Is China signalling a new approach on border dispute?

By Bhaskar Roy At the recent BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa, new Chinese President Xi Jinping told Xinhua news agency that “China and India should improve and make good use of the mechanism of Special Representatives to strive for a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon as possible.” Xi Jinping is the most powerful man in China today, and heads the Communist Party of China. He is also the supreme head of the military. Xi is the first top Chinese leader who is also the son of a leading revolutionary: his father Xi Zhongxun fought on the side of Mao Zedong during the revolutionary years and also worked with Deng Xiaoping to redirect China’s course from revolution to reform and opening up to the outside world in quest of economic development and rejuvenation. Xi Jinping is, in that sense, a “princeling”.[caption id=“attachment_706938” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] China President Xi Jinping. AFP[/caption] People in China expect Xi to break away from the old, rigid economic and political thinking. Overseas observers too are watching him very closely, particularly for glimpes of new thinking and controlling the PLA hawks. In India, the main question is whether Beijing under Xi Jinping is willing to shift from its rigid position on the border issue and steer a new road where there is real adjustment. To note, Xi is the only person in the Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee who has an understanding of foreign-cum-strategic policy. The old foreign policy interlocutors retired in March, and new incumbents with experience have replaced them, but few of them have a grip on Indian affairs. On the border/territorial issues, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a major say, especially on territory and strategic alignment. The Party Central Committee group on foreign relations, however, holds a nationalistic position. Contrast Xi’s position on the border issue in Durban with  his statement on the same issue on March 19 in Beijing, when he addressed journalists from BRICS countries. On the earlier occasion, Xi had said: “The boundary question is a complex issue left over from history, and solving the issue won’t be easy.” This was not only a reiteration of the old position, in some ways it was even worse. The words “won’t be easy” suggested a kind of frustration, especially with the 2005 agreement between the two sides at the Prime Ministerial level on modalities for resolution of the border issue. The 2005 agreement said that there would be no exchange of “settled population” territories. Wen Jiabao was the Chinese Premier then, and signed the agreement in New Delhi. Did he agree to a fair and rational position? Subsequently, Premier Wen had taken strong positions on China’s internal politics, supporting political reforms to the extent of warning that without it the country could revert to “Cultural Revolution”. He appeared to be a man of rational pragmatic thinking. The Chinese authorities or their interlocutors dug in their heels later. They wanted Tawang, a settled population territory of India and strategically located to deny the PLA easy pincer strike to cut off India’s North East from the mainland. No public elaboration has come either from China’s foreign ministry or the official media on Xi’s Durban statement for a “fair, rational framework” acceptable to both sides “as soon as possible”. There are two aspects of Xi statement that need to be analysed. The first relates to the phrase “as soon as possible”, which conveys an effort to discard his earlier position that it “won’t be easy” and it will “take a long time”. Second, there was no mention of the complex issue “left over from history”, which represents a departure from the position that had been heard for decades. What changed between March 19 and March 27? This is very difficult to assess. At the same time, if there is a substantive change in this very short time, it may mean that Xi may be introducing a new orientation in China’s foreign policy making. Have Xi Jinping’s advisors understood that they cannot get Tawang? The Indian side is aware that it cannot get Aksai Chin. From the Indian side it may be conceded that the offer from China at the highest level is genuine, and work from there. From the 1950s onwards, both sides have wasted opportunities to settle the border issue. Let not Indian political parties take an ultranationalist stand to score domestic political points that not “an inch” of Indian Territory can be bartered away. Legislation is overdue in Parliament to correct the earlier wrongs. In any boundary negotiation, there will be some give-and-take of territory, but not against national interests. Each country has its domestic constituency to satisfy. At the same time, there should not be any hurry. It is obvious that Special Representative-level talks are going to be energised soon. A lot of work will have to be done. To begin with, the exchange of maps of the western and eastern sectors. There will be regional and global strings attached to any border agreement. India has to insist, if such issues come up, to reject them. The border resolution has to be a clear deal and cannot be linked with India-US relations, India-Vietnam relations, India-Japan relations or new core interests that Beijing may present. South China must remain an open international shipping lane. India is not interested in containing China in any way, and Beijing must stop meddling in India’s neighbourhood. Tibet is a declared core issue for China, and India respects that. But the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhists go far beyond the Marxist concept of religion and humanity. These are worth bearing in mind when any border agreement is finalised. Bhaskar Roy is a New Delhi-based strategic analyst. Republished with permission from the Chennai Centre for China Studies.