Modifesto points to foreign policy shifts: No primacy to US

More than the economic agenda, the BJP’s election manifesto, which has the thumbprints of Narendra Modi all over it, is likely to have its biggest impact in the areas of foreign policy and nuclear doctrine. This is almost similar to what happened under the NDA, where the Pokharan blasts, the Kargil war and 9/11 redefined India’s foreign and security policy, even as subsequent economic sanctions – plus other global crises, including the dotcom bust – impacted growth. Foreign policy and security took precedence over the economy under Atal Behari Vajpayee and his National Security Advisor, the late Brajesh Mishra. The two engineered a complete turnaround in foreign policy, with the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks after Pokharan-II paving the path for a new high in India-US ties. The US became the prime pole for Indian foreign policy. Under Manmohan Singh, this relationship briefly went higher with the signing of the India-US nuclear deal, but in UPA-II the relationship has meandered into insignificance — with the nuclear deal not going anywhere, and diplomatic ties rolling downhill with the Devyani Khobragade affair. If Modi were to become PM, foreign and security policy could be in for another churn. The manifesto says “the (BJP) vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals, content and process, in a manner that locates India’s global strategic engagement in a new paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes our economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality, so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the international fora.” [caption id=“attachment_1472919” align=“alignleft” width=“380”]  Representational image. AFP[/caption] This may sound like a motherhood statement, but consider the omission: in the entire manifesto, the US does not figure even once. A glaring omission given that both Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh had invested their all in this relationship. Is this because Modi has been steadfastly denied a US visa and is not inclined to water this relationship at the roots too early? Possibly. But even without the US rebuffs, Modi had started a Look East policy, and this could be a major shift from current policy. Here is how I would decode the foreign and security policy statements in the manifesto. The manifesto says: “India’s relations with traditional allies have turned cold. India and its neighbours have drifted apart.” What this could mean: India’s “traditional allies” have been Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Japan and Vietnam in Asia. Russian ties have been lukewarm of late, and the Japanese one has not expanded beyond economic relationships. South Korea too is important as an economic partner, but the political ties have been weak. Modi has made two trips to Japan and one to China, and has made enquiries to seek direct ties between South Korea and Gujarat. These areas of diplomacy and alliances will be given prime importance. That is, apart from Israel, which has been an important defence partner since Narasimha Rao’s days. Modi will expand the Israeli connection, which is already strong with Gujarat’s agricultural sector. Since he wants to expand defence production in India, one should hear more on this later this year. The manifesto says: “Our foreign policy will be based on best national interests. We will create a ‘web of allies’ to mutually further our interests.” Later, in the guiding principles on foreign relations, the manifesto says: “Instead of being led by big power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond.” What this could mean: The old US-centric foreign policy, where we sided with the US even on sanctions against Iran, may be abandoned. Instead, the old “traditional” allies and new partners in Asia will be wooed and connected to Indian interests. This means Russia, Japan, Asean, et al. The manifesto says: “In our neighbourhood we will pursue friendly relations. However, where required we will not hesitate from taking strong stand and steps.” What this could mean: This means the stance towards Pakistan will be robust, while India will seek friendly ties with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The manifesto says: States will be encouraged to play a greater role in diplomacy; actively building relations with foreign countries to harness their mutual cultural and commercial strengths.” What this could mean: Modi has often said in the past that individual states should take the lead to build global ties with countries of specific interest to their non-residents or with whom they trade a lot. The impact of this on foreign policy could, however, be mixed. The question will be about what West Bengal will do to India-Bangladesh ties, and what Tamil Nadu will do to India-Sri Lanka ties. On the economic relations side, though, there will be some beneficial impact. China and Pakistan: What does the manifesto have to say about China and Pakistan? The BJP’s moves to re-examine India’s nuclear stance of no-first use has to be seen in this context. The objective reality is that the Chinese have a clear infrastructural and tactical advantage on our north-eastern and northern borders, while Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons to counter-balance India’s advantage in conventional warfare. The UPA has clearly dented India’s military edge in the air, sea and ground – as seen in the naval and air mishaps, the postponement of the Rafale fighter deal, the crisis in the army over Gen VK Singh’s age, and the slowdown in infrastructure building in Arunachal Pradesh. The manifesto says: “The BJP believes that the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress.” To claw back the advantage, it wants to take another look at the nuclear stance. So, " The BJP will - Study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times; Maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities; Invest in India’s indigenous Thorium Technology Programme.” What it could mean: India will take a second look at the no-first-use policy since India’s nuclear programme is largely driven by concerns over China, which has not declared any no-first-use doctrine. The same applies to Pakistan, but India’s strategic affairs experts felt in the past that Pakistan would not risk a nuclear war just over Kashmir or some other irritants like the 26/11 terror attacks_._ But with Pakistan developing tactical nuclear weapons – which do not cause dramatic destruction – India’s conventional advantage reduces. The same is the case with China. This is why the nuclear doctrine of no-first-use will need re-examination. India may have to go in for developing tactical nuclear weapons in order to keep any retaliation after, say, a terror attack below the threshold of total nuclear war that kills millions. On China, Modi could follow an independent and pragmatic policy, despite his macho nationalistic image. He will build his web of alliances, but keep the dialogue with China going. In the past, he has visited China and even claimed he obtained the release of some diamond merchants arrested for smuggling. This indicates that he will not be eager to pick a fight against China, even while building our defences and “web of alliances.”. But the relationship will be tricky. Under Modi, India’s foreign and nuclear policy are set for a sea change.