In a rare visit, a delegation of American lawmakers visited Himachal Pradesh’s Dharamshala this week to meet the Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama.
In a well-orchestrated convergence of mutual interests, the United States, the Tibetans in exile, and Indians with their nod to the visit came together to send a message to China. The message found its mark.
Shortly after the US delegation comprising House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul and Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi began their engagements with Tibet’s Government-in-Exile, the Embassy of China in India warned the United States to not “send the wrong signal”.
“We urge the US side to fully recognise the anti-China separatist nature of the Dalai group, honour the commitments the US has made to China on issues related to Xizang, stop sending the wrong signal to the world,” said the Chinese mission in a post on X (formerly Twitter).
The post used the Bejing-imposed name Xizang for Tibet as part of its practice of renaming minority-populated regions in China to undermine their history identity and culture.
A group of senior US lawmakers including former House speaker Nancy Pelosi met the spiritual leader Dalai Lama at his monastery in India. The delegation stated that it would not let China influence the choice of the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader’s successor. pic.twitter.com/NOCBoLEoLJ
— Firstpost (@firstpost) June 20, 2024
The Dalai Lama arrived in India in 1959 along with a large number of his followers. He had fled for his life from Tibet’s capital Lhasa following the failure of an uprising against the Chinese repression in the region. The Communist Party of China’s (CPC) forces had invaded and captured Tibet in 1949-50. Since the Dalai Lama’s arrival, China has denounced his presence and has consistently sought to undermine the movement he and his fellow exiles have waged.
Following the engagements in Dharamshala, the US delegation led by McCaul met Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar, and National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval on Thursday. It rested all doubts as to whether the visit had New Delhi’s approval.
Had a very good exchange of views with friends from the US Congress in a delegation led by @RepMcCaul, Chairman of @HouseForeignGOP. Deeply value the strong bipartisan support in advancing India- US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership.@RepMMM @RepBera @NMalliotakis… pic.twitter.com/qSElM0z2bt
— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) June 20, 2024
The convergence of India and the United States is part of the message to China that if you do not respect our sensibilities, we would not respect yours. It is not sudden but in the making since 2020 when China inexplicably plunged the bilateral relationship to its lowest since 1962 with a confrontation in Ladakh. For a long time before that, sections in the government and outside tracking China had questioned the rationale of respecting China’s red lines with no reciprocity.
The India-China relationship has lacked mutual respect from the onset, says Tej Pratap Singh, a scholar of China at the Banaras Hindu University (BHU).
“In 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel treaty. China still attacked India in 1962. Then, India unilaterally revived the relationship in 1976 by restoring ambassador-level ties and then Rajiv Gandhi made a historic visit to China in 1988. In 2003, Atal Bihari Vajpayee formalised the acceptance of the One China Policy. In all these years, China never offered any reciprocity despite all the concessions from India. China neither settled the border nor acknowledged historical agreements. Instead, it opened a new front in Sikkim and waded into the Kashmir issue,” says Singh, Professor, Department of Political Science, BHU.
Ladakh stand-off a watershed moment for India-China ties
Despite the then-External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj telling her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in 2014 that just as India accepted the One China Policy, India expected China to go by a One India Policy, the Modi government accommodated Chinese concerns for years.
Until 2020, Modi invested heavily in managing ties with China. India did not overtly engage with Taiwan or Tibetans. Modi’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2014 was very low-profile and Tibetans’ events were shifted from New Delhi to Dharamshala in 2018-19 as Modi reached out to Xi repeatedly. Two summits were held in China’s Wuhan and Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu — ‘Wuhan Spirit’ was the buzzword.
Even as India continued to try to accommodate China, there was no reciprocity. When Chinese President Xi Jinping first visited India in 2014, the visit overlapped with a Chinese military incursion in Ladakh. Then, in 2017, China waged a stand-off in Doklam at the India-China-Bhutan trijunction. China also opened a fresh flashpoint at the Sikkim border that was otherwise considered settled.
Even that did not make India turn too hawkish. The shift only came in 2020 when China mounted incursions after incursions in Ladakh and Sikkim. The paradigm shift was cemented on June 15, 2020, when the Chinese killed at least 20 Indian soldiers in a clash in Galwan Valley in Ladakh’s east.
