Come another month, and Pakistan will be going into general elections. This exercise is usually fraught with not just the usual charges of corruption, misgovernance and sundry other allegations, but also veiled pointers indicating the side the “establishment” is backing. This time around, these pointers are far less hidden. The “establishment”, which for lay readers means the military, its intelligence agencies and sections of the bureaucracy, have more than made their preferences clear — they don’t like Nawaz Sharif and they don’t like his immediate family. This dislike has been on the front pages for the last few months, and at present, the courts and every investigative agency in the country is bent upon proving Sharif guilty of corruption and thievery on a massive scale before the elections are held. On the face of it, this may seem daunting to the staunchest political head, but not Sharif. He’s more than used to this. [caption id=“attachment_4280599” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] File image of Nawaz Sharif. AP.[/caption] The problem for the establishment is that a number of factors favour the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) as a party. First,
the victimisation of Sharif by the courts
has been so apparent that it hardly needs any reiteration. Just two months ago, the Supreme Court of Pakistan barred him from holding any public position during his lifetime due to the very controversial Article 62 (1)(f) of the constitution, which demands that public servants be honest (’ameen’) and altogether untarred by corrupt practices. This was seen by even the most even-handed as irrational in the extreme and is likely to help Sharif rather than otherwise. After all, the former prime minister has honed “victimisation” into a poll tactic for years. Second, the attendance at his election rallies in most provinces has been considerable, indicating that party workers have performed their tasks. This means that the party machinery is intact, despite a year or more of battering and doubt. Third, he has an advantage that certain Indian political parties might easily understand — he really has no opponent. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari is a babe in arms compared to the canny Sharif family. Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has a better profile, but has no national presence. Both Bhutto and Khan will retain their regional ascendancy, but are nowhere near making it to the post of prime minister. While that’s the basic reality, there are other factors that are of interest to those following Pakistan’s elections scheduled for July. An excellent analysis by
The Herald
based on public opinion surveys — carried out along with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute — divides the estimation of polls into two segments. One is the performance of the government according to various benchmarks, which may be by international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, or more positive projections by Pakistani institutions themselves. The second is based on a study of public perceptions, a very chancy thing indeed, and likely to be swayed even by last-minute events. Polls are unpredictable at the best of times, but the exercise by The Herald seems as exhaustive and even-handed as possible. Broadly, it gives the PML(N) a little more than a fighting chance, with a majority of voters seeing its performance as “average”. The factors on which the present government was assessed as having done well is the improvement in infrastructure and relative improvement in power sector. In other words, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is paying political dividends. This perception will drive the next government — whomsoever it may be — regardless of the fact that the perception itself may be flawed. Regional popularity, or the lack thereof A second factor emerging in the polls is the unsurprising fact that the PML(N) is the most popular in Punjab, which is after all Sharif’s home base. But interestingly, the poll in the party’s favour is more due to his brother Shahbaz Sharif, with figures seeming to show that Nawaz may actually drag down the party in the province instead of up. In simple words, projecting Shahbaz as the central candidate will win more votes in Punjab, than Nawaz. Shahbaz is now “acting president” of the party, but not its boss.
Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan. AFP.[/caption] Balochistan is a vital area for the Pakistani security since this is where the CPEC debouches into the Arabian Sea through the Gwadar Port. The most significant development in Baloch politics has been the growth of a number of independents, some of whom have now grouped together under a new banner, the Balochistan Awami Party. The PML(N)’s ability to win over these independents depends on its own viability as a political force and on the depth of its purse. The latter is not in dispute at all. In other words, the elections are less about causes and more about money — and a lot of it. A review of the Urdu media is disquieting, indicating that elections have little to do with the common man. One sarcastic author has recommended that whichever party comes to power, it should nuke its own citizens so that at least the poor and impoverished can find their own way to a heaven that is denied to them in the state. The term “lootacracy” is now in use to refer to politicians skipping allegiances as nimbly as a goat, depending on who offers what. Others foretell an Arab Spring-like event, powered by the squabbles and fake news on social media. Regardless of the result, this is likely to be a deeply troubling election for Pakistan, with an increasing disconnect between the politicians and the voters and little in terms of actual political dialogue. Although this is hardly limited to Pakistan alone, the repercussions here could be far greater. A vengeful military, a spineless judiciary and an economy that is just about holding off a severe debt repayment crisis could result in an unholy mix. Someone should advise Nawaz to get out while the going is good — this prime ministership may be more dangerous than even he can imagine.