Elements of Pak military support terrorists: Ex US NSA John Bolton backs India's Operation Sindoor | Exclusive

It has been known for a long time that elements of the Pakistani army have been supporting terrorists, said former US National Security Advisor John Bolton, as he reiterated his stance that India has the “legitimate right” to defend itself. The remarks from Bolton came during an exclusive conversation with Firstpost’s Bhagyasree Sengupta.

In the insightful interview, Bolton gave his take on Operation Sindoor , suggested ways the US can be a mediator between the two nations and also reacted to how US President Donald Trump and his administration dealt with the tussle between the two nuclear-powered nations.

Bolton served as the US NSA from 2018 to 2019, during Trump’s first term as president. Interestingly, he still remains the longest-serving NSA under the Trump administration. He also served as the US Ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006.

During his conversation with Firstpost, Bolton recalled how Washington stood with India during the Pulwama terror attack, giving insights into the behind-the-scenes talks between the two nations at that time. He also gave his take on Trump’s West Asia tour and commented on some of Trump’s policies, like the truce deal with Houthis or trade tariffs on China and the world.

Edited excerpts: 

Q1. We are speaking a week after India launched Operation Sindoor, hitting 9 terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The operation was in response to the Pahalgam terror attack. What is your assessment of the turn of events that unfolded this week? 

Amb Bolton: Well, I think that certainly India had a legitimate right of self-defence in retaliating against those that it had reason to believe were behind or supportive of the terrorist attacks in Kashmir. This is certainly something that’s important for any country to be able to protect its citizens who are engaged in perfectly legitimate activity, tourists in Kashmir in this case. The Indian strikes were confined to what they believed were terrorist encampments or places that assisted in the terrorist activity across the border.

So obviously, the situation escalated after that. But it looks like now there is a ceasefire in place, and I think it exemplifies why this continuing problem of terrorism is a threat to many countries.

Obviously, the United States has had more than its share even before 9/11 and thereafter. India’s been the target of major terrorist attacks, not just in Kashmir, but obviously including the Indian parliament. So this threat from terrorism remains very serious, and the countries that allow terrorists to take bases within their country and permit this kind of cross-border attack, I think it’s something that really we should get back to the level of priority in international affairs it had before.

Priorities come and go. But people who suffer terrorism, as Israel did, for example, on October 7th, 2023, and all of us understand how deadly it is and that the aim of the terrorist is far from constructive.

Q2. You were the US NSA when the Pulwama terror attack happened in 2019, and during the Balakot Strike, you and the then-secretary of state said India had the right to defend itself. What kind of communication New Delhi had with Washington, DC, then, and do you think the current US administration was hesitant to take a similar stance post-Pahalgam? 

Well, in the case of the 2019 attack, we were in Hanoi getting ready for Trump to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. But we were in contact with our colleagues in Washington at the Defence Department and NSC, and the State Department and spoke to counterparts in India and Pakistan. That situation, I think, resolved itself at a lower level after a legitimate retaliation by India against bases that the terrorists had used.

So in that case, it ended a little bit more quickly. But I think it followed much the same pattern. Before the US got more involved, JD Vance, the vice president, had said it’s ’none of our business,’ which I think was wrong. When you have friends like India and the US, which have also been friendly with Pakistan for many years, when two nuclear powers in particular are in a potentially dangerous situation, the US should be involved.

I would give credit to Vance to Secretary of State Marco Rubio , and Trump himself for helping to bring the situation to a static level and allow what looks to be now a de-escalation. So I hope JD Vance has learned the lesson that his initial comment was wrong and that the US is hoping to be helpful to both parties.

Q3. When India and Pakistan came to a ceasefire understanding after three days of military standoff, President Donald Trump was the first one to announce it on social media. Only a few days ago, VP JD Vance said what was happening between India and Pakistan was ‘not our business’. Do you think Trump rushed to take credit prematurely? 

Well, that’s something Trump does all the time, so nobody should have been surprised by it necessarily. Normally, you would have a joint statement by the parties involved to show what I think really happened behind the scenes, were military-to-military communications between the Indian military and the Pakistani military. And some of the specifics of what the ceasefire would look like, when it would begin, and how it would be implemented were really done at that level.

But as I say, that’s just Trump. When he gets involved, he’s going to make sure he gets the credit for it, whether he deserves it or not. And I did note that Pakistan said more publicly about the US role than India did. I don’t know whether that meant that the Pakistanis thought the administration had taken a more favourable line to them and were more grateful because they were in a more difficult circumstance. I don’t know. But it would be, I think, appropriate at some time for the government of India to put its observations on the record, too.

Maybe they want to do that just through private channels, which I could understand. But it would be helpful to everybody outside to know a little bit more about exactly how the deal came to be.

Q4. Let’s talk about China. What is your assessment of China in relation to the US and also India-Pakistan ties? In recent months, India and China have appeared to address their differences, and Beijing even complained about rising terrorism in Pakistan. However, after Pahalgam, it tried to shield Pakistan even at the UNSC. How do you read this pattern?

