It’s true: Pak handlers used Indian live TV to guide gunmen

By Uttara Choudhury New York: Mumbai attack plotter David Headley told a Chicago court on Wednesday that live TV broadcasts from India gave terrorist handlers in Pakistan all the visuals they needed to instruct their gunmen on how to battle advancing Indian commandos, recalibrate the attack on the ground and inflict maximum damage. On 26 November 2008, terrorists had taken control of Mumbai’s Taj and Trident hotels, apart from the Jewish Chabad House, even while killing suburban commuters at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) in south Mumbai. TV visuals showing police and other kinds of commando deployments outside these places were believed to have helped the terrorists’ controllers in Pakistan to alert them on tactics. Headley said his Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) handler Sajid Mir, who was in Karachi, watched the live TV broadcasts, and issued constant orders to the gunmen in Mumbai who were carrying cell phones. Mir told two of the Lashkar militants exactly what to do at the Jewish centre in Nariman House. Headley said Mir alerted gunman Imran Babbar who was at the Chabad House to the arrival of Indian commandos in choppers. He told the terrorists to barricade themselves behind mattresses and ambush the commandos when they set foot in the Jewish community centre. [caption id=“attachment_15913” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“Nariman House, was one of 10 sites attacked by the terrorists during a 60-hour siege in Mumbai. Reuters”] [/caption] Six people at the Jewish centre, including  Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife, Rivka, who was five months pregnant, were tortured and killed during the Mumbai attacks by the Islamic terrorists. Headley told the Chicago court on Wednesday that he and accused Mumbai terror plotter Tahawwur Rana even heard the phone tap. “Politically there are many views about this but tactically what happened was brilliant,” Headley quoted Rana as saying after the Chabad House attack. Headley also said Rana exulted that Mir should be known as Khalid-bin-Walid, a fierce Muslim general who was a champion of Islam. Separately, guests staying at the Taj talked on phones to a TV station saying they were hiding at Taj’s private club Chambers. Within moments, handlers watching in Pakistan appeared to have alerted the terrorists, and a hail of bullets was fired at Chambers. As widely anticipated, when Headley was cross-examined by Rana’s lawyer Charles Swift, he began chipping away at Headley’s credibility, grilling him about his propensity for using Rana for illegal activities without really telling him the whole truth. Headley admitted that when he visited Rana in Pakistan in 1984, he took the military doctor to a tribal region so he could smuggle heroin, but he never told Rana drugs were involved in the trip. He just took him on the trip as insurance that he wouldn’t be searched by the police as he was travelling with a military doctor. “He was your friend but he didn’t do what you were doing,” Swift said. “No,” Headley replied. Swift then pulled up a stack of emails and asked Headley if he was in the habit of compartmentalising information, especially if it had anything to do with Rana, his ISI handler Major Iqbal and the Lashkar. “Yes,” Headley answered. “You did well in espionage school,”  Swift responded. “Thank you,” Headley replied with a ghost of a smile. Headley told the jury  that he received intelligence, reconnaissance and espionage training, through Iqbal, from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.