As Israel seeks revenge for Hamas attack, Gaza invasion fears rise

After an initial frantic scramble to stop an attack by the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, Israel’s military has come together and is now moving massive reinforcements towards the enclave while retaliating with airstrikes on roads, buildings, and other facilities in Gaza. Many of the 2.3 million people who live in the area that Israeli forces left in 2005 fear that the mobilisation and heavy shelling are the start of a ground invasion that will rival or even surpass Israel’s incursions in 2008 and 2014. According to Israeli security officials, the operation that caught the Middle East’s most powerful army off guard on Saturday required more than 48 hours to restore military cohesiveness, stop infiltrations, and clear Hamas fighters from towns they attacked. More than 1,000 Israelis were slain and scores of captives were taken by Hamas gunmen, who used a web of deception and relied on motorbikes, paragliders, and other common tools. This action could make an Israeli reaction more difficult. Yet Israel has responded with ferociousness. At least 830 people were killed by airstrikes on Gaza on Tuesday, while more than 180,000 people lost their homes, according to U.N. statistics. In the lead-up to two previous Israeli ground assaults in Gaza, destroying roads has been a common technique to obstruct communications and the movement of Hamas and other terrorists. In order to avoid landmines in existing roads, people claim that when Israel comes, its forces frequently bulldoze new pathways for their vehicles. Even though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promises “mighty revenge” in response to the significant casualties inflicted by the Hamas fighters in the worst breach of Israel’s strong defences since Arab armies attacked in 1973, sending troops into a densely populated, urban environment is not an easy decision. Airstrikes in Gaza “seemed very similar to previous Israeli operations,” according to Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel’s National Security Council, but earlier strategies had not neutralised Hamas in the past. A ground offensive could more effectively kill Hamas fighters and destroy the chain of command, Eiland said, but added: “The government is still reluctant in taking such an initiative because it might involve many, many more Israeli casualties.” Israel’s massive firepower advantage is undermined by urban warfare, which pits it against an opponent who has greater combat experience and is better equipped thanks to Iran. The terrorist group, which seized control of Gaza in 2007, also had time to develop a network of tunnels that aid in terrorist vanishing acts. Sometimes, Israeli soldiers refer to it as the “Gaza Metro”. Israel lost nine soldiers in their invasion in 2008. The number of fatalities increased to 66 in 2014. During the operation on October 7, Hamas captured a large number of people, most of them are civilians, but some are also soldiers. It raises a serious problem for a nation whose guiding principle is to leave no one behind. It agreed to exchange one inmate for hundreds of Palestinians in 2011. “Israel knows the great preparedness of the resistance factions and their ability to handle ground incursions,” said Talal Okal, an analyst in Gaza who writes for the daily Al-Ayyam newspaper, saying Israel may yet hesitate over a land assault. “It wants to make Gaza pay a heavy price but I don’t think it is prepared to pay the heavier prices should they enter Gaza,” he added. The Israeli government has not made a decision regarding the deployment of troops despite Israel amassing forces on the border with Gaza and calling up hundreds of thousands of reservists. Residents of Gaza claimed on Wednesday that other roadways, including a crucial beachfront road, were among the areas struck overnight. Targets reportedly included a Hamas surveillance camera network, weapons storage and manufacturing sites, and operative tunnels, according to Israel’s military. Major Amir Dinar, a spokesman for the Israeli military, responded when asked about a potential ground invasion: “We are striking Hamas infrastructure and we are going to strike hard and keep striking.” He said nothing further. Both the foreign ministry and office of the Israeli prime minister declined to comment. For this piece, two Hamas officials were unavailable for comment. A Palestinian terrorist official, who declined to identified, said: “There is a history between 2008, 2014 and 2023. The resistance is no longer the same or that under-equipped.” “We are always prepared. If Israel sends more soldiers in, they will either become bodies or hostages,” the official added. By commencing its offensive on October 7, Hamas has already shown that it is a tougher and more capable force than Israel had anticipated. Israel, which has prided itself on its capacity to infiltrate and keep track of militants, suffered a severe intelligence failure as a result of the Palestinian operation. Additionally, it revealed holes in Israel’s southern command. “The communication and command of the south collapsed and there was no communication. It took time to understand the full picture,” said David Tzur, a former head of Israel’s Border Police force who also commanded the police’s elite counter-terror unit Yamam. But the said force had now recovered. “Once all forces are on alert there is a quick reaction.” (With agency inputs)