India's surgical strikes: Destroying terrorist camps is apt, govt must now be prepared

Those who planned and participating in destroying militant launch pads across the Line of Control on Wednesday night deserve kudos. The capture of an Indian soldier, apparently elsewhere on the LoC later that day, put a damper on the success. Yet, there was no detracting from the Special Forces’ daring operation. Politically and diplomatically, it went like clockwork — almost too good to be true. The disastrous US operation in 1980 — also using helicopters and para-commandos — to rescue its diplomatic staff from Iran highlighted the military and political risks of such operations in hostile territories — unless the home government and army have been persuaded to turn a blind eye, as has been speculated about some US operations in other countries. In this case, the political and military leadership opted with maturity for a proportionate response to the Uri attack, which had occurred ten days earlier. It would have been foolish to give in to the war hysteria that followed that attack — the high-profile success of which must have taken even its perpetrators by surprise. Having upped the ante, the government must walk a tightrope with poise so that it does not lose the moral high ground — of appearing restrained. Coming across as irresponsible will undermine India’s diplomatic stand. Destroying those launch pads in a coordinated triple strike from three different army division headquarters was an adequate response, but not an overly belligerent one. It was a measured move, a far cry from the sabre-rattling about war and calls for Pakistan’s dismemberment that had preceded. Aimed at militants poised to infiltrate, the operation did not even target the Pakistani state per se. One hears the army had information of 300 trained militants at those launch pads, ready to infiltrate. In light of the mayhem they could have caused, the strike was legitimate defence against aggression — even if one did not view it as a response to the Uri attack. Consensus carefully constructed No wonder it had the backing of the international community, by and large. The external affairs ministry did immense spadework on the sidelines of the UNGA. India’s right to respond post-Uri was explained to a host of countries, and major powers were brought on board. That work reached fever pitch on 26 September, the day External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj spoke on India’s behalf. [caption id=“attachment_3027802” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] Representational image. PTI[/caption] Once the General Assembly session closed that day (Tuesday morning in India), the stage was set for the strikes. More international calls followed on Wednesday. The government deserves even more praise for building consensus immediately after the operation. It reached out to explain its actions not only to the media, the spectrum of political party leaders, and the international community. Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh also telephoned the range of state governments — a move reminiscent of Jawaharlal Nehru’s federal inclusiveness. Getting past nuclear blackmail By penetrating only a couple of kilometres across the LoC within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India has finally found an appropriate response to the nuclear blackmail which Pakistan has used for 30 years. It was in 1986 that General Zia-ul-Haq indicated to Indian interlocutors such as former foreign secretary MK Rasgotra that Pakistan had a nuclear weapon. True, the two countries only announced to the world that they had nukes in 1998, but India had tested one in 1974 and Pakistan had developed one (with Chinese help) by the mid-1980s. It was in 1986 that the Punjab insurgency was pushed to a higher level. And it was only with that weapon-shield in place that Pakistan propped up Kashmir’s militant insurgency from 1988. Of course, the Indian government made enough mistakes between 1984 and 1987 to put things in place for Pakistan. It split the National Conference and dislodged Farooq Abdullah. The replacement government, known as ‘curfew raj’, gave way to Governor’s Rule and then a shotgun Congress-NC marriage. Then came the rigging of the 1987 elections and violence against candidates and election agents who then became militants, assuming names such as Syed Salahuddin and Yasin Malik. Successive Indian governments considered going to war against Pakistan over the Kashmir militancy at least thrice during the 1990s, but were deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. So jittery did the US become in May 1990 that Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates was told to fly directly from Moscow, where he was on a scheduled visit, to Islamabad and New Delhi. He met both prime ministers. The satellite pictures Gates showed them of the Pakistan army’s suspicious (probably nuclear-weapons-related) movements over the past couple of days surprised both premiers. By contrast, current US National Security Advisor Susan Rice vouchsafed support for the Indian strikes. A statement from her office about her calling her Indian counterpart within hours after the strikes confirmed the US’s decidedly pro-India position. The US expects Pakistan to act against terror, the statement said. Politically and diplomatically, it went like clockwork — almost too good to be true Preparedness and balance Now, there will no doubt be militant strikes within the Kashmir Valley sooner or later, because although Wednesday night’s strikes may have prevented the crossing of a large number of potential infiltrators, a larger number has already entered the Valley over the past couple of years. Battles between militants and forces within the Valley are not new. But now that the battle has been taken to the opponent’s half of the field, India must be ready to face more aggressive responses. Having upped the ante, the government must walk a tightrope with poise so that it does not lose the moral high ground — of appearing restrained. Coming across as irresponsible will undermine India’s diplomatic stand. Politically, the government might have a tough task ahead. It has been wise to spend so much energy on consensus-building. It has already announced that it is ready for ‘anything’. The question is whether Pakistan will opt for responses other than militancy in Kashmir and, if so, whether these will be on the borders or within India. A key question is whether Pakistan’s chief benefactor, China, will now urge de-escalation or back further belligerence against India. An apocryphal Chinese curse says: ‘May you live in interesting times’. We do.