China’s Fourth Plenum: How will Beijing’s secretive meeting shape the global economy?

China’s ruling Communist Party is preparing for one of its most consequential political gatherings in years — a closed-door session that could shape the economic and political direction of the world’s second-largest economy for the rest of the decade.

From October 20 to 23, 2025, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) will convene its Fourth Plenary Session in Beijing, where top officials will deliberate on the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) and broader issues of governance, reform, and policy implementation.

While the proceedings are traditionally confidential, the outcomes of such sessions have historically guided China’s national priorities and influenced global markets, trade, and diplomacy.

What is the Fourth Plenum and its structure?

The Fourth Plenum is part of a regular series of meetings held by the Communist Party’s Central Committee, a powerful decision-making body comprising roughly 370 members — including 200 full members and about 170 alternates without voting rights.

These individuals represent the upper echelons of China’s political, military, and economic elite, spanning roles in the provincial administrations, the People’s Liberation Army, central ministries, and major state-owned enterprises.

Each Party Congress term, lasting five years, typically features seven plenums, each dedicated to specific themes and typical agendas:

• First: Selection of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the top leadership

• Second: Endorsement of senior government appointments

• Third: Introduction of broad economic and political reforms

• Fourth: Focus on governance and party discipline

• Fifth: Formulation of the five-year development plan

• Sixth: Discussion of ideological and social policy issues

• Seventh: Setting the agenda for the next Party Congress

In the current cycle, however, this sequence has shifted. A nine-month delay in the Third Plenum, which eventually took place in July 2024, has pushed the economic planning agenda to the Fourth Plenum instead of the traditional Fifth.

This adjustment means the 2025 session will take on the critical role of drafting the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) — China’s central economic and social roadmap for 2026-2030.

When will we know what was discussed?

Like most key political events in China, the Fourth Plenum will be conducted behind closed doors, away from public and media scrutiny.

The meeting is expected to take place at the Jingxi Hotel in western Beijing, a high-security complex managed by the Central Military Commission.

Once the meeting begins, participants are typically sequestered for the duration, with strict controls to prevent leaks or external communication.

Foreign journalists, and even most domestic media, are barred from the venue. Information on the discussions is released only after the plenum concludes, usually in the form of a brief communiqué summarising the decisions made.

The official statement, expected on October 23, will likely outline the broad contours of the new Five-Year Plan, highlighting policy priorities but avoiding any mention of internal debates or disagreements.

More detailed explanations are typically issued in the following week, though key data and targets — such as GDP growth goals, investment allocations, and sectoral priorities — will not be revealed until the National People’s Congress (NPC) session in March 2026.

What do we know about China’s 15th Five-Year plan?

Five-Year Plans have been the backbone of China’s governance model since the 1950s, providing a comprehensive framework for the nation’s economic and social development.

These plans, originally inspired by Soviet-style centralised planning, have evolved to become flexible instruments guiding reforms, industrial strategy, and long-term growth.

The upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan will chart China’s course for 2026-2030 and is expected to serve as a continuation — and an upgrade — of the previous two plans.

While the 13th Plan (2016-2020) highlighted technological modernisation and innovation through the “Made in China 2025” initiative, and the 14th Plan (2021-2025) prioritised “dual circulation” — the balancing of domestic consumption and global trade — the new plan will likely combine both approaches under the banner of “new quality productive forces.”

This term, a key phrase in recent Party communications, underscores China’s drive to cultivate advanced technologies, new industries, and innovation ecosystems capable of sustaining growth amid external pressures.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly linked the development of these productive forces with the nation’s long-term stability and global competitiveness.

In April 2025, Xi convened a seminar in Shanghai attended by provincial governors and senior officials, calling for efforts to expand China’s openness to the world “in light of a rapidly changing external environment.”

He stated the need to “improve the national innovation system, stimulate the vitality of innovators, and develop emerging and cutting-edge technologies,” highlighting education as a key foundation for this transformation.

These priorities were later echoed in Xi’s essays in Qiushi, the Party’s leading theoretical journal, and reinforced in the Politburo meeting on September 29, which pledged to strengthen reforms and ensure that “more benefits of modernisation are shared more widely and fairly.”

What may be on agenda?

China’s economic evolution

China’s history of Five-Year Plans reflects its broader economic evolution. The early plans in the 1950s and 1960s focused on industrialising a largely agrarian economy.

The 1980s plans marked a turning point, steering the country toward market reforms, allowing private ownership, and opening its markets to global trade.

The plans of the 2000s and 2010s concentrated on poverty alleviation and the transition from an export-driven economy to one centered on domestic consumption.

While Beijing declared victory in eradicating extreme poverty in 2020, many economists argue that China has yet to fully succeed in stimulating sustained household demand.

The 15th Plan is therefore seen as an opportunity to address this imbalance while consolidating progress in strategic industries such as electric vehicles, renewable energy, and semiconductors — sectors in which China has made major strides but still faces intense competition.

Innovation and self-reliance

Central to the 2026-2030 strategy will be an intensified focus on technological self-reliance. China’s leadership has consistently identified innovation as the driver of future growth, particularly amid an unpredictable external environment and ongoing US-China trade frictions.

