What the US gets wrong about India's Brics membership and Russian arms buys

US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick recently remarked that India’s historical preference for Russian military equipment and its participation in Brics have been points of contention in US-India relations.

Speaking at the eighth US-India Strategic Partnership Forum in Washington, DC, he said, “There were certain things that the Indian government did that generally rubbed the United States the wrong way[…]For instance, you generally buy your military gear from Russia. That’s a way to kind of get under the skin of America if you’re going to buy your armaments from Russia.”

Lutnick further said that India being a part of Brics, which he characterised as a grouping that is bent on not supporting the dollar and dollar hegemony, is “not really the way to make friends and influence people in America.”

However, his perspective overlooks the nuanced historical and strategic factors that have shaped India’s defence procurement and multilateral engagements.

Historical context of India’s defence procurement

India’s reliance on Russian arms is rooted in historical circumstances, not its membership of Brics. In fact, it is also very closely linked to the US foreign policy during the 1960s-70s.

During the Cold War, the United States aligned with Pakistan, providing it with military support to counter Soviet influence in the region. Consequently, India turned to the Soviet Union for defence equipment, leading to a longstanding partnership that included the supply of MiG-21 jets, T-55 tanks, and other military hardware.

This relationship was further solidified during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, when the Soviet Union supported India diplomatically and militarily, while the US sided with Pakistan. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1971 exemplified this strategic partnership.

Even in the post-Cold War era, the US weapons exports continued to come with many strings attached. In several of its arms deals, Washington has gone so far as to impose conditions about how the buyer nation may use these systems.

A prime example is the restriction on Pakistan for how it may use the US-made F-16s. It is not surprising that this hegemonic attitude from Washington has kept buyers at bay.

Evolving defence partnerships

In recent years, India has diversified its defence procurement, reducing its reliance on Russian equipment. The share of Russian arms in India’s imports decreased from 76 per cent in 2009 to 36 per cent in 2023.

India has increasingly engaged with Western suppliers, notably the US and France, acquiring advanced systems such as the Rafale fighter jets and P-8I maritime patrol aircraft.

Collaborative initiatives like the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and INDUS-X have further strengthened US-India defence ties, focusing on the co-development and co-production of military technologies.

India’s role in Brics

India’s participation in Brics is often viewed through the lens of its relations with Russia and China. However, India has used its position within the grouping to advocate for reforms in global governance and to promote the interests of the Global South. India has also resisted efforts by China to dominate the Brics agenda, particularly regarding initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative.

By remaining in Brics, India serves as a counterbalance to China’s influence, ensuring that the bloc does not become a platform for Chinese geopolitical ambitions— something the US would also want. This strategic engagement allows India to maintain its autonomy while contributing to a multipolar world order.

Rather than viewing India’s actions as contrary to US interests, recognising the complexities of its foreign policy can pave the way for deeper and more meaningful cooperation between the two democracies.

Alas, Lutnick has not gotten that quite right.

With inputs from agencies