The variant response of two governments to communal riots during and after the Ram Navami ‘festivities’ are revealing. In West Bengal, the Trinamool Congress, governing unhindered by concerns of any major backlash within the legislative assembly or outside of it, has failed to contain the violence or act against the perpetrators and instigators. In Bihar, on the other hand, the Janata Dal (United, JD-U) governing in partnership with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has proved far more decisive. A brief recapitulation would help. In West Bengal, the ruling party first declared a blanket ban on armed processions. The very next day, it announced that some ‘traditional’ processions would be exempted. During the celebrations, many of those out in procession brandished weapons and deviated from the specified route, in many cases purposely passing through minority neighbourhoods, chanting provocative slogans. The police failed to act. [caption id=“attachment_4418193” align=“alignleft” width=“382”]
Nitish Kumar (left) and Mamata Banerjee. Agencies[/caption] Riots broke out in the Asansol-Ranigunj area in West Burdwan district. The administration’s response was weak, to be euphemistic. Life in these riot-scarred areas has still not returned to normal. Showing signs of having learnt some lessons, the government ordered a strict crackdown and banned Hanuman Jayanti processions from displaying arms. Though formally the BJP and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad desisted from marching in procession, armed processions were in evidence; nothing was done to prevent this. All that we have are post facto assurances that action will be taken. Finally, though Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code still obtains in the area, the government’s (and, by extension the Trinamool’s) resolve to enforce it has been, to say the least, inconsistent. Babul Supriyo, the BJP MP representing the area, was turned back when he tried to visit the area last Friday, but a BJP delegation was allowed to tour it even after the administration had indicated that it would meet the same fate as did Supriyo. A few arrests have been made, but substantial action has not been taken. Let us leave to one side the question about whether prohibitory orders should have been imposed or whether it would have been appropriate to include in its ambit political opponents. The important issue is that the government issued orders and then stayed put when they were breached. It would have been better not to have issued the orders at all. In Bihar, the government led by the JD-U was far more decisive. Within a couple of days, over a hundred people were arrested and orders issued for the arrest of a BJP leader, Arjit Shashwat, son of union minister of state for health and family welfare Ashwini Choubey. Having evaded arrest for a few days and his petition for anticipatory bail being turned down, Shashwat was arrested on Sunday. His party had, in fact, signalled that he should surrender if denied bail, though Choubey had rubbished all allegations against his son in language tantamount to mocking the government. In addition, senior JD-U functionaries, including Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, made it clear to their coalition partner that Muslim-baiting and incitement to communal disharmony would not be tolerated. Kumar may be discovering in growing magnitude that having deserted the grand alliance with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), in an unconscionable betrayal of his electoral mandate, and opting to ally once again with the BJP, he is somewhat stuck between a rock and a hard place, but that did not prevent him from taking decisive administrative to maintain peace, which is his job (whether or not under pressure from the Opposition is not the main issue). West Bengal chief minster Mamata Banerjee, facing panchayat elections in a short while, opted, on the other hand, to run with the hare and hunt with the hound. It is not a particularly clever strategy for various reasons. Engaging with the BJP on its own terrain is both politically and administratively fraught with danger. The latter has been demonstrated; quick, stringent action on the day of Ram Navami could have prevented blood-letting and loss of lives. Strategically, the danger is not apparent in the immediate term, but logical thinking indicates that to compete on the BJP’s terrain can only strengthen its hand. Banerjee should know, first, that the BJP has behind it a history of majoritarian politics and mobilisation that dates at least a hundred years; and, second, she should remember that this kind of politics is central to avowed right-wing Hindu politics and ideology, while she professes, on paper, a secular form of politics and ideology. It should also be apparent that outside urban or suburban agglomerations, people have by and large not bought the politics of majoritarianism. Therefore, politically, Banerjee’s drift towards competitive communalism is unprincipled and almost unprecedented. She should bear in mind the fact that from the 1950s onwards, West Bengal has not witnessed much by way of communal tension despite being home to a large Muslim community – exceeding a quarter of the total population.
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