Each state is doing its own thing in war against Naxals

By Ajai Sahni The Maoist insurgency is now by far the worst of conflicts in India. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), there have been 811 incidents resulting in 270 deaths up to 14 June 2011, including 190 civilians and 80 security personnel. This is, however, lower than the figures for the same period last year, at 1,025 violent incidents and 473 persons killed, including 296 civilians and 177 security personnel. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Maoist-related fatalities in 2010, at 1,180, significantly outstripped the combined total of fatalities in all other terrorist and insurgent movements in the country.  Most disturbingly, 2011 has already witnessed at least 39 ‘swarming attacks’ by the Maoists, involving large numbers of armed cadre and people’s militia, as against 80 in 2010 and 75 in 2009.[caption id=“attachment_32729” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“Fatalities of an internal war. Rajesh Kumar Sen/Reuters”]  [/caption] The Chhattisgarh Police’s Operation Green Hunt and the Centre’s ‘massive and coordinated’ operations across the worst-affected states had resulted in a significant spike in fatalities towards the end of 2009 and up to the debacle at Chintalnar in Chhattisgarh in April 2010, when 76 security personnel were killed by the Maoists. After Chintalnar, offensive operations against the Maoist were drastically scaled down, and overall fatalities declined. The Home Ministry, which had been boasting of a ‘clear, hold and develop’ strategy, is now emphasising development works under the Integrated Action Plan. The tactical emphasis is now on “intelligence-based operations with minimal collateral damage”. Here’s how the battle between the Indian states and the Maoists (or Naxals) stands now. Andhra Pradesh: This is the dramatic success story among Maoist-afflicted states. From 320 persons killed in 2005, the state registered just 33 fatalities in 2010, and four in 2011 (till June). The Maoists made some tentative attempts in 2010 to restore their bases in the Telangana region and in the Nallamalla forests, but were quickly thwarted, with many of their top leaders arrested or killed.[caption id=“attachment_32734” align=“alignleft” width=“150” caption=“Ajai Sahni “]  [/caption] The Andhra Police have also successfully blocked cross-border operations into their territory from the neighbouring states by building an intelligence network across borders, and by operating in coordination with the police forces of the adjoining states. In their Social Investigation of North Telangana, the Maoists now acknowledge that social and economic conditions in their erstwhile Telangana stronghold have been so transformed that a restoration of their dominance there would be very difficult. In a last-ditch gamble, they have thrown their weight behind the Telangana statehood movement, hoping to install a ‘sympathetic’ government in the new state, if the current campaign succeeds. Bihar: Fatalities in Bihar stood at 98 in 2010, against 78 in 2009, and 2011 has seen 28 fatalities till 19 June. Both operations and security force morale continue to be undermined by Chief Minister Nitish Kumar’s continuous reiteration that the Maoists cannot be countered by force, and that all-round development and welfare measures alone can bring the Maoists back to the mainstream. The state government has remained unwilling to join the Centre’s ‘coordinated’ operations in the worst-affected states. State police chief Neelmani, however, has articulated a radically different position, declaring that he was “very much in favour of supporting” the Centre’s operations, and that “unnecessary confusion was created on the state’s ambivalence… We had, in fact, started raising our own anti-Naxal force on the lines of Andhra Pradesh’s STF (Special Task Force) in the absence of the Centre meeting our demands for additional forces.” Chhattisgarh: Chhattisgarh has been the state worst-affected by Maoist violence since 2006, with the exception of 2010, when it was briefly overtaken by West Bengal. Nevertheless, fatalities in 2010 stood at a high 327, slightly lower than the previous year at 345. A relatively low 99 fatalities had been recorded in 2011 till 19 June. The state government has consistently maintained that there is no alternative to giving an armed response to the Maoist menace, but misconceived operational strategies have led to the loss of many lives, with the brunt being borne by security personnel. Aggressive, though incoherent, operations had brought about a succession of debacles, culminating in the massacre of 76 security personnel at Chintalnar in April 2010, after which the forces went into a defensive huddle. Low grade operations have gradually been restored, but without any dramatic gains, even as Maoist consolidation continues apace. Meanwhile, on 31 May 2011, the army entered into the Maoist-dominated region of Chhattisgarh to set