Why anti-Naxal operations are doomed to humiliating failure

By Ajai Sahni A quick succession of Maoist attacks over three days, between June 9 and 11, which killed 18 security force personnel in Chhattisgarh, has again provoked a measure of hysteria in the media. There have been cries of a ‘sudden escalation’ of Maoist violence and of a ’new Maoist strategy’, suggesting that something unprecedented has occurred. Such an impression is the consequence of an absence of memory and documentation among the many commentators who have been agitated by only the most recent incidents in a very long chain of events. [caption id=“attachment_24813” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“Police officials of 4TH Battalion paying tributes to a CRPF jawan, who was killed in the Naxal attack in Bastar district, in Raipur on Sunday. PTI “]  [/caption] A look at the actual numbers is necessary for any objective assessment. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the total Maoist-related fatalities in 2009 stood at 997, and, in 2010, at 1,180. Till June 11, fatalities in 2011 totalled 347, indicating no extraordinary escalation in the annual trend. More specifically, the first five months of 2011 (January to May) witnessed 299 Maoist-related fatalities across the country. The number for the same period in 2010 was 630 (including, of course, the 76 personnel killed in a single incident at Chintalnar in Chhattisgarh); and in 2009, there were 372 fatalities, indicating a significant drop in 2011. Security force fatalities between January and May were 138 in 2009, 170 in 2010, and 57 in 2011, indicating a significant decline on this variable as well. In June, total fatalities in 2009 stood at 105, while security force fatalities were 60; in 2010, these numbers were 116 and 34, respectively; in 2011 (till June 11) they stood at 48 and 19, respectively. Nor, indeed, has there been any extraordinary escalation in Chhattisgarh – the reverse is, in fact, the case. Between January and May 2009, there were 140 fatalities (including 57 security force personnel) in the state; the numbers were 204 and 103, respectively, in 2010, and 67 and 18, respectively, in 2011, so far, indicating a significant de-escalation in the current year. The only transient spike is visible in the figures for June, with 32 killed, including 19 security personnel, in 2011, as against four and one, respectively, in 2010, and 10 and four in 2009. Such spurts are to be expected, with incidents of opportunity occurring unevenly in different theatres and at different times. There is no indication to suggest significant discontinuity with the general trends preceding the recent events. The Maoists have, of course, issued a statement in the wake of the latest series of attacks in Chhattisgarh, with Gudsa Usendi, spokesman of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee, threatening escalation unless conditions—particularly including a reversal of the decision to ‘deploy’ the army in the Bastar region and the “proposed acquisition of 750 sq km of land in the name of Army Training School”—are met. As the first contingent of the army moves into Raipur, eventually to deploy in the areas adjoining the Abujhmadh forest, to establish  a permanent training facility, a ’tactical counter-offensive’ may, indeed, be engineered, with widening attacks against security forces, both in the Bastar division and much further afield, across the ‘red corridor’ states. It is unlikely—though not impossible—that the Maoists will attack the army itself, at the present stage; but attacks against police and paramilitary forces can be expected to escalate. Indeed, such a response should have been anticipated before the decision to move the army into the Maoist heartland was taken. The army has, of course, clearly indicated that it would not engage in any anti-Maoist operation, and has not sought cover under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act for such engagement. Its presence in the Bastar division has, however, been thought of as having ‘symbolic’ significance – reflecting extraordinarily poor strategic judgement on the part of those who have conceptualised this ‘symbolism’. Clearly, the creation of the Army Training School in the Maoist heartland was intended to ‘send a message’—in other words, to intimidate—the Maoists. Over time, it is intended to ‘stabilise’ the Bastar division, the region worst affected by Maoist activities, and to create conditions for the ‘recovery’ of the Abujhmadh region, regarded by the Maoists as their ‘central guerrilla zone’ and command centre. Both objectives are, of course, impeccable. The problem is that they have not been reconciled with the current capacities and capabilities of the state and its agencies. Moreover, the Maoists can naturally be expected to resist – where necessary, with extreme violence – any disturbance of the status quo in any of their areas of disruptive dominance. It may have been thought that the state had learned some lessons after the boastful and disastrous ‘massive and coordinated operations’ and the ‘clear, hold and develop strategy’ initiated by the home ministry across the six worst Maoist-affected states in late 2009, which ended with the debacle at Chintalnar in April 2010. The Indian state, however, is evidently uneducable, and remains willing and happy to send other people’s children to slaughter without any rational calculus of gain. Maoist strategy and tactics are based on a rational and objective assessment of the state’s power. They are tailored to exploit the vulnerabilities and interstices of a state that the Maoists openly acknowledge to be far more powerful than any force they can raise in the foreseeable future. Their objective is to whittle away this great power at its margins, within a protracted war paradigm, which evades decisive confrontations, and seeks, in essence, disruptive dominance and gradual consolidation. A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the lack of coordination between various forces, or disagreements on counter-insurgency strategy between various states and with the Centre, as explanations for the state’s failure to deal effectively with the Maoist challenge. These are, at best, factors of marginal significance. The truth is, the state’s ‘strategies’—though they do not deserve to be called a strategy in the first place—are futile and fitful efforts to engineer decisive confrontations in areas or situations of clear security force dominance. Such an approach is a complete misunderstanding, of guerrilla warfare, of the protracted war paradigm, and of the current capacities and capabilities of the state. It is destined to inevitable, humiliating and bloody failure.  Ajai Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal.