How better India-China ties are a greater necessity than a choice

After Beijing’s ‘appreciation’ of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement emphasising historic ties and contributions of India and China, putting it as pas de deux (delicate dance) of the elephant and the dragon, Sino-Indian relations have taken a step forward from the frosty aftermath of the 2020 Galwan clash.

These statements echo the spirit of Kazan, where Chinese President Xi Jinping and PM Modi met in Russia during the BRICS summit last October, following the landmark announcement of a patrolling agreement between India and China in Depsang and Demchok along the Line of Actual Control.

The same spirit was reflected when, in February, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in Johannesburg, South Africa, on the sidelines of a G20 meeting. Before that, India’s economic survey for 2023-24, released in July last year, had made a strong case for seeking foreign direct investments (FDI) from China to boost local manufacturing and tap the export market.

However, the impact of all these are yet to hit ground zero. Like in January, the two countries agreed to resume direct flights and facilitate personnel exchanges and mutual dispatch of journalists between the two countries, but the same is yet to materialise.

In February, the Defence Ministry cancelled a contract for 400 drones, citing concerns over the use of Chinese components. Also, despite the talks of allowing Chinese investments going around the policy circles, tangible outcomes are yet to be delivered.

China seeks to keep boundary questions separate from trade and people-to-people exchanges. However, India was rightly adamant that bilateral relations cannot be compartmentalised and that the boundary question is integral to the larger metrics of Sino-Indian ties. Perhaps this facilitated the reaching of the aforementioned patrolling agreement.

Also, the time lag in implementing the talks on the ground is justified on the Indian side, considering past experiences, such as the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai of the 1950s or the Wuhan spirit (2018) that only culminated in the Galwan clash of 2020.

Even this time, India has strongly objected to China’s creation of two new counties in the Hotan prefecture of Xinjiang, which include areas within India’s union territory of Ladakh. Minister of State for External Affairs, Kirti Vardhan Singh in a written response to parliament on Friday, stated: “The government of India has never accepted the illegal Chinese occupation of Indian territory in this area."

Once again, the familiar pattern repeats itself: talks are followed by China’s incremental encroachment on Indian territories, suggesting that Beijing seeks to have it both ways. Such incidents are likely to derail the efforts for thaw in India-China relations, as New Delhi rightly insists that mutual respect of territorial sovereignty is integral to bilateral cooperation.

India cannot compromise its interests in the name of ‘Asian solidarity’, especially when China continues to employ its salami-slicing tactics, despite diplomatic overtures. This is why India is cautious about advancing trade and people-to-people exchanges with China. If Beijing wants to tap into India’s lucrative markets, it needs to make more meaningful gestures, particularly in light of the ‘China plus one’ strategy gaining traction in the West and the looming threat of US tariffs.

But for both the Asian giants, despite India’s legitimate concerns, good ties are more a necessity than a choice. Whether it may be countering the hegemony of West-dominated global financial institutions, questions of global commons and climate change, the West’s sermons or commentary on domestic policies, or the outlook towards multipolarity, leading the Global South – India and China have much ground to cooperate rather than contradict.

Albeit, the debates of including China, the second-largest economy and technological and manufacturing great power with superpower aspirations, in the Global South are quite valid, yet Beijing’s footprint and the support from the countries of the Global South are too heavy to write off.

Beyond this, the adage ‘Geography is destiny’ holds true. Contrary to the Chinese narrative, India and China were not historically direct neighbours. It was only after China’s annexation of Tibet (1950-51) that the two civilisations found themselves in such close geographical proximity. Now, as neighbours, India and China must coexist, and given the high stakes, finding a harmonious balance is crucial.

If the Kazan meeting may have showcased options to the sermonising US-led West, recent ‘elephant-dragon ballet’ shows careful navigation of choppy waters of changing world order under Trump 2.0.

While Trump’s tariff threats may haunt India and, to an even greater extent, China, there’s a growing realisation that under Donald Trump’s presidency, the US will adopt a more transactional approach than ever before, even since World War II. This shift is expected to redefine not only transatlantic ties but also Indo-Pacific relationships, emphasising strict transactional relevance.

If Trump has made a reset with Russia, many experts relate it to the Trump administration’s will to counter China, but unlike his predecessor Joe Biden, who called Xi Jinping a ‘dictator’, Trump considers the Chinese president a ‘friend’. Recent statements from Trump suggest we can expect Xi in Washington soon; only Friday, the news came that direct talks between the two presidents can be held soon.

Although Trump’s claim of a ‘trillion-dollar deficit’ with China is exaggerated, as quoted by CNN , the official federal figures show the 2024 deficit with China in goods and services trade was $263.3 billion. But still, Trump wants to abridge this gap as much as possible and gain a competitive edge over China in innovation and trade balances. Beyond this, Trump has not made clear the same ideological or human rights orientations which his Democrat predecessor had while dealing with China.

Recently, regarding the question of whether the US would ever allow China to take control of Taiwan by force, Trump refused to answer , stating that he will ‘never comment’ on that. Later his Secretary of State Marco Rubio indeed clarified the president’s statement, stating Trump is opposed to any change to Taiwan’s “status quo” by force or extortion. Rubio’s statement is quite assuring, yet the incident says many things about the priorities of the American president.

In these times, when the global order is becoming increasingly transactional, a middle power like India that aspires for growth and peace is well playing a delicate dance of diplomacy, which is neither completely confirming nor overtly confrontational to the interests of any great power, whether that may be Washington, Beijing or Moscow. India’s interests and policies are well embedded in national interests, due to which New Delhi treads carefully where fools rush.

India’s diplomatic approach is reminiscent of the wise words of Kabir, the mediaeval Indian devotional mystic poet and saint, who said:

कबीरा खड़ा बाज़ार में, मांगे सबकी खैर,

ना काहू से दोस्ती,न काहू से बैर।

Kabir, standing in the marketplace, wishes well-being for all; he cultivates no excessive attachments for anyone, nor has he any animosity for someone.

Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.