Does China really want to be part of Pakistan-designed anti-India axis with Turkey?

Veterans say foreign policy and diplomacy are ever evolving domain of governance. The ongoing tension following a 4-day military clash with Pakistan has seen India step up its diplomatic efforts to counter a narrative that Islamabad has been trying to build. This also stems from an apparent frustration with both UNSC veto member China and Nato member Turkey, the two countries that have backed Pakistan terror outfit it has backed for long carried out an attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam. Twenty-six people were killed, 25 of them were shot dead by terrorists after ascertaining their religious identiies.

Several world leaders, experts and geopolitical commentators have said India’s frustration with the apparent Pakistan-Turkey-China axis is legitimate. This comes against the backdrop of the alignment of Beijing and Ankara with Islamabad during Operation Sindoor — a military exercise launched by New Delhi to dismantle terror infrastructure in territories under Islamabad’s control following the Pahalgam attack on April 22.

Though the Indian operation focussed solely on terror camps, it was met with unwarranted hostility from both Ankara and Beijing, on diplomatic and military fronts. Tensions have escalated sharply, especially after Turkey’s direct involvement on Pakistan’s side during the operation.

A report by the Times of India said two Turkish personnel operating military drones were killed during the offensive, confirming Turkey’s active role in aiding Pakistan during the operation. The incident has triggered concern as Turkey appears to have decisively abandoned any pretence of neutrality in the region.

Due to Turkish actions, fallout is evident. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) has revoked Çelebi Ground Handling India Pvt Ltd ’s security clearance as of May 2025, citing national security concerns. Çelebi, a subsidiary of Turkey’s Çelebi Aviation Holding, operates at nine major Indian airports including Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad and Chennai and handles over 28,500 flights annually. Its clearance was originally granted in November 2022.

The trade math

In a February 2025 article for Turkiye Today, Enes Berna Kilic highlighted a deepening trade disparity between Turkey and China, based on data from the Turkish Statistical Institute and the Ministry of Trade for the January–July period.

Turkey’s exports to China in 2023 totalled $3.3 billion, whereas imports from China soared to $45 billion, making China Turkey’s largest source of imports and accounting for more than 13 per cent of its total import volume.

The bilateral trade deficit, which stood at $0.7 billion in 2002, ballooned to $38 billion by 2022, with no sign of a slowdown in 2025. Nurettin Akcay, an expert on China-Turkey relations, forecasts that Turkey’s imports from China could exceed $50 billion this year.

In comparison, Pakistan’s trade data for the 2023–24 fiscal year also reflects a pronounced imbalance. Bilateral trade with China reached around $17.07 billion, with imports valued at $14.51 billion — up 24 per cent from the previous year — and largely consisting of machinery, chemicals, iron and steel and other industrial inputs.

Pakistan’s exports to China, primarily cotton yarn, refined copper and raw copper, stood at $2.56 billion. Despite modest export growth, the wide import-export gap continues to reflect a structural trade deficit.

According to the Embassy of India in Beijing, the surge in India-China trade since the early 2000s has positioned China as India’s top goods trading partner since 2008—a status it continues to maintain. Between 2015 and 2022, trade between the two countries expanded by 90.14 per cent, with an average annual growth rate of 12.87 per cent.

In 2022 alone, total trade rose by 8.47 per cent year-on-year, reaching $136.26 billion and crossing the $100 billion threshold for the second year running. During this period, India’s imports from China climbed to $118.77 billion — marking a 118.77 per cent increase — while exports dropped sharply by 37.59 per cent to $17.49 billion, down from $28.03 billion in the previous year. This resulted in a substantial trade deficit of $101.28 billion.

After nearly five years, direct flights between India and mainland China are set to resume, indicating a mutual push toward easing diplomatic tensions. Both sides have committed to deepening bilateral cooperation and boosting future investment.

In 2023, total trade exceeded $115 billion, reinforcing China’s role as India’s largest trading partner. However, Indian exports to China fell by more than 22 per cent, while imports rose by 15 per cent, underlining India’s ongoing reliance on Chinese products. However, despite that the double game of China continues unabatedly.

India-China: Deep trade, deep distrust

Even when viewed purely through a data-driven lens, India currently maintains the most extensive trade relationship with China among the three nations. In 2022, the bilateral trade volume between India and China reached $136.26 billion—significantly higher than Turkey’s approximately $48.3 billion and Pakistan’s approximately $17.07 billion.

Despite the presence of considerable trade deficits for all three countries, the scale, duration and overall depth of India-China economic ties—bolstered by diplomatic engagements and renewed connectivity—highlight India as having the most robust economic linkage with China among them.

Given the depth and longevity of India-China trade relations, it is particularly disappointing that China repeatedly aligns itself with Islamabad—both on international platforms and during military standoffs with India—even in situations where Pakistan’s actions are clearly problematic. This ongoing pattern undermines trust and contributes to a growing sense of strategic betrayal in India’s view of its relationship with China.

