Why India-China border talks never make any progress

by Bhaskar Roy China’s Special Envoy for boundary talks with India, Dai Bingguo, is in New Delhi for the Special Representative (SR) level talks with his counterpart, Shivshankar Menon. The talks, earlier scheduled for November, were called off when the Chinese demanded cancellation of the World Buddhist Conclave in Delhi addressed by the Dalai Lama in his religious capacity, and the two dates clashed. It is unrealistic to expect the boundary issue to be resolved any time soon. It is not a simple demarcation of boundary between the two countries: rather, it is the fundamental basis for cooperative, stable and mutually supportive relations between the two countries, because it will personify “mutual trust”. The border question has been bedevilled by the difference in the perception of the length and ambit of the border. India’s sovereign position is that the border is 4,117 km long starting from the India-China-Myanmar junction in the eastern sector to the northwestern end of Pakistan- occupied Kashmir (PoK), save for the border of Nepal and Bhutan with China. The Chinese position is that the border is around 2,000-odd km long. China does not accept Arunachal, PoK and Jammu and Kashmir as sovereign Indian territory. Beijing claims the entire Arunachal Pradesh as its territory, and the entire Kashmir state as territory disputed between India and Pakistan. [caption id=“attachment_183517” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“India and communist China held vastly different views about each other and did not know each other politically and strategically. Reuters”]  [/caption] Till recently, China held Sikkim as an independent country under illegal occupation, but that’s said to have changed and it accepts Sikkim as Indian territory (This writer still has some questions on Chinese sincerity on Sikkim, based on some factual indications from Beijing). The SR-level talks deal not only with the boundary question; it discusses bilateral relations, regional issues and international developments. These talks were started with the recognition that, despite China’s political spin that the two countries enjoyed peaceful relations for two thousand years, the reality was India and communist China held vastly different views about each other and did not know each other politically and strategically. The 2000-year relationship is a fallacy, and a Chinese propaganda narrative to obfuscate the real issue and prolong it. One learns from history. At the same time, it is futile to debate now whether the border issue could have been resolved in the 1950s. For far too long, the international community has allowed China to play on the theme of what it calls unjust treaties forced upon a weak China by stronger powers and colonialists, and to misinterpret treaties. India must insist that the Shimla Agreement of 1914 drawing the thick line to demarcate Tibet and India, called the McMahon Line, had nothing to do with China. It is an independent Tibet that signed the treaty with British India. China is responsible for only that part of the Shimla Agreement that demarcated the border between Tibet and China. Next, China’s claim on Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh (on the ground that the 6th Dalai Lama was born there) has no basis. The Dalai Lama can be born anywhere: the 3rd Dalai Lama was a Mongol Prince. China’s first communist leader Mao Zedong saw India would be a major competitor to China for Asia’s leadership. Despite Japan having emerged as a significant power in Asia under the US umbrella, it is India that matters the most. China’s aim has always been to keep India under pressure and make it fear China. In this, China has largely succeeded. The 1962 Sino-indian war was well-calculated. The Chinese army withdrew for strategic reasons, not out of a sense of goodwill. It could not have held on to that territory; but what it could, it still holds on to. The current India-China scenario is very different from 1962. China has emerged as a major economic, political and military power. But India too is not what it was in 1962. China realises that India has also emerged as a strong power and will continue to grow: it has acquired its status in the G-8 and the G-20 and has broken out of the South Asia cage that China had tried to confine India to. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister for India (equivalent to the rank of Indian foreign ministry regional secretary) Liu Zhenmin told the official news agency Xinhua that China hoped for better and faster development of strategic and cooperative relations between the two countries. China’s top official think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), advocated expanding the current strategic economic dialogue with India among other countries and regions in the context of dealing with the US. These reasonable statements, however, stand in stark contrast to the recent Chinese statements in regard to the unacceptable treatment to an Indian diplomat and two Indian businessmen over a business dispute in Yiwu in eastern China. Additionally, Beijing has always opposed any international deal India that enters into, which can help develop India’s intrinsic strength. It opposed the India-US nuclear deal, it continues to oppose nuclear transfer to India, and has resented the Australian consensus to export uranium to India. It has exhibited similar concern over India-US high technology cooperation and India-US military exercises. It has indicated strong reservations over India’s Look East policy, and declared concern over India-Japan strategic cooperation and defence agreement. In China’s perception, India was coopted into the US policy in Asia as a powerful deterrent to China’s ambition to dominate Asia. India’s Look East policy is opening up India’s historical assets in South East Asia. China is yet to understand that India has its own independent foreign policy, it will never be a domino to any country, and India will not be there to douse fires started by the US or any other country. At the same time, India will not stand by when its interests are challenged anywhere in the world. Both China and India must have forthright exchanges to clarify each other’s apprehensions. But if China wants to dominate in a free world, that will be regrettable and regressive. The boundary problem will remain captive to these concerns and mistrust. The ball is in China’s court. Bhaskar Roy is a China analyst based in New Delhi. Republished with permission from the Chennai Institute of China Studies.