Between India and China, even glacial change is progress

During US President Richard Nixon’s history-making “ping-pong” diplomacy tour of China in 1971, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was asked for his thoughts on the lessons and the impact of the French Revolution. Zhou famously responded to say that it was perhaps too early to tell. The consideration that Zhou felt that even a couple of hundred years were insufficient to come to judgement on the momentous events of 1789  became a marker to flag China’s reputation as a deliberate, far-thinking, eternally patient civilization that cannot easily be hustled. That perception continues to this day, despite more recent revelations that Zhou was perhaps not making a profound philosophical point in the way that he’s been credited with. It turns out that Zhou may have had the rather more proximate student riots in Paris in 1968 when he said that it was probably too early to tell the impact. In this day and age of hypermedia, leaders don’t always have the luxury of making deliberate judgments about historical events and about civilizations. And they, in turn, are similarly judged on their pronouncements and actions in real time. No value judgments here; that’s just the way it is. [caption id=“attachment_796493” align=“alignleft” width=“380”]  Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. PTI[/caption] Given the glacial pace of movement in virtually every aspect of Sino-Indian relations that came up for mention in talks between the leaders of both countries during Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s current visit to India, it is easy to surmise that that the interactions were a colossal flop . Indeed, when you go line by line, syllable by syllable, over the joint statement that the two sides put out on Monday, it’s easy to make the case that there is little more than boilerplate assertions from both sides, and very little by way of providing fresh impetus to the relationship and the many-layered, complex negotiations between them. And yet, it is possible to discern the faintest hint of a change in the perceptions that each side signalled to other, even if they are not adequately reflected in the obtuse language of joint statements. In themselves, they may not make for dramatic headlines, but taken in their entirety, they do count for something. To give credit where credit is due, the Indian side, from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh downwards, has indicated to the Chinese Premier and his delegation that India considers the border dispute to be a matter of “core interest”. That formulation is significant, and one that the Chinese side will find easy to assimilate, given that China too has defined (for the benefit of the international community) its own “core interests” on which its interests must be acknowledged and respected without any room for negotiation. These include, for instance, acknowledgement of the “one-China principle”, and in particular China’s absolute sovereignty over Tibet, and its claims over Taiwan, the de facto independent republic over which China claims sovereignty. In more recent times, of course, China has expanded its “core interests”  to cover its claims over the South China Sea, and the small islands where its territorial claims run frequently into conflict with those of the many littoral states in the region. More significantly, the omission in the joint statement of the standard formulation of India’s commitment to the “one-China” principle too sends out a strong signal. It may appear to be merely a meaningless ritual, one that doesn’t count for anything, but anyone who understands China’s own perturbations about its territorial integrity will know just how important this is from China’s perspective. Evidently, the Chinese side was pushing repeatedly for this clause to be inserted in the joint statement, but India withheld consent in order to signal that respect for territorial integrity should be reciprocal - and that China’s most recent border incursion in Ladakh accentuated the absence of trust on this front. All this makes up for India’s signal failing, while the incursion drama was unfolding, to protect its own interest and instead seek to play down the gravity of the incursion. On other fronts, too, there was marginal progress in the fact that Premier Li acknowledged India’s concern about the growing trade imbalance between the two countries. Of course, such an acknowledgement has merit only if the Indian side holds China to its commitment to restore a sense of balance. In this context, India can learn from China’s own principle of judging intentions not on the basis of words but on the basis of actions. In a way, Premier Li’s principal mission during his visit to India was to secure greater access for Chinese industries. China’s economy will be his primary responsibility for the next decade, and as China slips into a lower orbit of growth, Li will be looking to newer markets - including India - for Chinese industries to profit from. That gives India a bit of commercial clout, in order to protect its interests elsewhere, but that can be leveraged only with the exercise of political will by the Indian side. On quite another front, Li’s public interactions, including with the media, and just his body language during his appearances with Indian leaders, conveyed the ongoing generational shift that is under way in the Chinese leadership. Li came across as less stuffy, even borderline engaging, and particularly in contrast to the wooden personality of Manmohan Singh, he came across as positively affable. In many ways, he symbolises a China that is less inward-looking, and more ready to engage with the world. So, in my reading, Li’s visit may not entirely have been a colossal flop. The subtle message has been conveyed to his side that India considers the sanctity of its border, even when it has not been formally denominated, as sacrosanct and of “core interest” and that prickly provocations - such as the recent one in Ladakh - will extract a price on other areas. That signalling is not entirely without significance - although of course the only real test of China’s intentions in the future is to see what it does, not what it says. In any case, it may be possible to make that judgment a lot sooner than the 200 years that the world believes Zhou needed to make an assessment on French revolutionary history…