The Galwan clash of May 2020 marked a turning point in India’s approach to economic engagements with China. India responded by banning numerous Chinese applications —including prominent names like TikTok and Shein—citing national security concerns.

More recently, the Indian government has ordered the banning of an additional 119 apps, primarily video and voice chat platforms, that are linked to developers based in China and Hong Kong. This action was taken under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, which grants the government authority to restrict access to online content in the interest of national security and public order. Details of these measures were made public by Google via the Lumen Database, which tracks government requests for content removal.

Pakistan-Turkey axis against India

It is rather unfortunate that China is ignoring the trade math with India in its zeal to stand with Pakistan at all times. Turkey is being seen in India as an ‘ungrateful nation’. Following a catastrophic earthquake in Turkey in 2023, India dispatched over 250 rescue personnel and substantial humanitarian aid under Operation Dost . Despite this goodwill, Turkey has shown little diplomatic reciprocity , instead aligning with Pakistan, a country with a proven track record and stated policy of fomenting terrorism in India, particularly in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Tensions escalated further in 2024 when Turkey implemented a total embargo on defence-related exports to India . This move came as a surprise, especially since India had previously invested in the Turkish drone firm Zyrone Dynamics in 2021 — a gesture meant to boost bilateral defence collaboration.

Ironically, trade data examined by India Today’s Data Intelligence Unit as quoted by the Business Today report suggests that India continues to export a range of engineering goods to Turkey, many of which are relevant to drone technology. These include aluminium components, automotive systems, telecom gear, aircraft parts, and various electronic assemblies.

Crucially, components used in UAV production — such as lithium batteries, signal receivers, video transmitters, antennas, ESC units, flight controllers, cameras, motors, propellers, structural frames and control modules — are among the exported items. Some of these are suspected to have ended up in drones used by Pakistan against Indian military assets during Operation Sindoor.

This combination of military cooperation with Pakistan, strategic betrayal despite humanitarian aid and dual-use technology transfers has fuelled calls within Indian security circles to recalibrate New Delhi’s posture toward Turkey. What was once a potentially cooperative relationship is now being reassessed through the lens of national security, alliance politics and realpolitik.

Although India had significant success in neutralising the Turkish weapons used by Pakistan, New Delhi can never afford to grow complacent over this victory, as Turkey’s defence industry is expanding at a rapid pace. The key point is that India must maintain vigilant and sustained surveillance of Turkey’s defence sector and its evolving arsenal.

Turkey and Pakistan have significantly expanded their defence partnership, marked by the transfer and co-development of advanced military technologies. Key areas of cooperation include drone systems, with Pakistan acquiring Bayraktar TB2 and AKINCI TİHA drones from Turkey, reportedly used in operations along the Indian border.

Both nations are also advancing air-to-air missile capabilities under the GÖKTÜG Project, which includes the BOZDOGAN (short-range) and GOKDOGAN (beyond-visual-range) missiles designed for F-16 aircraft, featuring strong resistance to electronic warfare. In the naval sector, Turkey is co-producing four MILGEM-class (Jinnah-class) corvettes with Pakistan, with the first, PNS BABUR, already delivered. These efforts reflect growing military-to-military and industrial cooperation, reinforced through joint ventures and technology transfers.

Beyond platforms, Pakistan is integrating various Turkish-made systems, including precision-guided munitions (HGK, LGK), battlefield rockets (TRG-230/300), and electronic warfare technologies. Turkish firms like ASELSAN and HAVELSAN are partnering with Pakistani defenxe institutions such as Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) for local production of radars, thermal sights, and communication systems.

While a deal for 30 T-129 ATAK helicopters remains stalled due to US export restrictions, the broader collaboration continues to deepen. This defence relationship underscores a long-term strategic alignment, enhancing Pakistan’s military capabilities and strengthening Turkey’s role as a key defence partner.

Pakistan’s growing reliance on Chinese arms

The recent India-Pakistan hostilities, including a notable long-range air battle on May 6–7, showcased the increasing reliance of Pakistan on Chinese and Turkish military technology. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistan has received $8.2 billion in arms from China since 2015, making it the top recipient of Chinese arms and accounting for 63 per cent of China’s total arms exports between 2020 and 2024.

Pakistan deployed a variety of advanced foreign-made weapons, including Chinese-origin PL-15 air-to-air missiles, HQ-9, LY-80 and FM-90 air defence systems. The PL-15 missile, developed by AVIC and designed for long-range air combat, is integrated into Pakistan’s JF-17 Block III and J-10CE fighters, with an estimated 70 aircraft in the fleet capable of deploying these missiles. According to The Indian Express, visuals released by the Pakistan Air Force on April 26 confirmed these missile integrations.

The PL-15E’s guidance system uses inertial navigation, Beidou satellite updates, a dual-pulse solid rocket motor and AESA radar for terminal homing. Despite its sophistication, Indian forces reportedly intercepted and neutralised these weapons, showcasing operational shortcomings.

