The equations between the military establishment and the civilian dispensation at the helm were never cosy in Pakistan in the best of times. While it is common knowledge that the former wields influence disproportionately big to its position in a democracy and dictates terms in matters of policy, both internal and external, the depth of mutual distrust between both rarely played out openly in the public domain. The secret memo purportedly written at the behest of president Asif Ali Zardari and delivered to chairman of the joint US chief of staff admiral Mike Mullen might ensure that. The memo reveals that Zardari who feared a military coup after Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden’s killing by an US team at Abbottabad, made a slew of promises to the US which were clearly against the interest of the powerful military. Besides promising to hand over the Pakistan-based masterminds of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the memo says, Zardari was willing to create a new security team favourable to Americans. The team would eliminate Section S – the most notorious among ISI units which manages the agency’s relationship with Islamist militant groups, including the anti-India outfits and the Taliban in Afghanistan. There is a clear hint that the Pakistan’s military is a stumbling block for America’s interests in Afghanistan. [caption id=“attachment_135177” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“The secret memo is purportedly written at the behest of president Asif Ali Zardari and delivered to Mike Mullen. Getty Images”]
[/caption] The memo also sought that Mullen should convey a strong message to the army leadership. “Request your direct intervention in conveying a strong, urgent and direct message to General Kayani that delivers Washington’s demand for him and General Pasha to end their brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus…” “Should you be willing to do so, Washington’s political/military backing would result in revamp of the civilian government that, while weak at the top echelon in terms of strategic direction and implementation (even though mandated by domestic political forces), in a wholesale manner replaces the national security adviser and other national security officials with trusted advisers that include ex-military and civilian leaders favourably viewed by Washington, each of whom have long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities,’’ it added. Curious indeed! What was Zardari up to exactly? Exhorting a foreign government to act against his own country’s military? It is understood that the latter, for all practical purposes, functions independent of the civilian authority though it is officially still subservient to it. But the head of the state going this far in his effort to undermine its importance is unusual. Now scapegoats would be found and sacrificed to protect the president. Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, who is supposed to have handed over the letter to Mullen, has already been summoned to explain the matter. It is possible that he would be punished. But the entire episode reveals the level of desperation of a powerless, discredited civilian head of a failed country and the confusion in the arrangement of power within it. Given the political reality in Pakistan, Zardari’s fears appear genuine. The country has spent several decades of its independent existence under the military rule - from 1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988 and 1999 to 2008 – and coups are common. That General Kayani, the present army chief, has been vocally averse to the military running the country is no solace for Zardari. The memo suggests that the civilian government wants to break free of the stranglehold of the defence forces in the country’s affairs and would go to any extent to that end. However, it easier said than done. True democracy, which could be a strong counterforce to authoritarian inclinations, is yet to take roots in Pakistan. And Zardari, who is precariously low on moral authority, courtesy serious allegations of corruption and other scandals against him, is certainly not the person who could lead the change.