Five myths about Pakistan

The triumphal moment is past, as is the exultant relief of emotional closure. What is left is a big, thorny question mark over US foreign policy, or more specifically its policy toward Pakistan. Within the contentious debate over Islamabad lie the faultlines of a new rift between the Democratic party left and their opponents to the centre-right. A rift that became painfully apparent when California senator Diane Feinstein broke ranks with the top two leaders – John Kerry and Dick Lugar – of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to question continuing US aid to Pakistan. “Either we’re going to be allies in fighting terror, or the relationship makes less and less sense to me,” she said much to the discomfort of her senior colleagues.  A sentiment echoed more strongly by senator Frank Lautenberg, who declared, “Before we send another dime, we need to know whether Pakistan truly stands with us in the fight against terrorism.” No doubt much of this is music to New Delhi’s ears. The implications of Osama’s presence in Pakistan has become a matter of interpretation. Looked in one light, it indicates a violation of trust by a trusted ally. And if this first view becomes conventional wisdom, then the policy going forward will inevitably be far less carrot and a much bigger stick. But there is a strong case to be made for continued US engagement with Pakistan – at least in terms of its own long-term interests. The name that most often pops up in liberal essays making that case is that of Anatol Lieven. The former Times (London) reporter’s recent book (released this month in India) Pakistan: A Hard Country (Penguin, Rs 425) has been widely praised as “a mature antidote to the neo-conservative ‘cut them adrift’ policy.” Lieven’s core argument about Pakistan consists of five basic theses, and all of them are likely to raise eyebrows (to put it mildly) on this side of the border. Thesis number one: Pakistan is not a failed or even a failing state. It may be weak, but nowhere close to imminent collapse: “If Pakistan were an Indian state, then in terms of development, order and per capita income it would find itself somewhere in the middle, considerably below Karnataka but considerably above Bihar.” As for chaos and instability, he carries the provocative comparison further, arguing: “…India too has faced repeated rebellions in different parts of its territory, some of them lasting for generations… [T]he Naxalite Maoist insurgency affects a third of India’s districts and effectively controls huge areas of the Indian countryside – a far greater proportion of India than the proportion of Pakistan ever controlled by the Pakistani Taliban.” (Before we all jump up in collective outrage, Lieven’s attempt to equate Pakistan to its neighbours have been mostly greeted with skepticism except in some cases as in  Pankaj Misra.) Two, contrary to the hue and cry raised over the prospect of Pakistan turning into a “mullah” state, Islamic fundamentalism enjoys very little support amongst the larger population. Most Pakistanis are more likely to support the Afghan Taliban – as resisting US occupation – than their local counterparts. “In many ways, terrorism by the Pakistani Taleban is a sign not of strength but weakness,” writes Lieven, “If you want to overthrow and capture a state, you need either a mass movement on city streets… or a guerilla movement in the countryside … or a revolt of the junior ranks of the military, or some combination of all three.” The book claims that Islamic extremists neither enjoy support in the cities or among the peasants, and certainly not within the military. Hence the army’s greater willingness to come down hard on the Pakistani Taliban – in Swat and south Waziristan – than Afghan strongholds in other parts of the country. Three, one of the few scenarios that will strengthen extremism is the direct intrusion of the United States into Pakistani territory. The book argues even the drone attacks – widely praised in India and the United States as a strategic military tool – are counterproductive and dangerous. Lieven cites a WikiLeaks cable from US Ambassador Anne Patterson that warns: “Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk destabilising the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis without finally achieving the goal [of eliminating Al Qaeda or Taleban leaders.” More relevant – given recent events and rumours of a future strike to take out Mullah Omar – is Lieven’s claim that the presence of US special forces on the ground in Pakistan – however limited – is likely to be disastrous: “I have been told by soldiers of all ranks that faced by open incursions on the ground by US troops, parts of the Pakistani army would mutiny in order to fight the invaders.” And lead inevitably to the prospect of civil war. Four, since US presence in Afghanistan exacerbates anti-US sentiment in Pakistan, strengthens their sympathy for the Afghan Taliban, and weakens the military’s ability to crackdown on homegrown extremism, the best bet for the United States and NATO is to withdraw. And to do so, using Pakistan as a broker to mediate a deal with the Taliban. One of the greatest stumbling blocks in the US-Pakistan relationship is India – not only because of the dispute over Kashmir, but also over India’s current involvement in Afghanistan. Here again Lieven cites a Patterson cable: “Increased Indian investment in, trade with, and development support to the Afghan government, which the USG [US government] has encouraged, causes Pakistan to embrace Taliban groups as anti-India allies. We need to reassess Indian involvement in Afghanistan and our own policies towards India.” [caption id=“attachment_7441” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“Demolished school In Mingora City Swat after an army operation. Photo by Kashif Mardani”]  [/caption] What both Patterson and Lieven leave unsaid – but strongly imply – is that the solution to US woes in Afghanistan may lie in installing an anti-India Taliban regime that will satisfy Pakistan’s fears. All of which leads to Lieven’s fifth and most provocative conclusion that Pakistan is more critical to the security interests of the United States and the West in the subcontinent – more so than either Afghanistan or India. And these security interests far outweigh any economic interest served by the alliance with India. Better to ’lose’ the war and alienate New Delhi than run the risk of pushing Pakistan over the brink into civil war: “Not even the greatest imaginable benefits of US-Indian friendship could compensate for the actual collapse of Pakistan, with all the frightful dangers this would create not just for the West, but for India too.” Whatever our views on Lieven’s theses, a number of them are likely to find greater circulation as Americans start to push for an end to an unpopular war. Republican senator Dick Lugar, defending financial aid to Pakistan on CNN, offered up a garbled version of the same: “As a matter of fact, Pakistan is a critical factor in the war against terror, our war, the world’s war against it, simply because there are a lot of terrorists in Pakistan.” The tangled relationship between the conflict in Afghanistan, battle against terrorism, and the precarious alliance with Pakistan presents almost no good options to the United States. And that can’t be good news for the rest of us in India. Note: You can read parts of Lieven’s thesis about Pakistan in his Chatham House lecture delivered back in 2007.