9/11 and terror: The war has to begin and end in Pakistan

It is 10 years since that fateful morning when 19 terrorists took control of four aircraft, three of which struck the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The attacks that left over 3,000 dead seemed to herald the beginning of the age of ‘super-terrorism’. The United States led by President George W Bush responded with a declaration of war on terrorism. The strategic doctrine that underpinned this ‘war on terror’ was a combination of defence and deterrence on American soil and attack and prevention overseas. The contribution of each of these elements to American security is open to question. But it is clear that the offensive and preventive component of this strategy has pitched the US in prolonged conflicts with no easy end in sight. In Iraq, combat operations may have ceased but the political reconciliation essential for a stable peace has proved elusive. The war in Afghanistan continues to take its toll without an edifying end in sight. Meanwhile, the US finds itself involved in overt or covert operations in a range of other countries—Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria to name a few. On the 10th anniversary of 9/11, the Obama administration is bound to talk up its major success in the war on terror: the killing of Osama Bin Laden earlier this year. The impact of Bin Laden’s death on the effectiveness of al Qaeda remains to be seen. Preliminary assessments differ depending on the analyst’s views about the organisational nature and structure of Al Qaeda. Those who believe that al Qaeda is a centralised outfit plotting, coordinating and executing major terrorist attacks think that the death of Bin Laden is a severe blow. [caption id=“attachment_78807” align=“alignleft” width=“380” caption=“The attacks that left over 3,000 dead seemed to herald the beginning of the age of ‘super-terrorism’. Reuters”]  [/caption] Those who believe that al Qaeda is a flat, networked outfit operating with franchises claim that Bin Laden’s passing is not going to make much of an operational difference. Neither of these views is entirely convincing, for they overlook the central contribution of Bin Laden to al Qaeda’s functioning. Osama shrewdly understood the diffused nature of power in a world of global communications. Contemporary conflicts are as much, if not more, about winning the battle of public opinion as about winning the battles on the ground. The ability to craft and disseminate convincing narratives—about the nature of the struggle, the stakes involved, the progress of operations and the eventual outcome—is a crucial dimension of warfare in the early 21st century. Bin Laden was an outstanding purveyor of the al Qaeda’s narratives—messages that drew and secured support for the outfit in its attempt to take on the US. His death may or may not affect the operational effectiveness of al Qaeda, but it will certainly diminish its ability to appeal to new bases of support and approval. The Obama administration can also draw comfort from the fact that the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East has taken the form of popular, democratic protests. The al Qaeda’s message appears to have little resonance with the crowds that throng the main squares and thoroughfares across the Arab world. To be sure, there are Islamist outfits of various kinds involved in these protests. But their ideology and politics is considerably different from that of al Qaeda. Set against these positive developments are more worrying trends. The most problematic of these is the conflict in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre. The elimination of Bin Laden has created the necessary political backdrop for an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the exit may not be all that smooth. For one thing, the insurgency has proven more resilient and adaptive than anticipated by American strategists. General David Petraeus’ much feted counter-insurgency strategy has not been as successful as the Pentagon would like us to believe. Claims about the ‘momentum’ of the insurgency being broken betray a serious misunderstanding of the nature of counter-insurgency warfare. Control of territory, not momentum of operations, is the key factor in counter-insurgency—particularly when the insurgency has an external base. The US military’s performance on this score has so far been decidedly mixed. Equally dubious is the assumption about a smooth transfer of operational responsibility to the Afghan security forces. In the past year an additional 100,000 Afghan personnel have reportedly been recruited and trained. But their operational mettle is yet to be tested seriously. Besides given the persistent problems over the availability of Western trainers, it seems unwise to rely too much on the capability of the Afghan forces. To be sure, there will be a residual American presence to shore up the Afghan forces. But the insurgency is also morphing in more dangerous ways. The last couple of months have seen a surge in the use of improvised explosive devices and in the assassination of senior Afghan leaders. Efforts to reach out to the Taliban have been halting. The possibility of a negotiated settlement is made much more difficult by the fact that the Taliban is no longer a unified entity. There are several factions and associated groups that have considerable operational independence. The upshot of it is that the Americans will have to rely on all available partners to create a patchwork of small deals with these outfits. The most important of these potential partners is Pakistan. But, as many American officials realise, it is the least reliable of partners. The challenge of dealing with Pakistan is compounded by the fact that Pakistan is also the main focus of America’s battle against the al Qaeda and its affiliates. (As far as India is concerned, Pakistan has always been the epicentre of terrorist concerns - whether it is 26/11 or the latest Delhi blast which is being laid at the door of HuJi - a Bangladesh outfit with links to Pakistan’s ISI.) The US not only depends on Pakistan for cooperation on intelligence and covert operations, but is also concerned about the possibility of Pakistani nukes falling in jihadi hands. Washington does hold certain critical levers like economic aid to Pakistan. But the Obama administration believes that sanctions or conditions-based aid will not work. Figuring out how to deal with Pakistan is the single most important challenge in America’s struggle against terrorism. Unless the Obama administration takes a more realistic tack, the US might find itself embroiled in the region for another decade. Srinath Raghavan is Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.