The case against PM and Chidu is same as case against Modi

No matter how the 2G scam finally ends - with some convictions, a minor rap on the knuckles for some others, or no major consequences for anyone at all - several questions have been thrown up by it.

Question 1: What is the limit to collective cabinet responsibility? Especially if one member is willing to break the law or blur its edges, and the others know all about it but don’t stop it.

Question 2: In a coalition era, where ministries are assigned on the basis of party negotiations, does the PM remain first among equals, or is he merely a titular head of government, with no oversight role?

Question 3: What is the basis on which government decides to balance revenue considerations against policy priorities?

There are, of course, many other questions, but these three are of primary important since they have been thrown up by the 2G scam.

Let’s put things in perspective. The case against Narendra Modi in Gujarat is that he either looked the other way or asked the police to do nothing when mobs were indulging in killings on a big scale. That is, the accusation is either one of abdication of duty or a deliberate act of policy to let the mayhem continue for a while. Proof of either, of course, is another matter.

The case against Manmohan Singh and P Chidambaram is exactly the same - only there is documentary evidence to prove that they wanted spectrum to be sold through a market-discovered price, and they knew A Raja was doing something wrong in the way he not only hijacked the policy, but also subverted it by arbitrarily changing cut-off dates for eligibility and backing his favoured licence aspirants, including Swan and Unitech.

But the PM did nothing even when he had ample time to stem the rot . And in the end, he specifically asked his principal secretary to keep him out of it.

Here’s the evidence that policy was hijacked right from under the PM’s nose, and he was impotent or unwilling to do anything about it.

[caption id=“attachment_92331” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“The PM knew what Raja was up to. Chidambaram knew what Raja was up to. And both were unhappy with that knowledge. This is probably why the PMO finally decided to distance itself from Raja’s acts. Reuters”] [/caption]

The policy hijack began under Raja’s predecessor Dayanidhi Maran, who wrested the decision-making on telecom spectrum away from the Group of Ministers (GoM), and Raja continued with the same possessiveness.

The story of the hijack begins in February 2006 , when the Prime Minister set up a Group of Ministers (GoM) comprising the finance, defence, home, parliamentary affairs and telecom ministers as its members to look at various issues concerning effective and optimum use of spectrum and to evolve a pricing policy.

But within days the PM was forced to retract by Dayanidhi Maran, who claimed the PM had gone back on his word to leave spectrum pricing to him.

This is what Maran said in his letter of 28 February 2006 to the PM: “You may recall my meeting with you on 1st February 2006 when we had inter-alia discussed the issue of the Group of Ministers relating to the vacation of spectrum by defence. You had kindly assured me that the terms of reference of the GoM would be drawn up exactly the way we wanted, which was to focus only on the issue of vacation of spectrum.”

So, it’s clear that Maran is telling the PM he had agreed to drawing up the GoM’s terms of reference “exactly the way we wanted.”

Maran then went to demand what was agreed. “I am, however, surprised to note that the GoM as constituted has much wider terms of reference, some of which I feel impinge upon the work normally to be carried out by the ministry itself. I shall be grateful if you could kindly instruct the concerned to modify the terms of references suggested by us which are enclosed.”

The only conclusion one can draw from this is that the PM originally agreed to let Maran decide spectrum issues, and then thought it was better to let a GoM handle it, and then, again under pressure from his DMK ally, he gave Maran sole charge of spectrum pricing.

The issue of a GoM came up again when Raja was communications minister. Duvvuri Subbarao, when he was finance secretary, wrote several notes saying that when there were revenue implications to spectrum pricing, the finance ministry had to be part of the decision-making and should thus be decided by a GoM. If it was not, it would be a breach of the government’s own transaction of business rules.

What Subbarao knew and said the then finance minister (Chidambaram) or the PMO could not have been ignorant of. In short, both the PM and the then finance minister knew that they were transgressing basic governance rules when they allowed Raja to run his own spectrum allotment and pricing policy.

This is why the finance ministry under Pranab Mukherjee sent a note to the PM saying if Chidambaram wanted, he could have stopped Raja from going his own way ( see finance ministry note ).

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There are sins of omission and commission here - and the PM is guilty of both. It is not going to be easy to argue that selling spectrum in 2008 and 2001 prices was a well-considered decision that emanated from the idea of raising teledensity or making call charges low for the aam aadmi.

The PM knew what Raja was up to. Chidambaram knew what Raja was up to. And both were unhappy with that knowledge. This is probably why the PMO finally decided to distance itself from Raja’s acts.

This is what proves it. On 10 January 2008, Raja allots 122 letters of intent (LoIs) to telecom aspirants. On 1 January, the PM is alarmed and his Principal Secretary TKA Nair notes that the PM would like to take the developments into account. But by 15 January, the PM knows what actually happened - that Raja ran a non-transparent policy intended to favour some parties.

So, on 15 January, Nair notes that the PM wants his views to be “informally shared with the department. He does not want a formal communication and wants PMO to be at arm’s length”.

In an interview to The Economic Times , Arun Shourie asks why the PM would want to be at “arm’s length” for a policy that supposedly had the government’s blessing. “Why would he give this instruction to his officers unless he knew that there is murky stuff going on and it is better to stay away. I think he had full knowledge and I think he had deep apprehension that something terrible has happened and his only concern was let’s stay away from the filth. That is not what a PM is supposed to do.”

On 15 January, Chidambaram too realises that Raja has succeeded in his mission to hijack the telecom policy. He recommends a new method of spectrum pricing in future, and - despite that fact that he could still have stymied it - tells the PM that “the past may be treated as a closed chapter”.

The answers to the questions raised at the start of the article are thus as follows.

• The PM, the finance minister and the cabinet acquiesced in Raja’s folly.

• If they succumbed to pressure from the DMK to run its own telecom policy, Sonia Gandhi as manager of the coalition is morally responsible, too.

• There was no clear weighing of pros and cons in deciding whether spectrum should be priced cheap or discovered by bidding or auction. That was Raja’s own policy - and the PM and Chidambaram allowed that to happen by disregarding the business transaction rules.

The case against Manmohan Singh and Chidambaram is strong. And it’s not just about the revenue loss issue.