PM Modi should pack Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' for inflight reading on his way to China

When it comes to China, it is best for India to think along parallel tracks: the economic relationship, the cultural linkages, and the border standoff have to be dealt with separately, even though they may be interlinked. This is what Narendra Modi should keep in mind as he begins what promises to be the most important visit by an Indian Prime Minister to its most important neighbour: China. To come back with some diplomatic or economic gains, Modi needs to understand three things: first, how China thinks; second, how it is executing its strategy for Asian dominance; and three, how it sees India and how we see it. And yes, Modi’s in-flight reading en route to China should include a copy of Sun Tzu’s classic, The Art of War. The Chinese leadership knows this text by heart. [caption id=“attachment_2242286” align=“alignleft” width=“380”]  Reuters image[/caption] So what do we need to know about how China thinks or acts? First, Chinese power has historically been focused on creating a cohesive society internally, through constant and brutal internal warfare. China has seldom sought territorial conquests outside during its five thousand year history. China considers itself culturally superior to the rest of the world, and believes the world should pay obeisance to its power and cultural refinement. “All under Heaven” was the mandate the Chinese gave their emperors. It did not change under Mao’s Communist dicatorship or Deng’s authoritarian capitalism that China adopted after Mao. China seeks formal recognition by the world, and India, of its superiority, culturally or otherwise. India poses a threat to its cultural superiority, if not economically or politically. Second, China projects power more or less the way Sun Tzu, a second century BCE Chinese military strategist, taught it. The key elements of Sun Tzu strategy are deception and the consistent building of one strengths clandestinely. Sun Tzu advocated intimidating and overwhelming the enemy without war. China fights a war rarely, and then too only if it thinks it can win overwhelmingly. The key Sun Tzu precepts to note are the following quotes from his book: “Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.” “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.” And “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.” To counter China, India needs to understand when China is bluffing, and when it is genuinely capable of going to war over an issue. In 1962, China went to war by fooling Nehru into believing the border issue was a small thing, when it was actually a big deal for China, which had just invaded and taken over Tibet. Even as it prepared for war, it lulled Nehru into believing it was all for peace. Little wonder we lost 1962. Since the 1980s, China has been building its economic and military might slowly, but consistently. When Communist Soviet Union appeared to be a threat, it used the US as counter-weight to show strength to the enemy. After Mao, Deng realised that military might could not be sustained without economic might. China built the most powerful manufacturing capability over the next 20 years and became factory to the world. The world woke up too late to the Chinese threat. Having achieved economic and military might next only to the US, China is now implementing the second of Sun Tzu’s maxims: subduing the enemy (or enemies) without fighting. It yanked Hong Kong out of Britain’s grasp without a fight. It has embraced Taiwan in an economic partnership where the latter ultimately has to succumb to a Hong Kong-like solution and Chinese takeover. The west will not fight over Taiwan. China has also enticed the rest of Asia with economic partnerships – and neutralised them. It is now trying to browbeat Japan and India to yield on its territorial claims by a show of high belligerence. China is unlikely to go to war or push its luck too far on these issues, but only if both Japan and India play their cards right. We should not only build an alliance, but also beef up our economies and military might even while talking trade and culture with the Chinese. These parallel tracks are key to containing China. When they see strength, they back off. This is what we can learn from Sun Tzu: “Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.” Right now, both India and Japan are relatively weak vis-à-vis China. This is, therefore, a very good reason to appear strong and economically and politically aligned. China is doing the same to us with its string-of-pearls alliances in the Indian Ocean. From Sri Lanka to Bangladesh to Nepal and, most certainly, Pakistan, China is trying to tell us it has us surrounded. Resistance to its geopolitical aims is pointless. We have to stare back, and silently keep building our military strengths and alliances. We don’t need to provoke, but frequent trips to the north-east, regular consultations with the Dalai Lama on Tibetan concerns, and strategic conferences with the US, Japan, and Vietnam are vital to doing a Sun Tzu on China. On trade, too, China currently holds the high cards – seemingly. In 2014-15, says Mint quoting the Confederation of Indian Industry, India imported $45 billion more from China than what we exported. Our manufacturing has hollowed out due to China. Modi needs to tell China that this is unsustainable. China has to buy more from India, or allow its currency to appreciate significantly against the rupee. There is need for a direct rupee-yuan currency market that is not intermediated by the US dollar. We could also throw hints that lucrative infrastructure projects could be offered to China if it is more reasonable on trade balance. We can bring up the issue of Chinese dams on the Brahmaputra – and throw in the possibility of international arbitration for disputes in the area. China won’t accept, but we should bring it up nevertheless. We should also whisper in Chinese ears about Islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan. The Chinese know all about it, but there is no reason why we should not fan their fears relentlessly and give them unsolicited intelligence on what we know about the jihadi terror. What we should never do is bring up the border issue or its alliance with Pakistan every time we meet up. Our interests are best served by indicating that we can defend ourselves. Bringing up the border repeatedly makes China feel that its actions on the border are rattling us. They are long-term players, and they are looking for signs that we are desperate for a settlement. We should never be desperate for a settlement of the border issue. We should be willing to wait till kingdom come. In fact, Modi should surprise China by never bringing up the border. If they want to, they can. We also need to understand China’s real interests: they definitely want Tawang, the birthplace of the Dalai Lama, and probably not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, which they call lower Tibet. But they will never tell us this. They are desperate to end Tibetan resistance to Han Chinese rule by taking all the Tibetan holy places and ensuring that the next Dalai Lama is under Chinese control. We should never support such a move – and must make it clear in closed-door meetings that India will never recognise a China-appointed Dalai Lama. Unlike Pakistan, where our relationship is blighted by that country’s unremitting hatred of India (at least, as far as the Pakistani army is concerned), in China’s case the underlying cause of tension is not innate hostility (despite our humiliating defeat in the 1962 war), but the long-term power asymmetry that has gone unaddressed. This asymmetry is what China wants to retain, and which Modi needs to correct. This correction is what China wants India to be deflected from through belligerent action. When you are perceived as weak, bullies will try and intimidate you. And China is nothing if not a bully. This is what explains Chinese border incursions last September, just when President Xi Jinping paid a visit to India after Modi took over as PM; this is what is at play even now, as China’s official media keeps up a high-decibel anti-India chant, whether by warning him against visiting the north-east, and especially Arunachal Pradesh, or by alleging Modi is “playing little tricks” on the border. This is typical Chinese strategy – to keep the other side off-balance by constantly trying to unsettle it with pinpricks or intimidation even while officially talking peace and good neighbourliness. Last September, Modi appeared irritated that Xi’s visit was timed with a border incursion in the Chumar sector of Ladakh. He noted: “Yeh chhoti chhoti ghatnayen bade se bade sambandhon ko prabhavit kar deti hain. Agar daant ka dard ho to saara sharir kaam nahin karta hai”, The Times of India quoted Modi as telling Xi. However, this time the government’s response seems to have been different. Even as the Chinese media upped the ante on Modi’s “little tricks”, the Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar ticked off the Chinese by protesting against their proposed investment in infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and Modi himself met legislators from the north-east, including Arunachal Pradesh, to send a simple message to Beijing: two can play the game. Even as this shadow-boxing was on, Modi talked peace and poverty eradication as a joint India-China responsibility. One hopes Modi and his China advisors have read Sun Tzu.