predecessors, who voluntarily stepped down after two five-year terms. His continuation in office without term limits earned him the unofficial title of “President for Life.”

Headwinds challenging Xi’s power

Despite his ironclad hold on power, Xi’s tenure has not been without controversy or crisis. His handling of the Covid-19 pandemic faced widespread criticism, both domestically and internationally.

When the virus emerged in late 2019, doctors who first raised alarms were detained, and Xi remained silent publicly until January 20, 2020, despite being briefed on the outbreak on January 7. This delay is widely viewed as a lost opportunity to contain the virus early.

The subsequent enforcement of the “zero-Covid” policy involved mass lockdowns, forced quarantines and extensive travel restrictions. Though initially hailed as a success, the policy eventually crippled China’s economy and triggered rare public demonstrations.

Its sudden reversal in December 2022 left millions un-vaccinated, particularly the elderly and raised questions about planning and transparency. By July 2022, only 51 per cent of citizens over the age of 80 had received a single vaccine dose, compared to 93 per cent in Japan.

Economic challenges have also heated up. When Xi first came to power, China’s GDP grew at 7.8 per cent in 2013, already slower than previous years. Since then, growth has steadily declined.

Promises to double the size of the economy by 2035 remain far off-track amid a slowing property sector, declining exports and regulatory crackdowns on private enterprises.

In foreign policy, Xi’s assertive posture has alienated several regional neighbours. China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, under the so-called “nine-dash line,” have escalated tensions with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia, pushing them closer to the United States — an outcome contrary to Beijing’s strategic objectives.

Dissent within the top ranks

Xi’s leadership has also seen repeated purges of top-level officials, indicating an undercurrent of instability within the CCP’s upper echelons. In 2023 alone, Defence Ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu were removed from office.

That same year, Foreign Minister Qin Gang — formerly ambassador to the US and a fluent English speaker — disappeared from public view just months into his role.

While Wei and Li were reportedly ousted over corruption charges, no explanation has been offered for Qin’s removal.

The expulsion of Admiral Miao Hua from the Central Military Commission — the apex command structure of China’s armed forces — further suggests discord within the military leadership.

These developments, though rarely acknowledged in state media, hint at fractures inside the tightly guarded corridors of Chinese power.

Although Xi continues to dominate headlines — appearing on the front page of People’s Daily 157 times between April and June 2025 — there are clear signs that the monolithic image of his rule is being tested.

What next ahead of CCP’s National Congress in 2027?

Xi Jinping turned 72 in June this year. The next significant milestone in China’s political calendar is the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party, scheduled for 2027.

That event will mark the end of Xi’s third term as General Secretary and could provide clarity on whether he plans to remain at the helm or initiate a phased handover of responsibilities.

Although some analysts have suggested that recent developments could indicate preparations for succession, others note that no apparent successor has been identified.

Unlike previous leaders, Xi did not promote a designated heir at the end of his first term in 2017 and has refrained from doing so since.

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With inputs from agencies