Pakistan Air Force base attack: Here's why Peshawar is a magnet for terror attacks

The terrorist attack on the Badaber Air Force Base in Peshawar is the latest in a string of frequent attacks that have plagued the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Under three years ago, the adjoining Bacha Khan International Airport was also attacked by terrorists, presumably seeking to gain access to Badaber. According to a tweet by Major-General Asim Bajwa, director-general of Inter-Services Public Relations, 13 terrorists were killed in Friday’s raid, while 10 soldiers are injured, and one (Captain Asfandyar) martyred. [caption id=“attachment_2438578” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] An image of a neutralised terrorist tweeted by Major General Asim Bajwa. Image courtesy: Twitter/@AsimBajwaISPR[/caption] Major-General Bajwa tweeted that between seven and 10 terrorists (as per early estimates) dressed in constabulary uniform, attempted to break into the base early on Friday morning. They began by attacking a guard room, and were quickly surrounded by the Quick Reaction Force, and later army commandos and local Pakistan Air Force troops, with the police forming an outer cordon. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the first five months of 2015 saw 94 terrorism cases reported, over 4,600 suspects arrested and 138 search and strike operations conducted in Peshawar. In March this year, Sardar Mohmand, a district leader of the PML-N was gunned down by armed assailants in the city. So what is it about Peshawar that makes it a magnet for attacks by terror outfits, specifically the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)? Firstly, home to Pakistan’s fifth largest population, Peshawar has the closest geographical proximity among the country’s major cities, to Afghanistan. However, to explain the attacks in the past 15 or so months, its proximity to North Waziristan is more pertinent. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched on 15 June 2014, is a joint military offensive being undertaken by the Pakistani armed forces against various terrorist groups on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in North Waziristan. The collapse in peace talks between the government and TTP — signalled by the 8 June, 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, as this Express Tribune report illustrates — necessitated the launch of the operation. In June this year, Maj-General Bajwa tweeted that the operation had been successful in neutralising 2,763 terrorists:

Z-e-A:Op moves to last few pkts close to PakAfgn border.So far 2763 terrorists killed,837 hide out destroyed.253 tons explosive recovered-2

— Gen(R) Asim Saleem Bajwa (@AsimBajwaISPR) June 13, 2015

As a fallout — or ‘blowback’ — of the ongoing operation, terror groups have been launching retaliatory attacks, most notoriously, the assault on the Army Public School in Peshawar that saw 132 children and nine members of staff killed on 16 December. The TTP claimed credit for the attack as revenge for Zarb-e-Azb, but the identity of the mastermind was unclear: A video posted online two days after the attack claimed Umar Mansoor was the mastermind, as this Reuters report pointed out, but according to Shahab Ali Shah, a local government official in KPK quoted by The Telegraph, it was Saddam Jan who “was responsible for facilitating the massacre”. As it turned out, Jan was killed in a Christmas Day raid by security forces in Jamrud Tehsil. Secondly, it must be recalled that Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf chief Imran Khan, perceived to be a Taliban apologist, after all represents the sentiment of his electorate that voted him to parliament in 2013. What this has meant is that terrorists are able to mingle with the civilian population, estimated to be around 3.5 million, in Peshawar. And while the armed forces can launch airstrikes and assaults in the sparsely-populated hills of KPK, doing so in a crowded city is certainly not feasible. Which is what leads to the third point — policing. As this article in Express Tribune pointed out, “(the) police infrastructure is arguably one of the most poorly managed institutions in Pakistan”. Understaffed, underfunded and undertrained, the law enforcement machinery of the country lacks the capacity to be able to handle terrorists who are able to blend with the locals. An operation against terrorist or insurgent groups can only be effective if backed up by proper policing. See: British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya between 1948 and 1960 for an example. Lastly, the November 2013 drone strike that killed TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud has left a leadership vacuum in the outfit. As a result, various factions have spawned — some that identify with the Al-Qaeda and others that see affinity with the Islamic State. The rivalry has spilled over into the cities, including Peshawar, and is evident in direct inter-faction fighting and acts of one-upmanship that target civilians and armed forces. Unfortunately, attacks like the one on Friday — which, at the time of writing, has been claimed by the TTP — are likely to persist until the civilian government, armed forces and police machinery are able to coordinate to oppose terrorism ‘in all its forms and manifestations’ in practice, and not just on paper.