Reports from The Economic Times and RAND Corporation highlight a significant shift in Pakistan’s defence procurement strategy toward cheaper and more financially flexible Chinese arms. This reliance is driven largely by cost-effectiveness and attractive financing terms offered by China, such as loans and deferred payments, in contrast to the stringent conditions imposed by Western suppliers.

However, this comes at the expense of quality and reliability. The Indian military’s Operation Sindoor exposed flaws in Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied HQ-9 air defence systems, which failed to prevent precision Indian missile strikes on high-value terror infrastructure and airbases.

Likewise, Pakistan’s PL-15 missiles and J-10C jets failed to achieve their operational objectives or halt India’s air offensive, despite claims suggesting otherwise. The RAND report underscores that while Chinese weapons offer an affordable path to defence modernisation for financially constrained countries like Pakistan, the trade-off is often reduced performance and effectiveness in high-stakes combat situations.

Uyghur repression and the hypocrisy of Muslim-majority states

Turning to Pakistan and Turkey: Pakistan is led by General Asim Munir, an Islamic hardliner who serves as the Chief of Army Staff. Similarly, Turkey is governed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who harbours ambitions of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, analysts say, and positioning himself as a leader of the Muslim world. In stark contrast, China is fundamentally an atheist state, a non-believer country.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, since 2017, China has detained over a million Muslims—mostly Uyghurs—in so-called reeducation camps in Xinjiang, where they face mass surveillance, forced labour and involuntary sterilisations.

Multiple foreign governments, including the US, have called this genocide, while the UN human rights office states these actions may amount to crimes against humanity. Estimates from US officials and researchers suggest 800,000 to two million Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Uzbeks have been detained.

Even outside the camps, Xinjiang’s 11 million Uyghurs live under harsh oppression. In 2022, Human Rights Watch cited official data showing over half a million prosecutions in Xinjiang since 2017, and The Associated Press reported that one in every 25 residents in one county—exclusively Uyghurs—had been jailed for terrorism-related charges.

Despite this, both Turkey and Pakistan have softened or remained silent on China’s actions. In June 2024, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Xinjiang—the highest-level Turkish visit since 2012—but did not condemn the abuses drawing criticism from Uyghur advocacy groups, the Middle East Eye reported.

Although Turkey once criticised China’s policies, it now prioritises trade: China is its third-largest trading partner and Ankara seeks more Chinese investment, agricultural imports and tourism.

Similarly, Pakistan has maintained a strategic silence on the Uyghur issue, as noted by The Geopolitics, out of deference to its deep economic and military ties with Beijing.

A study by Zunyou Zhou from Max Planck Institute notes that China justifies its harsh counterterrorism and de-radicalisation policies in Xinjiang based on alleged rising Uyghur terrorist activity—measures that both Turkey and Pakistan have chosen to overlook.

Does China really want to join a Pakistan-designed front against India?

China’s growing ties with Pakistan and Turkey, especially when they act against India, are more about short-term tactics than a strong, formal alliance. China has always supported Pakistan—both politically and with weapons—but this is mainly because China sees India as a rival, not because it supports any anti-India plan led by Pakistan or Turkey.

Recently, India launched Operation Sindoor to destroy terror camps in Pakistan-occupied areas. Both Turkey and China reacted negatively. Turkey even sent drones to support Pakistan, which caused some deaths. This shows Turkey is getting more involved. But China’s response was less aggressive and more careful, showing that it prefers to stay unclear rather than get into a direct fight with India.

When it comes to trade, China’s economic ties with India are much stronger than with Pakistan or Turkey. In 2022, trade between China and India was over $136 billion, while with Pakistan it was only $17 billion and with Turkey around $48 billion. Even though China sells much more to India than it buys, India is still China’s biggest trading partner in the region. This strong trade connection makes China think twice before fully supporting any anti-India moves by Pakistan and Turkey.

Turkey, although it often speaks and acts against India and is close to Pakistan in military and religious matters, does not have much influence on China’s foreign policy. In fact, Turkey depends heavily on Chinese goods and has a big trade gap with China.

Also, China doesn’t share the same ideology as either Turkey or Pakistan. Politically, China rejects all kinds of religious belief systems. Its treatment of Buddhist Tibet and Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang bears testimony to this. Uyghurs are among the most persecuted communities in the world. Yet, both Pakistan and Turkey have maintained silentce on China’s treatment of Uyghurs, often drawing criticism in their respective domestical political circles. It also shows that their ties with China are more about benefits than shared beliefs.

A clear pattern seems to be emerging: China helps Pakistan with weapons and supports it in international issues, but at the same time, it continues to trade and talk with India—like trying to restart flights and bring in more Chinese investment. This shows that China is not truly part of an anti-India group but is instead using these situations to gain benefits for itself.

China wants to limit India’s power and increase its own influence, not support any long-term alliance. This connection is not based on shared ideas or formal agreements—it’s based on what suits China’s interests at the time.