The NPC Standing Committee’s special research report on the 15th FYP listed “science and technological innovation” as the second of five major initiatives, ranking it even above the expansion of domestic demand.

The 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans laid the groundwork for this approach by encouraging heavy investment in R&D, promoting high-tech industries such as artificial intelligence, robotics, high-speed rail, and semiconductors, and highlighting renewable energy and digital infrastructure.

The upcoming plan is expected to deepen these priorities, allocating resources toward R&D systems, infrastructure for innovation, and integration of talent and technology.

The Politburo communiqué from September 29 also reaffirmed that “developing new productive forces” will remain at the center of the new plan, aligning with Xi’s vision of fostering sustainable and high-quality growth through science, technology, and education.

Governance and party personnel matters

Although the Fourth Plenum is now primarily associated with the economic roadmap, these meetings have historically served as platforms to reinforce party governance and disciplinary mechanisms.

Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2012, such gatherings have been used to strengthen the Party’s institutional control and consolidate political stability. Past fourth plenums have addressed issues such as anti-corruption, rule-based governance, and state-owned enterprise reform.

In recent years, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has reached unprecedented levels, resulting in the removal or investigation of numerous high-ranking officials.

Since his third term began in 2022, at least nine full members of the Central Committee have been officially dismissed.

Most of these cases have involved disciplinary or corruption probes; the only exception is former foreign minister Qin Gang, whose dismissal was formally announced but not linked to such an investigation.

Several other senior figures — including Politburo member He Weidong and senior party diplomat Liu Jianchao — have not been seen at public events for months, fuelling speculation of pending disciplinary action.

Should the plenum formalise their ousters, it could trigger a new round of internal promotions and realignments as factions within the Party position themselves ahead of the 2027 Party Congress.

What does the history of fourth plenums tell us?

Fourth plenums have frequently served as turning points in the CPC’s political history. In 1979, the session accelerated agricultural reforms to boost productivity.

The 1985 meeting laid the groundwork for the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), which deepened economic restructuring.

The 1989 Fourth Plenum, held weeks after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, saw Zhao Ziyang removed as general secretary and Jiang Zemin installed as his successor.

In 1999, the leadership endorsed major reforms to overhaul inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), leading to restructuring and consolidation in key sectors.

The 2004 and 2009 plenums prioritised governance reform, while the 2014 and 2019 sessions advanced legal modernisation and state governance reform, respectively.

These meetings have repeatedly marked the introduction of major structural and ideological shifts — each aligning the Party’s political authority with the evolving economic model.

The 2025 session, with its focus on innovation and restructuring, appears to continue that trajectory.

Why does this meeting matter to Beijing?

Beyond internal reforms, the Fourth Plenum arrives at a critical juncture for China’s economy. Global demand remains uneven, while rising protectionism, trade restrictions, and technological barriers have complicated Beijing’s growth strategy.

China’s leadership faces the complex task of reducing dependence on exports and infrastructure spending while stimulating domestic consumption to create a more balanced growth model.

While analysts expect strong political emphasis on encouraging consumer spending, the persistent US-China trade dispute, along with tariffs and export controls, continues to push policymakers toward industrial upgrading and strategic investment.

In practice, this could mean sustained financial and institutional support for manufacturing, advanced industry, and national innovation projects, rather than a wholesale pivot toward consumption-led growth.

Such an approach could solidify China’s dominance in sectors like electric vehicles, green energy, and high-end manufacturing, while also addressing vulnerabilities in semiconductors and aerospace technology.

However, this industrial focus may perpetuate deflationary pressures and add to the country’s debt burden, with potential global repercussions.

Economists warn that China’s growing share in global manufacturing, coupled with relatively weaker domestic demand, could maintain friction with its trading partners.

Why does China’s Fourth Plenum matter globally?

The Fourth Plenum’s timing places it squarely within a complex global context. It comes just before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea, where Xi and US President Donald Trump are expected to meet.

The event follows Beijing’s recent decision to tighten export controls on rare earth elements, prompting Trump to threaten triple-digit tariffs in response.

Although China’s five-year plans are formulated independently of short-term geopolitical events, foreign policy and national security considerations increasingly influence Beijing’s domestic economic agenda.

The emphasis on technological independence, supply chain security, and domestic innovation capacity all reflect Beijing’s intent to insulate its economy from external shocks and strategic pressures.

Observers note that Beijing views safeguarding national interests and ensuring self-sufficiency as fundamental to its long-term strategy — particularly amid what it perceives as an era of intensified great-power rivalry.

The policies that emerge from the plenum will likely reinforce this outlook, making China’s internal planning a key factor in shaping international economic and trade relations over the next five years.

As the world’s second-largest economy and leading manufacturer, China’s policy direction influences global supply chains, investment flows, and commodity markets.

The meeting’s outcomes are particularly relevant to sectors such as semiconductors, renewable energy, electric mobility, and high-end manufacturing, where China’s industrial policies could affect competition and pricing worldwide.

At home, the plenum will be seen as a reaffirmation of Xi Jinping’s long-term economic vision.

With inputs from agencies