How the brinkmanship of its rulers could make Turkey a hub of Islamic State

Much has been said about how the British bombing of Islamic State (IS) in Syria could generate anti-West hate, and thus help more than damage IS. Perhaps not enough has been said, however, about the even greater dangers of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent brinkmanship. Being so much closer to IS than Russia, France or Britain, the road Erdogan has taken might even allow his country, in many ways the crossroads of the world, to be partially overtaken by the terrorist organisation.

The consequences of that could be catastrophic, for Turkey is the gateway to Europe – a fact of which the Turkish establishment is keenly aware. In fact, Turkey startlingly tried to turn its attack against the Russian air force into a ticket to the European Union. As soon as it brought down a Russian warplane for intrusion into its airspace, Turkey’s prime minister declared that there was no better moment for Turkey to join the EU.

Turkey has almost certainly overplayed the Cold War card. Taking on Russia might have pleased the West, even have been covertly backed. But the president risks isolating Turkey by calling down the wrath of a resurgent Russia while remaining shut out of the EU.

He must realise that the detention of Turkey’s most respected editor made as great an impact on global public opinion as the revelations over which the editor was detained – that Turkey is covertly aiding Islamic State. In fact, there are insistent rumours that Erdogan’s son is involved in the covert oil smuggling from Syria by Islamic State.

To be sure, including Turkey in the European Union would have been an excellent idea two decades ago, when it was seriously considered and negotiated. Deep down, the real reason why it was not allowed was the subliminal wariness in the mind of European policymakers about diluting what they perceived as Europe’s essentially Christian character. Including Turkey would have changed that identity.

That is precisely why it would have been a good idea. It could have leavened the polarisation the world has since experienced. However, now that that polarisation is far advanced, it is extremely unlikely that Europe will change tack. In fact, there is a debate in the UK about whether it should remain in the Union.

Turkey is already pretty isolated with regard to geostrategic objectives. It remains far more committed to regime-change in Syria than other major powers now are. The real danger to Assad’s regime was in the couple of months immediately following the Iran deal in June. By then, Russia’s preparations to come to his assistance militarily were already well on the way.

Now, the US seems to be willing to brook President Assad’s continuance in power. A significant section of Israel’s policy establishment takes the view that, given the experience of regime-change in Iraq and Libya, allowing Assad to continue is better than risking ‘an unknown devil’. Assad remains Iran’s favourite. And of course, Russia has openly gone to Assad’s defence.

In the multiple wars that are being waged on the soil of Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s objectives are the most complex – for they are based on sociological enmities as much as geopolitical ones. Kurdish control over some territory in both Syria and Iraq upsets Erdogan more than IS’s control of territories in both.

After Britain and France drew nation-state borders in what they called the Near and Middle East after the World War I, the ethnic Kurd population was spread over parts of five countries, including Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Kurdish political mobilisation in the Turkish elections early this year brought down Erdogan’s party (although he remained president) until fresh elections a few months later reversed that political upset. Turkish Kurds often feel alienated from the state. Many Turkish Kurds prefer to identify themselves as being from Kurdistan (a country they hope to establish) rather than from Turkey.

The Kurdish militia is strongly resisting Islamic State in Syria. On the other hand, there have been many straws in the wind over the past couple of years that the Turkish state and Erdogan’s own family have supported Islamic State with supplies, safe routes for materials and fighters from Europe who want to join its ranks, communication – and, it now appears, a black market for Islamic State’s most lucrative resource, oil.

For the future of Turkey, not to speak of the rest of the world, President Erdogan must urgently find a way to bind together the peoples of his many-splendoured country. He must then find a way to forge stable ties with his neighbours to the south, east and north. Alienating them all might leave him in the arms of a force that has horrified the world, and which could permanently damage Turkey’s amazing historical and cultural heritage.