Coup? It’s Tweedledum vs Tweedledee in Pakistan

Does a military coup in Pakistan really mean much to the world? It should not. Given the history of army rule in the country and the turbulent equations between the civilian dispensation and the military establishment, a constant in independent Pakistan’s political narrative, the apprehension of a coup is never invalid. Moreover, there’s not much to choose between the civilian rule and the military rule on the basis of their performance. As the relationship between the civilian government led by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the powerful military establishment headed by General Pervez Kayani hits a new low, the real question is: does democracy stand a chance in Pakistan? The arrangement of institutions in an ideal democracy makes the representative government superior to others, including the military and barring the courts. The arrangement has not worked out perfectly in the country. [caption id=“attachment_179306” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“The civilian governments have not been credible and assertive enough to keep the military confined to its constitutional role. Reuters”]  [/caption] The civilian governments have not been credible and assertive enough to keep the military confined to its constitutional role. If a large section of the people in the country still consider the former untrustworthy and believe the latter could be counted upon in times of crisis, the blame lies squarely on the quality of leadership. That the US, the biggest benefactor of the country, would rather do business with the military than the civilian authority tells the story much better. The trouble, which has come to a head now, has been brewing for quite sometime. The relationship has been uneasy since the killing of Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, a military cantonment, by US Seals in May last year. The assault, besides being a huge embarrassment for the country because of the presence of Osama, amounted to attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty by the Americans. The true story in the episode is only a matter of conjecture at this point but it had sparked tension between the military and the civilian leaders. Troubles intensified and now seem to have spiralled out of control after the Memogate scandal. A message, purportedly prepared at the behest of President Asif Ali Zardari and supposed to be delivered to Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the principal American interlocutor to Kayani, urged the US to back the elected leadership of Pakistan against the military establishment. Zardari, who perceived a coup threat from Kayani, promised to disband the notorious ‘S’ section of the ISI which controls the insurgent groups such as the Taliban and Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Toiba besides handing over the 26/11 plotters to India in exchange for US support. The message was written in the aftermath of the Osama killing. Mansoor Izaj, a conduit between Washington and Islamabad, claimed that Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States Hussain Haqqani was the author of the memo. Since then nothing has been normal between the army and the civilian authority. Haqqani has resigned since and the matter is in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Kayani and the ISI, though restrained in their reaction, have not taken kindly to Zardari’s misadventure. The government’s insistence that it had nothing to do with the letter has cut little ice. It was seen to be conspiring against its own institution. By sacking Defence Secretary Naeem Khalid Lodhi, who is close to Kayani, Gilani seems to have touched a raw nerve in the Army and the ISI. A day ago, he was quoted by the Chinese media saying, Army chief General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani and the ISI had violated the Constitution by submitting statements to the Supreme Court on the Memogate by bypassing the defence ministry. The reaction from the other side was sharp. Such accusations will have ‘grievous consequences’, said a defence statement. Kayani was soon closeted with other generals, which triggered the speculation of a coup. If Gilani stays firm against the army and refuses to withdraw his decision, risking a coup it could send a strong message to the other side. It is not such a bad idea. Unless the civilian authority stops pandering to the military, it will never get a chance to strengthen democracy in the country. In the bargain, it might get some respect from people. But coming back to where we started, for the outsider it does not matter much. It’s a choice between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.