Following the Ladakh stand-off, the Modi government blocked Chinese telecommunication firms like Huawei from the roll-out of the 5G network in the country. It blocked Chinese investments, mergers, and acquisitions, and clamped down on the Chinese companies operating in the country — Chinese apps were banned, loan apps were brought under the scanner, and companies like Vivo and Oppo were pushed to sell majority stakes of India units to Indian companies.
For the first time, India acknowledged the existence of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), one of the shadowiest Indian special forces rooted in the India-China conflict and staffed by Tibetans in exile in large numbers. The official engagement with the Tibetans also increased following the Ladakh stand-off.
#VantageOnFirstpost: Indian Prime Minister @NarendraModi hosted the visiting US delegation, after their meeting with the @DalaiLama yesterday.
— Firstpost (@firstpost) June 21, 2024
What signal is New Delhi trying to send on the Tibet issue? @Palkisu tells you. pic.twitter.com/ZblBDlgaIG
In 2021, Modi publicly wished the Dalai Lama for the first time in many years and has continued to do so every year since. In the years since, the Indian military has facilitated the Dalai Lama’s visit to Ladakh and flown him into the region —claimed by China bordering his homeland of Tibet— in military helicopters. Top officials like governors and chief ministers have met him and the Indian leaders have increasingly referred to the border with China as the India-Tibet border —which it actually is— instead of the India-China border.
During the Ladakh stand-off, videos were also released of Tibetans tying the ‘khata’ —the sacred white Tibetan sash— on vehicles of Indian Army and SFF that were carrying troops for deployment to the frontlines.
While the engagement with the Tibetans picked up pace, India also ramped up cautious engagement with Taiwan as China also became aggressive by the day regarding the self-ruled island and increased military provocations there.
Since 2020, there has been a recognition of the reality that India does have some levers that it can pull regarding China to signal that respect for sensibilities cannot be a one-way street, says Manoj Kewalramani, a China scholar at the Takshashila Institution and author of the book Smokeless War: China’s Quest for Global Primacy.
“Since 2020, India has been telling China that we can indeed pull some levers on issues that concern you. The idea is that if you do not accept our concerns, we will not accept yours. The US delegation’s meeting with the Dalai Lama is also part of the signalling to China that if you worsen the relationship by ratcheting up disputes, we can also rake up stuff that you may otherwise consider settled. This may include giving foreign governments a platform to engage with the Tibetan ‘separatist’ movement,” says Kewalramani.
While the post-2020 approach to China is indeed a paradigm shift, there is also an element of continuity. Even though India formally accepts the One China Policy, India has not iterated that since 2009. The idea is that One China will be only iterated if the other side iterates One India, as Swaraj told Yi in 2014.
Is India playing the ‘Tibet Card’ — again?
The commentary on Tibet ranges from it being a non-issue to it being one of the central issues in the India-China relationship. Kewalrami says it’s is a knob for New Delhi that it can turn up or down as per the situation.
“The real question is not if India is playing the Tibet card or not. The question is what’s the endgame from turning up the knob now. Does New Delhi feel the Tibet issue gives it enough leverage? That does not seem likely. But turning up the knob now can definitely lead to annoyance and friction for China and undermining the Chinese narrative. That way, the moves regarding the Tibetans can be meaningful,” says Kewalramani, a Chinese Studies Fellow and the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution.
This time, India is not playing the card alone. It is joined by the United States. Even though the American interest in Tibet may look sudden and sceptics of the US foreign policy may flinch at the India-US convergence, neither of them is new.
Since the 1950s, the United States and India have been engaged on the issue of Tibet. Initially, the United States tried to rope in India to mount a united response to the Tibet question. The United States also supported Tibetan guerillas against the Communist regime of Beijing and, following the India-China War of 1962, helped India enlist Tibetans in the SFF and supported India militarily.
In her book Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War, Tanvi Madan noted that while the United States was willing to address the Tibet issue in early 1950s, it was not willing to do it without India and was wary of spillovers.
“But, while Washington was willing to encourage Tibet’s leaders and its autonomy in spirit, it was unwilling to act alone to provide military or financial assistance or appoint official representatives to Tibet. Acheson [US Secretary of State] maintained that India had the primary responsibility to help Tibet…Furthermore, like Britain and India, the US was concerned about any spillover impact on the Korean situation — the reason why it would not promise a specific response to a potential Tibetan appeal to the UN,” noted Madan, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Asia Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution.
The book also quoted the US Department of State saying at the time: “Tibet as a weapon for alerting GOI [Government of India] to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist Govt and, specifically, for manoeuvring GOI into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.”
As was the case in 1950-60s, the US outreach to India over Tibet is part of a broader geopolitical contest. While the contest was with the global Communism in the Cold War, the United States is now in competition with China — some see it as one of democracy versus autocracies.
“For the past few years, the United States has witnessed an increased focus on Tibet about real autonomy for the region. There is also a sense in the United States of an existential clash with China. This is what’s leading to the increased India-US convergence on China and the moves regarding Tibet are part of the bigger response to rising and aggressive China,” says Kewalramani.
Even as India and the United States appear to be playing the Tibet Card jointly, some critics question the utility and even the existence of such a card. Former Indian diplomat Phunchok Stobdan has argued that there has never been a Tibet card as India and the United States both accept the One China Policy, Tibet itself has accepted Chinese sovereignty, and the Dalai Lama’s establishment is also eager to make a deal with China than waging an overt conflict.
In his book The Great Game in Buddhist Himalayas: India and China’s Quest for Strategic Dominance, Stobdan further flagged that the US involvement brings harm instead of benefits. He wrote, “The Dalai Lama and the ‘Tibet Card’ are Cold War-era relics. The issue has been kept alive for almost six decades, mainly due to the games being played, some at the behest of Western powers. The Dalai Lama and Tibet ‘cards’ have not served any deterrent purposes for India; rather, they have prolonged mutual suspicion and hostility with China.”
While the extent of the leverage the Tibet Card gives India is up for debate, Kewalramani tells Firstpost that the idea is to keep the wound open.
“If you keep the wound open, the Tibet question in this case, then who knows where it leads someday? Maybe, nothing may happen today, but who knows what the card might yield in the future? So, you don’t put a lid on the issue,” says Kewalramani.
India has upped the ante with China
When Modi and Jaishankar met the US Congressional delegation, the gloves came off. The speculation by some on social media that the delegation had gone rogue with their statements was settled and New Delhi’s approval of the visit was for all to see.
Kewalramani says that India is playing a high-risk game now considering China too holds levers against India.
“Even as India has been shifting its policies regarding China since 2020, it has done so very carefully. India does not speak about Xinjiang. India is very cautious about Taiwan and has issued very cautious and few statements in recent years. So, India’s actions with China are very calculated. These moves regarding Tibet with the United States, however, mark a shift to a high-risk approach,” says Kewalramani.
#WATCH | Himachal Pradesh: Former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi says "...His Holiness Dalai Lama, with his message of knowledge, tradition, compassion, purity of soul and love, will live a long time and his legacy will live forever. But you, the President of China, you'll be gone… pic.twitter.com/zf4GP5W4g6
— ANI (@ANI) June 19, 2024
Even as the United States is on the same page for now with India on Tibet, there are doubts in some quarters whether that’s going to last. Singh, the China scholar at BHU, highlights that the United States backed India on China and Tibet in 1950-60s but it petered out by 1970 and the United States was on the other side entirely in 1970s.
“The US policy on Tibet has been patchy, but now that China is the main US adversary, which is also the case with India, the two countries may have much more lasting convergence than in the 1950-60s on Tibet as the Tibet Card can be part of the broader efforts to contain China,” says Singh.
As far as the policy shift’s risks are considered, Singh tells Firstpost that being risk-averse has not paid India over the years. He argues that the more anyone accommodates China, the more belligerent China becomes. Citing the case of the failed Western bet on bringing China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and legitimising it internationally with the hope that it would liberalise the country, Singh says softness with China has never paid off.
“India has always been reactive with China. It has never been proactive. Even as there has been a shift in the past few years, India is still not properly proactive. But there is at least much more sharpness in the reactions now. The hope is that this will evolve into a proactive policy. As for the risks, you need to take risks. Otherwise, you don’t even have a chance at making gains,” says Singh.