Naxal attack in Sukma: What led to the ambush and how the STF got trapped

Five days after the security forces claimed a successful and fool-proof mock drill in the jungles of the Maoist hotbed Bastar in Chhattisgarh, Maoists killed seven security personnel in an ambush on 11 April. In the biggest attack on security forces this year in the state, the Maoist cadre killed seven personnel of Chhattisgarh’s elite Special Task Force (STF) including the STF Platoon Commander Shankar Rao and injured 10 in Sukma in south Bastar on Saturday morning. [caption id=“attachment_2193681” align=“alignleft” width=“380”]  The injured STF jawans in a camp in Sukma. Image coutesy: R Bhatnagar / Sukma[/caption] “It’s very unfortunate and painful. We’ve lost our seven jawans including the team leader Shankar Rao, who was extremely courageous. They fought bravely for three hours in the remote interior. The injured jawans are being airlifted to Raipur by chopper for immediate medical attention," RK Vij, ADG (Naxal Ops), Chhattisgarh told Firstpost. What happened? According to sources, a squad of 60 STF personnel led by Platoon Commander Shankar Rao left Polampalli police picket late in the evening on 10 April on a routine round and headed into interior forests. The squad spent the night in the forest. The next morning on 11 April, as they entered the forest between villages Pidmel and Dabbakonta, nearly 500 Maoists opened fire at them. “The Maoists surrounded the STF team from all sides and unleashed attack by resorting to random firing, without giving them any chance to save themselves. After a fierce battle for more than an hour, when the STF men tried to retreat, the Maoists continued to fire and eventually seven personnel died, and 10 were injured,” a Sukma-based source said. “The casualty could have been more, but a few STF men, who belong to this place, knew the local Gond dialect and they could make out the strategy of the Maoist cadre, who were communicating in the local dialect,” the source added. The strategy adopted by the Maoists is similar to the one they had used earlier too in the same Sukma area. How the STF got trapped? “We’ve come to know that the STF squad had got a tip-off about a Maoist camp and were headed towards it. But, it was a false trap laid to lure the squad,” RK Vij said. This is not the first time that a trap was laid to make the jawans step into it. The question had risen in the 1 December, 2014 ambush as well, on whether the CRPF jawans were lured into Elamgunda forest by the Maoists? Counter-terrorism analyst Anil Kamboj opined, “The Maoists lay a trap by passing false information through their local channel and the security personnel don’t have time to confirm it, as they have to take swift action. Even when they try to confirm, it gets leaked. Getting 100 percent true information about a tip-off is practically impossible.” A repetitive pattern The most unfortunate part of the incident is that it reveals a repetitive pattern in terms of location, tactic and time. Surprisingly, the present ambush took place in the same Dornapal-Chintagufa area, where several ambushes and killings of security forces had taken place in the past including the most deadly one, when 76 personnel were killed in 2010. Counter-terrorism experts attribute it to Maoist Liberated Zone, the deadliest area under the control of LWE (Left Wing Extremism) in the Red Corridor. The attack comes just at the time the rebels launch their annual Tactical Counter-Offensive Campaign (TCOC). The TCOC, the military term for the most violent operations time of the Naxal cadres, is usually noticed in the summer months between February and June and security forces are on their maximum vigil during this period as they anticipate audacious attacks on them by the Maoists. Every year from April till the beginning of the rains, the Maoists send out guerrilla squads to attack the security forces. Not only is the movement easier in summer compared with the wet season, the heat withers the bushes and tall grass, offering the hiding ambush teams a clearer view of the troop movement. Almost all the major attacks in Chhattisgarh have taken place in summer, including the Darbha Ghati attack in May 2013 that wiped out a chunk of the state Congress leadership. “The Maoist cadre remains quiet for some time and the moment the security men are caught unawares, they unleash attack on them. Whenever, the security forces fail to follow the standard operating procedure (SOP), they get trapped and killed. This has happened in Bastar in the past too,” Kamboj said. Why no end to killing of innocents? There seems to be no end to the killing of security personnel and innocent villagers by the Maoists. During his swearing-in ceremony on 12 December, 2013, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh had vowed that his government would sternly deal with the LWE and uproot it. But, no such thing has happened. On the contrary, the number of security personnel, policemen and civilians, who have been killed since then has risen. “There is always a difference between the ground-level operation and planning. The Naxals have a strong hold on the locals and they have a stronger intelligence network than the police. The killing of security men will continue and the Maoists will have an upper hand until some important factors are taken care of,” Kamboj pointed out. Vital factors Enumerating the factors, Kamboj said: • A strong political will is needed to curb this menace, which is missing. • There is corruption in between the channels. • Effective penetration into the Maoist Liberated Zone and control is yet to happen. • Need for an operation vis-à-vis development. It becomes very difficult for the security forces to make way through the tough terrain; whereas it’s easier for the Maoists. • Coordinated approach needed between civil administration, politicians, development authorities, local police, STF and the local people. • Inability to address the root cause of the problem. • Vote bank politics is a deterrent factor in tackling the Naxal menace.