up a training command in Abujhmadh—currently the ‘central guerilla zone’ of the CPI (Maoist)—in Narayanpur district. This action has provoked another Maoist ‘tactical counter-offensive’, and violence has escalated after an extended lull, in May and June 2011. The state government has sought to address the endemic shortage of forces by accelerated recruitment and training of Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF) personnel at the Jungle Warfare and Counter-insurgency School at Kanker. However, while significant numbers have been recruited and trained over the past years, their deployment has been irrational, with fewer than 2,500 of such personnel being assigned to counter-insurgency duties. Jharkhand: After a particularly bad year in 2009, with 217 fatalities, Maoist violence shifted out of the state into West Bengal, bringing Jharkhand’s fatalities down to 147 in 2010. Jharkhand emerged as the operational base for Maoist campaigns in West Bengal through late 2009-2010. The year 2011, however, indicates that Maoist activities within the state are again escalating, with 88 fatalities till 19 June. The Maoist attack at Lohardaga on 3 May 2011, demonstrated the degree to which the state’s operational responses have remained rudderless and ill-planned. Serial landmine blasts had left 11 policemen dead and over 50 injured, even after the Intelligence Bureau had conveyed specific information that Lohardaga had been extensively mined. The Lohardaga incident was only one of a continuous succession of Maoist attacks on security forces in Jharkhand. The Maoists have been exerting efforts to bring the Santhal Parganas region under their dominance in order to establish a corridor of free access to West Bengal, Bihar and Bangladesh. The state’s operations against the Maoists continue, but lack coherence and focus, and have resulted in increasing security personnel fatalities rather than any restoration of the writ of government. Orissa: Orissa had 108 Maoist-related fatalities in 2010, as against 81 in 2009. Some 47 persons have lost their lives in 2011 (till 19 June). The abduction of the District Collector of Malkangiri in February 2011 was a body blow to the state’s operations and prestige. The state agreed to withdraw cases against five prominent Maoists and 153 tribals. However, Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik insisted that Maoist violence must stop before any halt is called to the anti-Maoist operation by the state. The state’s capacity to fight the Maoists remains poor, with chronic deficits in manpower and technical capabilities. Various initiatives to modernise and strengthen the police have been halting and uncertain. Maharashtra: Maharashtra experienced a sharp drop in Maoist-related fatalities in 2010, at 40, as against 87 in 2009. An escalation is, however, already in evidence in 2011, with 46 dead by 19 June. The Gadchiroli district, abutting Chhattisgarh, into which the Abujhmadh forest overflows, remains the epicentre of violence in Maharashtra, though adjoining districts have also seen significant Maoist consolidation. The Maoists have declared their support to the Vidarbha Rajya Sangram Samiti (Vidarbha State Struggle Committee), seeking a separation from Maharashtra for this backward region. The broad orientation of the establishment in Maharashtra towards the Maoist menace remains confused, with excessive emphasis on developmental projects that simply cannot be implemented. The security sector continues to suffer from massive deficits and an evident loss of direction. The state fares poorly in modernising its police forces, failing to use the funds allocated by the Centre. West Bengal: In the wake of Nandigram, Singur and Lalgarh, and in the run-up to the state assembly elections, West Bengal had witnessed a tremendous escalation in Maoist violence, registering the largest number of fatalities in 2010, at 425, pushing Chhattisgarh, with 327 fatalities, to second place. In 2011 till 23 June, 38 persons had been killed. With the elections over, and with Mamata Bannerjee installed in power, fatalities in the state have tailed off quickly, bringing West Bengal (38 killed till 19 June 2011) to fifth place in terms of fatalities, after Chhattisgarh (99), Jharkhand (88), Orissa (47) and Maharashtra (46). In the pre-election phase, Banerjee had committed to withdrawing central forces from the Jangalmahal area, and, though she has reiterated that she would “never backtrack from our commitment”, she is yet to take a decision on the issue. Anti-Maoist operations have, however, come to a virtual standstill, while intelligence inputs indicate that the Maoists are regrouping. On 4 June 2011, the Maoists in West Bengal decided to declare a ‘ceasefire’ in the state to give Banerjee “time to fulfil her promises to Jangalmahal”, including the withdrawal of joint forces. Ajai Sahni is Executive Director of the Institute of Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal Email: ajaisahni@gmail.com