Russia's rush of affection for Pakistan could rejig South Asia equation, will discomfit New Delhi

Pakistan’s deepening relationship with Russia has been a matter of intense strategic deliberations in New Delhi. This relationship is particularly underpinned by frequent summit-level interactions, growing military ties and strategic coordination for Afghan reconciliation.

Now, Pakistan foreign secretary Tehmina Janjua has come up with a so-called seven-point roadmap for further strengthening ties between Pakistan and Russia, underlining what she felt Russia’s changing position on India-Pakistan military tension. She said “shedding baggage of Cold War history, Pakistan and Russia have been brought into closer orbit of improved communication, better understanding and strategic coordination.” While praising Russia for playing a positive role in de-escalation between India and Pakistan after military tensions flared up when India took punitive action against terrorist safe havens in Pakistan’s Balakot, she pointed out that in a “sign of changed configuration of our relations… Russia adopted a more nuanced policy for South Asia. During recent stand-off with India, Russia offered to mediate, which was welcomed by Pakistan.”

It is a well-known fact that India has been absolutely opposed to a third party mediation in its disputes with Pakistan, reasoning that any third party involvement would be tantamount to legitimising the use of terrorism by Pakistan’s security establishment for the past three decades. Pakistan has traditionally been perceived negatively in Russia due to its involvement in the Afghan conflict and support to various jihadist elements.

On the other hand, India has been viewed as a friendly partner in Russia ever since Soviet times. But Janjua is correct in claiming that Russia’s position in relations between India and Pakistan has been undergoing a marked change for some time as alliances and partnerships involving major regional and international powers are in a state of constant flux. Pakistan’s continued deterioration of its relationship with America, coupled with consolidation of ties between India and the US is contributing to Islamabad’s closeness with Moscow.

The points Janjua has discussed and therefore deserve special attention in New Delhi include deepening strategic understanding, increase in defense relations and Russia’s potential participation in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). However, what makes the study of Pakistan-Russia ties particularly interesting is that both seem to be learning from each other as far as the use of proxies against technologically and economically superior adversaries.

It is often believed, and rightly so, that Pakistan has begun to learn a great deal from Russia on how to wage hybrid warfare via social media as Kremlin seems to have taken the art of information warfare and propaganda to an entirely new level. Having successfully implemented its information warfare strategy in the 2016 American presidential election, Russia has since been using similar tactics in various West European countries in an attempt to polarise the political atmosphere while increasing the trust deficit between governments and citizens.

Pakistan’s ‘deep state’ employed vastly similar information warfare tactics very skillfully after India carried out airstrikes in Balakot and also during the capture of an Indian pilot by Pakistani authorities. Concerted attempts were made to twist the political and social narrative in India through various social media platforms so that measures aimed at inflicting punishment against Pakistan becomes a challenge for India’s political leadership.

However, the point that needs to be understood here is that Kremlin may also be learning from Pakistan’s strategic toolbox on how to carry out proxy warfare activities that are amenable to non-attribution and plausible deniability against America; Moscow is painfully aware that it is incapable of paying the consequences that it would encounter if it advances its interests by means of a full-fledged military encounter with Washington.

A little background is in order: As failure of the Pakistani military in its wars in 1965 and 1971 prompted its megalomaniac rulers to conceive and implement a strategy of ‘thousand cuts’ against India, this strategy effectively came to depend upon the use of proxies in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. In fact, the Russians were themselves victims of this proxy warfare during their decade-long occupation of Afghanistan when Pakistani military, with enthusiastic support from America and Saudi Arabia, armed, funded and trained the mujahideen against the Soviets in the anti-communist ‘jihad’.

Later on, Pakistan used this hybrid strategy against India in Kashmir and elsewhere, which still shows no sign of abating. Thus, Pakistani security establishment’s major force multipliers over the past three decades are various terrorist groups focused on India, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). This strategy essentially believes in the dictum of Pakistan’s former dictator General Zia-ul- Haq who once remarked that it was necessary for Pakistan to ‘keep the pot boiling’ in conflict zones. This background can help us understand how the appeal of ‘warfare on the cheap’ may have proved an irresistible strategic allure for Russian president Vladimir Putin in his country’s strategic competition with the United States.

As Pakistan’s security establishment has successfully maneuvered to secure large amount of American dollars for its support in the global war on terror since 2001 without terminating its not-so-secret ties with terrorist organisations, the Russians seems to have become admirers of Pakistan’s talent in using proxies to fulfil its agenda. A bloody military encounter in Syria, which did not receive much attention in India’s strategic circles, may throw some light on the dangerous dimension of mutual learning processes between the generals in Rawalpindi and the Kremlin.

According to some media accounts well as sources in American military, a firefight on 7 February, 2018, was one such incident which gives a considerable insight on how the Putin regime used proxies against the US in the Syrian war. As per a media report, a pro-government militia force loyal to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad attempted to overpower American troops on the eastern side of the Euphrates River near Syria’s city of Deir ez-Zor.

The US military detected the advancing militia and reportedly confronted its Russian counterpart about the disturbing development. However, when Russia refused any such connection, the US troops went on to crush the attack successfully. Though there is dispute about the number of fighters killed, it is in the range of 300 to 500.

Russia publicly refused any involvement in the above military encounter as it denied the presence of its citizens among the fighters. The Pentagon also decided not to confront Russia publicly and allowed the issue to fade from public memory as the immediate concern was to demonstrate unity of purpose in defeating the Islamic State. However, American military and intelligence officials are convinced that almost all the killed militia were actually Russian mercenaries along with their Russian-made T-72 tanks and other military vehicles.

In informal discussions, they strongly believe that these mercenaries were most likely the members of the Wagner Group, which is considered extremely close to Putin and known for undertaking missions that Russian government does not want to be directly associated with. It is believed that group officially runs its operations out of Hong Kong as such businesses are not legal in Russia. It reportedly recruits from retired military personnel from Russia and some former Soviet republics primarily through word of mouth.

These pro-Moscow mercenaries have reportedly fought alongside pro-Russian separatists in many parts of the conflict zones, including Eastern Ukraine. As per reports, the Wagner group has its members in Syria to seize oil and gas fields, and provide protection on behalf of the Assad regime. It would not be an exaggeration if the Wagner group is compared with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, the LeT and the JeM, which are also carrying out objectives that their sponsoring State — Pakistan — cannot do publicly.

American military sources also disclosed that when the bodies of Russian militia killed in the encounter with the US troops were returned to their homes, their families were silenced with cash and intimidation. Sounds familiar? In fact, this pattern of ensuring no media publicity closely resembles what Pakistan’s intelligence-jihadist combine has been doing when Pakistan-based, anti-India militants are killed in operations against Indian forces.

As the Trump administration announced that Pakistani military participation in its premier training institutions would be discontinued, Moscow immediately sensed the opportunity and lost no time in signing a pact with Islamabad, welcoming Pakistani military personnel at top Russian military academies. This meant a total turnaround in Russia’s Pakistan policy as well as a new era of Pakistan’s military diplomacy. Moreover, the two countries have begun to conduct regular training exercises between their armed forces.

Seen against the backdrop of Pakistani military personnel being trained in Russian military academies, it will now become much easier for both militaries to learn from each other in an institutionalised manner and perform better in hybrid warfare.