Well, I think Beijing has had hegemonic aspirations all along its Indo-Pacific perimeter. Its influence inside Pakistan has been growing in recent years. This, I think, is of enormous concern to the United States, as it is to India.

The latest statistics that I’ve seen reported in the media are that China is supplying roughly 80 per cent of Pakistan’s sophisticated weaponry. It used to be that the US was a major supplier, and the Pakistanis are still flying some US planes. But this increase in China’s role gives them a considerable amount of leverage over Pakistan, and particularly with the military in control the way they are now.

And I’m worried about that. I think that this has been a legitimate concern of India’s for a long time, given the relationship between Pakistan and India, maybe tempered somewhat when the US had a better relationship with Pakistan than it does today. Overall, between the US and China, I’d say that Trump backed down on his tariff war with Beijing. They’ve got a 90-day pause. But even the existing tariffs that remain in place, 30 per cent on the US side, 10 per cent on the Indian side, are huge by contemporary standards. And I think that will
contribute to the economic uncertainty around the world.

Trump has always wanted to make the biggest trade deal in history with China, but that won’t resolve in and of itself. That won’t resolve the problems that China’s caused in the international trading system. It’s theft of intellectual property.

It’s subsidisation of its companies in competition with foreign companies. Its failure to open the Chinese domestic market, although pledging to do so on many occasions, hasn’t happened. So those fundamental problems with China’s behaviour in international trade remain.

Q5. As you mentioned about Trump’s tariffs on China, initially, President Trump was adamant about raising the duties. Now, do you think Trump is looking more keen on reaching a trade deal with China? 

Well, I think that’s been Trump’s objective for a long time. He tried it during the first term. It didn’t work. But I think he’d love to sit down with Xi Jinping at some point and try and get something started there. We’ll see whether that comes about. I mean, I think Trump has gone to excessive lengths in launching this whole trade war.

I don’t think it’s going to work out very well for the United States. We don’t know what the economic effects are going to be, but many believe they’re going to be significantly negative. It may be that we end up returning to the world much as it looked before Trump
announced, especially the reciprocal tariffs.

But even the 10 per cent so-called baseline tariff is a huge increase over basically the average of all tariff barriers that existed before that. I think there were plenty of inequities that the US wanted to remedy in international trading on bilateral issues. But I think that could have been done in a much less damaging way than simply announcing the tariffs in the way that Trump did.

Q6. Recently, Pakistan’s Defence Minister outrightly admitted to supporting terrorism, saying his country was doing ‘dirty work’ for the US-led West. What is your experience as a former US NSA in countering the terror apparatus of Pakistan?

Well, you know, I saw that statement. I don’t know what the defence minister meant about the US role in it. Maybe he was referring to Afghanistan, which was a place where Pakistan had its own concerns.

But we’ve known for a long time that elements of the Pakistani military, especially ISI, have been supporting terrorists. We had this problem when the US and much of the international community were aiding the Afghan Mujahideen to push the Soviet Union push the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. ISI had its own agenda, and that ultimately resulted in the Taliban takeover in Pakistan after the Soviets departed, when the Afghans were trying to form an inclusive government for everyone in Afghanistan, and the Taliban was able to defeat them with the aid of elements of the Pakistani military.

So we had this problem throughout our effort to oust the Taliban and go after al-Qaeda after 9/11, and the situation hasn’t changed that much. I think from Pakistan’s own point of view, the support for terrorists has harmed it. It has kept it isolated in the international community.

It’s made international investors reluctant to go into the country. So whatever those who originated and continued this policy of support for terrorism thought, it’s not aiding Pakistan in any of its legitimate national objectives, and it’s kept Pakistan’s economy and the welfare of its people at a relatively low level. If you compare growth in the economy in India over the past 30 or 40 years to the Pakistani economy, the differences are enormous, and what that’s done is harm the average Pakistani citizen.

Q7. One reason US-India ties flourished was the de-hypenation of US ties with India and Pak. Some see President Trump’s recent statement as a ’re-hyphenation. What are you reading?

Well, I think much of the de-hyponization came after 9/11 and and I think Secretary Powell and President Bush worked hard to try and do that. And I think right now the common threat that we see, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, but really on a global basis, is the China-Russia axis. And so there’s a lot to talk about there.

I think beginning in the Trump administration, going through the Biden administration, the Asian security quad of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States is a very important forum. It’s distressing to me that Pakistan is so much under the influence of China now. Ultimately, that’s not going to be to their benefit.

We know that Pakistan got its nuclear weapons designs from China. We know that because when Libya gave up its nuclear weapons designs, they turned over to us many of the details of their would-be enrichment programme and the nuclear weapons designs they had obtained from AQ Khan, the Pakistani nuclear entrepreneur, and they were in Chinese. So, I mean, we know where that came from.

