Don’t believe the hype: What Russia selling helicopters to Pak is actually about

A deal signed in June 2014, is now set to fructify with Russia sending Pakistan a draft contract on the delivery of four Mil Mi-35M (Hind E) helicopters for an undisclosed fee. When signed, the deal that represented a departure from Cold War equations that saw Moscow and Islamabad on opposing sides, even as the new Cold War was slowly hotting up to the West of Russia, caused a fair bit of consternation in India. In what is now a very real scenario, these helicopters will augment Pakistan’s fleet that already contains several Mi-17 helicopters provided by the US, including four donated as recently as 2009. Should the Ministry of External Affairs summon Russian ambassador Alexander Kadakin? Should New Delhi send Moscow a sternly-worded advisory? [caption id=“attachment_2402494” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] Representational image. Reuters[/caption] Or should India call for a review (better yet, cancellation) of the Memoranda of Understanding inked during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in December last year? The answer is no, no and for heaven’s sake, no. At first glance, the prospect of Russia — having lifted its decades-long embargo on selling arms to Pakistan last year — arming Pakistan with attack helicopters built for “ round-the-clock combat use” is daunting, worrying even. Further, descriptions of this sale as a portrayal of the “ changing priorities of Moscow”, or the consequence of a “ cold-shouldered response to Moscow by New Delhi” almost make it sound like a major betrayal. This is where a bit of context and perspective is useful. Firstly, the message (if any) from Moscow to New Delhi is likely to be a Godfather-esque “It’s not personal, it’s business”. Sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and European Union in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, have left its economy in tatters. According to Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, the financial fallout of the Ukraine crisis has been $106 billion. Russia’s foreign trade had dropped by 30% in the first couple of months in 2015, largely due to a reduction by over a third of trade with the EU. Exacerbating the country’s 40% decline in energy trade is the fact that the global oil price has dropped from $102 per barrel at the start of the Ukraine crisis in November 2013, to a little over $40 per barrel at present. This situation has led to Russia seeking to diversify its export basket. Secondly, the deal is as much about geopolitics as business, and a shift in Russia’s South Asia policy is very much in effect. But it’s not quite as simplistic as the narrative doing the rounds that “India’s decision to enter into tighter embrace with the US had prompted Russia to rethink its defence relationship with Pakistan”. A few other trends need to be taken into consideration. The growing proximity between India and the US, marked most recently by Prime Minister Narendra Modi joining an elite club (that includes Putin) with a hotline to US President Barack Obama , is merely one factor. Another is the fact that the increasing hostilities between the US and Russia on one hand, and the US and China on the other, have pushed Moscow closer to Beijing. Meanwhile, the US and Pakistan have been gradually distancing themselves from each other, with Washington threatening to suspend military aid, and Islamabad pushing back against claims that Pakistan is an American client state. And finally, the drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan, although slowed down, is right around the corner. What all this boils down to is the opportunity in Afghanistan. Through the mechanism of the Murree Peace Process, China and Pakistan have been attempting to define their space in Afghanistan. By pivoting towards China and expanding relations with Pakistan, Russia is trying to create strategic space for itself in Kabul. In fact, the theory that Russia’s proximity to Pakistan and support for its membership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is linked to Islamambad’s influence in Afghanistan, cannot be ruled out completely. Apart from being able to curb the outflow of terrorism and narcotics from the country, influence in Afghanistan is a way for Russia to bridge its Central Asia and South Asia policies. Thirdly, an escalation of antagonism in India-Pakistan relations is highly unlikely to be in the best interests of Russia. The SCO becoming a casualty of India-Pakistan hostility — like SAARC has become — is highly undesirable to Russia, and much less so if Moscow is to be fuelling it. Furthermore, it would undermine the status of the SCO, which has in some circles been referred to as the “ Nato of the East”, particularly in the eyes of the real Nato. Amidst all this, there is a concern that this new bonhomie could feed into the growing closeness between Saudi Arabia and Russia (with Riyadh set to invest $10 billion in Russia, and Moscow willing to sell Iskander tactical missile systems to Saudi Arabia). In turn, this could set off a Russia-Saudi Arabia-China-Pakistan nexus in the region that will not augur well for India. For now though, New Delhi should be watchful, but not read too much into the sale of helicopters and let paranoia infect historically close relations with Moscow. But, Russia’s deputy prime minister Olegovich Rogozin would do well to keep a handkerchief close at hand. Particularly after his statement last year that Russia would never create trouble for India in the region by arming its enemies, following which he added, “If someone says otherwise, spit in his face”.