British help in Blue Star: Some answers, more questions about Indian bungling

London: The incomplete records revealed by British Foreign Secretary William Hague relating to British help, or consultancy, over Operation Blue Star provide a few answers relating to that consultancy. But they provoke many more questions than the answers they provide. And these are questions about the Indian handling of the event rather than the peripheral British involvement. The records indicate that an assault plan drawn up by the British SAS commander turned consultant had been approved by Mrs Gandhi in February 1984. And yet that plan was never put into action. [caption id=“attachment_137650” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] The Golden Temple in Amritsar. Reuters[/caption] A letter dated 23 February 1984 from the British foreign office says that “the (name of agent withheld) spent eight days with the Indians. He travelled and operated… Our speedy response to the Indians’ request for assistance was much appreciated by them and they put every facility at the disposal of their visitor. He made a ground reconnaissance of the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar on 10 February flown there by special helicopter. “It was clear to the officer that the Indians had not given much thought to how they should root out the extremists, beyond applying the ‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’ principle. With his own experience and study of this kind of problem, he was able to advise the Indians of a realistic and workable plan which Mrs Gandhi approved on her return from Moscow on 16 February.” The letter includes cautionary remarks from then British high commissioner in India Sir Robert Wade-Gery that “if and when the Indians put the plan into operation and it went wrong, they should not be able to pin any blame on us.” The note speaks also of “likely difficulties and various requirements that need to be fulfilled if the plan is to have a reasonable chance of success.” It adds: “It remains to be seen whether Mrs Gandhi has the political will to act. The officer had the impression from the Indians that she would proceed.” If that indication is accurate, Mrs Gandhi seems to have approved a plan that the British had said was workable, and that Mrs Gandhi found to be so. But in February of that year itself that very plan was running into unexpected hurdles. That same letter from the British Foreign Office of 23 February speaks of a telegram sent (presumably by Sir Robert) on shooting in the Golden Temple “last weekend” and the deployment of a commando squad. The letter says: “The (agent name withheld) was not present at the time. (Names withheld) do not believe the shooting arose from an attempt by Indian authorities to implement their plan, but believe that the arrival of the commandos, if confirmed, could presage an operation.” The correspondence raises some of the biggest unanswered questions of 1984: what was the plan that Mrs Gandhi had approved, and why was it dropped? Clearly that plan was born of a dialogue between the British SAS man and Indian intelligence and police officials – with no plan for involvement of the army at that stage. But the correspondence indicates that some elements of the plan discussed with the plan were used in the final assault. Another Foreign Office letter almost a year later, on 7 March 1985 notes that the British government had asked for prior warning of any action but that “in the end we were not given any specific briefing until the day the actual invasion of the Golden Temple took place (5 June 1984).” The letter adds: “However, the Indian equivalent of our intelligence coordinator asked (name withheld) in Delhi on 13 June 1984 to express his gratitude to (name withheld) the prompt and helpful response which resulted in the (name withheld) report. Although some of (name withheld) recommendations were used, the main concept changed once the Indian army took over (name withheld) who sponsored (name withheld) visit.” The letter of March 1985 says: “A frontal assault was attempted using some of the Indian Special Forces and casualties were suffered. (name withheld) emphasised that the large number of deaths was not the result of poor implementation of the (name withheld) plans, nor of any deficiency in the plans but was due to the Army’s decision to do it their own way.” In effect the correspondence pins the blame on the Indian army for getting it wrong – a view then shared by many in India, including senior police officers who had wanted the action to be handled at the police and para military level. Mrs Gandhi herself offers some sort of answer to the unanswered question – without mentioning what that earlier February 1984 plan was and why it had to be dropped. “The para military forces were insufficient in number to control growing terrorist activities,” Mrs Gandhi wrote to Mrs Thatcher on 14 June, 1984. “So we had to send in the army.” Mrs Gandhi’s letter to Mrs Thatcher has been released along with the other correspondence. But only three months earlier she had approved a plan with about the same number of para military forces present. What led to that change of plan is not clear from this correspondence. Mrs Gandhi spoke of the foreign elements in her letter to Mrs Thatcher. She said that “it is now established that they (terrorists) were in contact with and receiving help from hostile outside elements.” She added: “It is never easy to undertake security action involving a place of worship, especially in a country where religion is so easily and often used for political ends. But this place, so sacred to people of the Sikh faith, had been converted by terrorists into a base of operations.” Mrs Gandhi wrote that Harmandar Sahib within the Golden Temple was not touched, and as a result of that decision the army “suffered heavy casualties.” The Akhal Takht was also not to be touched, she said, but it was “used as a hide-out and was full of grenades and other weapons. The damage there was also largely due to explosions from within.” Mrs Gandhi ended her letter prophetically: “Although the hard core of terrorists within has been liquidated, we have a difficult period ahead of us. Many in the Sikh community have been shaken by this traumatic event. The process of healing and conciliation will take time but we shall persevere.”