Ultimately, I think peace on the subcontinent is going to have to require an understanding between India and Pakistan. They’re the two biggest powers. That’s the reality.

And I think the interference, the continued increase of influence that China’s had over Pakistan has only made what we all know is going to be a difficult process that much harder. And the longer that’s delayed, the greater the negative effect on economic growth on the subcontinent as a whole. Ironically, as I said before, particularly for Pakistan.

Q8. President Trump is on a West Asia tour. In Saudi Arabia, an ambitious deal was signed. He met Syria’s new leader, al-Sharaa. And he has defended accepting a jet as a gift from Qatar. Your thoughts on it?

Well, I do think it’s right to look at the Middle East as a huge opportunity for the whole world. Even during the Biden administration, they talked about the trade and transportation corridor from India through the Middle East to Europe, which I think would greatly benefit everybody. And it would benefit the United States as well.

What Trump has shown is that if the Europeans don’t take advantage of the opportunity in the Middle East, our businesses are prepared to do it. And I think increasing closeness and economic ties with the US would benefit them, would benefit the U.S., would benefit India, too, if we could do the same there. You know, I think the new regime in Syria, to me anyway, has not demonstrated adequately a renunciation of terrorism.

I wouldn’t have lifted the sanctions without more action from the new regime, turning over all of the records of the Assad regime’s taking of American hostages and other foreign hostages, turning over, opening up Syria to inspection for the Assad regime’s chemical weapons, and biological weapons programmes, and a clearer commitment to permit the Kurdish inhabitants of Eastern Syria to be full participants, as with the Druze, as with the Alawites, and to show that the HTS group and the new regime are not simply agents of Turkey, which gave them a lot of assistance. So I would like to see action before lifting the terrorist sanctions. Trump’s already done that.

But now, really, I think the new government has to perform. And as for the plane, I think that already in the United States, strong supporters of Trump have criticised the decision to accept the plane. Rand Paul, the senator from Kentucky, and a number of influencers who have been
strongly supportive of Trump.

So these are not Trump critics. These are his supporters saying they don’t think it’s a good look. We’ll have to see how it turns out. I think it’s in doubt whether he’ll actually take the plane, given the level of criticism it’s brought up.

Q9. Recently, The New York Times reported that the loss of two jets forced President Trump to identify who was with the Houthis. Would you call it a policy failure? 

Well, I think it was a mistake. I don’t think this deal does much of anything. I don’t think it opens the Suez Canal Red Sea Maritime passage.

I think commercial shippers have already indicated that they still don’t think it’s safe to go through. The Houthis themselves, the day after Trump made his announcement, said the deal did not cover any ships that, in their judgment, were tied to Israel or trading with Israel. And so the reaction of commercial shippers has been that they’ve looked at their insurance rates.

They don’t think it’s safe. They’re not going to reopen it. Obviously, that’s having a devastating impact on the Egyptian economy, which depends on Suez Canal revenues.

And it’s harmed the prospect of increased trade between India and Europe because the transportation costs are still high. Moreover, I think the U.S. left Israel high and dry because, as this deal was being undertaken, the Houthis were attacking Israel, including landing a missile very near Ben Gurion International Airport, a civilian airport, Israel’s biggest. So the Houthi threat remains.

I think it was a bad move to think that we could declare a truce and just act as if it were back to business as normal, because it certainly is not.

Q10. Over the two stints of US President Trump, you remain the longest-serving NSA. Why does the President change his NSAs so frequently? In contrast, Indian PM Narendra Modi has shown consistency with NSA Ajit Doval. What would you say?

Well, Ajit Doval has been a very positive influence, I think. And I think Prime Minister Modi’s reliance on him shows that he trusts his judgement. The trouble with Trump is that he just wants people to agree with him.

And it’s not a question of trying to stop the president from doing what he wants to do, but from saying, well, Mr. President, if you thought of this fact or this fact or this fact, have you considered these options? Have you weighed the pros and cons? Ultimately, the president’s going to make the decision.

Nobody’s under any illusions about that. The question is, will he make a well-informed, well-considered decision or just one that is spur of the moment? And I think that’s the problem. I think that’s kind of fundamental to Trump’s way of acting. And I don’t see that
changing for the remainder of the second term.

Q11. Another important meeting is likely to happen between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in direct peace talks. President Trump has been pushing for it. How do you see this scene unfolding?

Well, it’s still not clear whether Putin will show up in Turkey for the meeting with Zelensky. I think most people think he will probably not go. I don’t think Trump will go, although he offered to.

So I’m not sure what will come out of this right now. I think Trump is indicating he may turn away from the ceasefire efforts. He seems unwilling to put pressure on Putin. And Putin, for his own reasons, seems to think that momentum on the battlefield in Ukraine is going in Russia’s direction. I think it would be in Russia’s interest to have a ceasefire. Putin doesn’t agree with that.

And as long as he thinks he can continue military operations without feeling additional sanctions, especially from the United States, I think he’ll continue to do it.