Two lessons from Gurdaspur attack: Strengthen police, develop jihadi-bashing strategy

From the clues available so far on the Gurdaspur terror attacks which left four policemen and three civilians dead on our side and three terrorists on the other, two things seem likely: one, this was a Pakistani-ISI operation using their jihadi terror groups; and, two, Khalistani groups may not be behind this outrage.

There is good news and bad. One bit of good news is that despite the kid-glove treatment given to Khalistani militants by the Punjab government, the militant groups are not finding local traction. The second good news is that the Punjab police, hardened by its past successful fight against militants, is capable of combating some degree of terrorism on its own.

The bad news is that we still don’t seem to have an effective strategy against Pakistan. At least, none that seems to be working.

To be sure, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have made it clear that force will be met with force on border provocations. Also, after first reacting to Pakistani perfidies with withdrawal from talks, the government now seems to have decided to continue with talks.

But this still does not amount to a strategy. The professed intent – dialogue and strong response to provocation - is clear, but the underlying muscular buildup is missing. Fighting fire with fire on the border is one thing, but provocations in civilian areas – as in Gurdaspur – also need some kind of hard response so that Pakistan gets the message that we are not a shooting range for its jihadis.

Effective strategy flows from a clear understanding of what our aims are and what the enemy wants to achieve.

Let us be clear about what the enemy wants to achieve: Pakistan’s Deep State (the ISI and army and their jihadi adjuncts) see themselves at war with “Hindu” India. This is why Pakistan will never offer us any concession. Every time there is even a hint of any softening on the part of the elected government (as we saw at Ufa recently), the jihadis strike back, no doubt with the support of the Pakistani army and ISI.

The Pakistanis use talks only when they think there are some unilateral gains to be made without any reciprocity – hence the keenness to solve the Siachen issue, where we lose strategic advantage by demilitarizing it while they gain by getting us out of those strategic heights (it also suits China to get us out of there). Our peaceniks are fools to believe that defending Siachen at such high cost is somehow not in our interest. Control of Siachen is vital to our military strategy in that sensitive area where Pakistan and China shake hands to our disadvantage.

Ajai Sahni, Executive Director of the Institute of Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal, notes that the Gurdaspur attack should be seen as part of Pakistan’s long-term strategy. He writes in The Economic Times today (29 July): “It (the Gurdaspur attack) is a reminder ….that these borders have administrative relevance for us, but have no significance for the jihadis and their state sponsors, who have dedicated themselves to the ghazwa-e-hind (the war to bring India under the sway of Islam, part of the apocalyptic confrontation between belief and unbelief that the jihadis think they are currently engaged in).”

Without understanding this as the basis of Pakistan’s enmity towards us (which is true not only for the jihadis, but also for large segments of the ISI and the Pakistani army), no counter-strategy will be effective.

The core point is this: the Pakistani jihad against India will not end till the idea of Pakistan is itself dies an unsung death. As long as the Pakistani Deep State believes it is in an ideological confrontation with unbelievers, terrorism will not end. And it is not about Kashmir at all. Kashmir is merely the excuse to recruit jihadis against India. If we make concessions on Kashmir, they will up demands on us, not clasp our hands in friendship.

So what would make for an effective counter-strategy against this reality?

First, we have to retrain our police forces in all states – especially vulnerable border states and states that drive India’s economic progress (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka) – to take on terrorism directly. It is not enough to have an NSG platoon hanging around for anti-terror operations. Or use the army for the job.

Punjab defeated Khalistani terror not with the army but with its local police force under effective leadership. Andhra defeated Maoism using special police forces, the Greyhounds. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks were ended by the NSG, but that was because the local police had poor leadership.

As KPS Gill, former Director-General of the Punjab Police, said in an interview to ET, the NSG is not the answer to terrorism, though it can be useful at times: “Unfortunately, the government is misreading the writing on the wall. What happened when Mumbai attacks took place? They empowered NSG instead of the local Mumbai police. Who has to react first in such kind of situation? Remember, it was the unarmed ASI of Mumbai police who first spotted and took on the terrorists.”

Lesson One in strategy is that terror has to be fought by the police, and special forces like the NSG can only perform specialised operations when required. Creating NSG hubs may be useful, but this may be sending the wrong message: that tackling terror can be left to the NSG and is not a police job.

Second, what the centre needs to do is something different. It has to develop the ability to hit back at Pakistan and the jihadi groups without provoking war or a nuclear standoff. This needs the buildup of a strong intelligence network on-ground shooters or saboteurs who can be counted on to punch the jihadis where it hurts – in their home bases. It is time to take the war to the jihadi camp, but covertly.

Third, the Indian political leadership should talk less and work more. We have been talking about developing an effective response to Pakistan for as long as one can remember, more so under the Modi government. What the Modi-Doval doctrine should do is develop a long-term counter-terror capability without talking too much about it. Tough talk and little action will lead to quick public disillusionment.

Most importantly, the Indian security establishment must be prepared to keep up the pressure on Pakistan – economically, politically, militarily and in terms of counter-terror ops – forever. The Soviet Union did not crumble till the US ensured its defeat on all fronts. This is what we must do to Pakistan till its Deep State actors realise that there is no victory possible against India. India should never be committed to keeping Pakistan strong.

Our political leaders should never be under any illusion that talks will solve problems with Pakistan. They won’t. Only an iron fist will work.