 "(File) Chinese President Xi Jinping. Reuters")
When Chinese President Xi Jinping set 2049 as the year the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would match or surpass US military power, the choice was symbolic. The date marks the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China and reflects Xi’s pledge of “national rejuvenation” through economic, technological and military strength.
In Xi’s worldview, the PLA is a tool to further China’s global imperial ambition. This has been on display in the South China Sea, relentless threat to invade Taiwan, and also in its needling of India, triggering a long-drawn military stand-off in eastern Ladakh. Xi is often projected to be working to achieve China’s middle kingdom dream in a post-modern world. To achieve this, China aims to match the military muscle of the US.
This ambition now appears increasingly precarious. For all the outward shows of strength—stealth fighters unveiled at airshows, naval ships conducting blue-water drills and nuclear warheads added annually—the Chinese military faces a deep internal crisis.
Turmoil within the PLA’s high command has cast doubt on the coherence, loyalty and preparedness of a force that Xi has invested more than a decade reshaping, a New York Times report said. The paradox is stark. At the very moment when China’s military looks bigger than ever from the outside, its leadership structure is experiencing its most severe disarray in decades.
Crackdown on military leadership
Since 2022, at least 21 senior PLA officers have been purged or disappeared from public life, including three members of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the body that sits at the apex of Chinese military power, a Foreign Affairs report said. Among those removed were Defence Minister Li Shangfu, Vice Chairman He Weidong and Admiral Miao Hua, once considered untouchable and close to Xi.
The removal of He Weidong, the PLA’s second most senior officer, was particularly shocking. His disappearance in early 2025 suggested not only disciplinary action but also Xi’s diminishing tolerance for mistakes, even from proteges. Similarly, Admiral Miao Hua, responsible for political work inside the military, was investigated for “serious violations of discipline”—a euphemism often denoting corruption or disloyalty.
Impact Shorts
View AllThe wave of purges appears systemic rather than selective. Beyond top commanders, more than two dozen officials in the armaments industry and other senior officers have also been targeted since 2023, signalling Xi’s frustration with corruption, inefficiency and the PLA’s perceived inability to meet his exacting standards.
Scale of turmoil and historical comparisons
The scale of this crackdown has led some analysts to argue that Xi’s actions could eclipse the internal military upheavals under Mao Zedong. Mao’s campaigns were notoriously destabilising, undermining trust and paralysing institutions, yet Xi’s methodical purges of both allies and rivals suggest a more calculated form of coercion. In essence, Xi seems willing to dismantle senior leadership structures repeatedly to guarantee personal loyalty, even at the cost of continuity and expertise.
What makes this round of purges more striking is that many of those ousted were once close to Xi, having served with him during earlier stages of his career. Their removal highlights the unpredictability of Xi’s governance model: loyalty is never permanent and political survival depends on continuous demonstration of allegiance and competence. This environment, while consolidating Xi’s dominance, risks breeding paranoia and instability at the very heart of the PLA.
Xi’s grip and distrust
According to Foreign Affairs, Xi’s management of the PLA to that of a mafia boss. His power is undisputed, yet his behaviour betrays profound mistrust of his own lieutenants. By purging even allies, Xi sends the message that no officer is indispensable, ensuring dependence on his patronage.
This style of rule reflects two central objectives. First, Xi insists on the PLA’s absolute loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), treating the military as the ultimate guarantor of party survival in times of crisis.
Second, he wants a combat-ready force capable of winning wars against advanced adversaries, particularly the United States. But his recurring dissatisfaction with the PLA leadership suggests that he doubts whether the force, despite vast resources, is truly prepared for such missions.
The dilemma is that Xi’s obsession with loyalty undermines professional confidence within the ranks. Constant fear of investigation or removal may ensure political conformity but erodes morale and initiative. In practice, officers are less likely to take risks or show creativity—an essential quality for modern warfare.
Strategic uncertainty and Taiwan’s shadow
Xi’s insistence on military modernisation is not abstract. He has set specific benchmarks: a “basic modernisation” by 2035, a force capable of taking Taiwan by 2027 and a “world-class” military by 2049, the South China Morning Post reported. These goals, however, now appear jeopardised by the leadership churn.
The Taiwan contingency looms especially large. US officials believe Xi wants the PLA to be ready for a potential invasion of the island within the next two years, the New York Times piece said.
Yet the removal of senior commanders at this critical juncture raises doubts about the PLA’s readiness. Even if China’s arsenal is expanding, warfighting depends on stable, competent leadership. Analysts warn that the turbulence could disrupt command cohesion, slow modernisation and ultimately reduce the credibility of China’s military threats.
The irony is that Xi’s heavy-handed approach, meant to ensure absolute reliability in wartime, may instead create uncertainty about whether the PLA can operate effectively in high-pressure situations.
Historical roots of Xi’s obsession
Xi’s fixation with the PLA is deeply personal and political. Unlike his two immediate predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, Xi grew up in the shadow of military influence. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a revolutionary veteran, and many of Xi’s princeling peers served in the armed forces. This background gave Xi both familiarity with military culture and an acute sense of its political importance.
When Xi first entered the CMC in 2010, he encountered a military riddled with corruption and dominated by entrenched cliques loyal to Jiang Zemin. Early in his tenure, he declared that the PLA must be ready “to fight and win battles”—a slogan that exposed his scepticism about its actual readiness.
The memory of 1989, when the PLA hesitated before ultimately cracking down on student protesters in Tiananmen Square, also weighs heavily on Xi. The Arab Spring of 2011 reinforced his conviction that the survival of regimes depends on reliable military support. For Xi, ensuring the PLA’s willingness to act against both domestic unrest and external threats is paramount.
Reforms and risks
Xi’s military reforms have been sweeping. In 2015, he overhauled the PLA command structure, reducing the dominance of the ground forces and creating a joint theatre command system more aligned with modern warfare. He has slashed troop numbers, invested heavily in the navy and air force and emphasised “intelligentisation”—integrating artificial intelligence, machine learning and cyber capabilities into military operations.
These reforms mirror the United States’ post–World War II and Cold War restructurings, which sought to unify command and integrate services. Yet they also generated internal resentment, especially among ground force veterans who saw their influence eroded. By dismantling long-standing hierarchies and traditions, Xi has forced the PLA to adapt rapidly, but the transition has left scars.
What makes the current purges so destabilising is that they follow these reforms. The removal of leaders at the very moment when structural changes are still bedding down risks compounding uncertainty. Officers who might have guided the PLA through this transformation are gone, replaced by figures whose main qualification is personal loyalty to Xi.
Implications for superpower ambition
History tells us that military modernisation is not a linear process. It requires decades of consistent leadership, doctrine development and institutional stability. By repeatedly resetting the PLA’s leadership, Xi is undermining the very continuity needed for long-term transformation.
Moreover, China’s international environment is hardening. US alliances in Asia are strengthening, regional states are investing in their own militaries and technological competition is intensifying. In its “world-class” goal, China lacks reliability in command structure, preparedness for complex operations and the ability to integrate political loyalty with professional competence.
The current turmoil casts doubt on whether these shortcomings could be met. China observers say Xi’s PLA may look formidable on paper but brittle in practice. With tensions building over Taiwan and in the South China Sea, Xi’s China faces a dilemma of going forward with the purge or deal with its internal contradictions that, observers say, have come in the way of its military superpower ambition.