With newly elected Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te set to assume office on May 20, there is intense speculation surrounding China’s potential response to the event. In anticipation of an aggressive response, Tsai Ming-yen, Director-General of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, announced on May 1 that island authorities will be implementing measures to strengthen national critical infrastructure. Aiding the island’s overall defence posture, on April 24, United States President Joe Biden has also signed a bill to mobilise $8 billion in defence aid to the Indo-Pacific in general and Taiwan in particular. With neither the US nor China backing down on their respective positions on the Taiwan issue, these developments add fire to the already deteriorating cross-Strait dynamics.
US’ proactive role worries China
During the recently concluded meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Xi conveyed that the very first “red line” the US should not cross in its relations with China is the Taiwan issue. However, the US’ decision to continue to provide political and military support to Taiwan is motivated by two key factors: shared values and national security interests.
While from a values-based perspective, the US sees its role in the Taiwan Strait as a defender of democracy and a provider of net security, from a national security interests perspective, it sees immense value in deterring China, preventing undue escalation, and securing supply chains in critical sectors such as semiconductor chips, wherein Taiwan plays a vital role.
Hence, in the run up to Lai’s assumption of the presidential office, the US has embarked on a mission to demonstrate commitment to Taiwan. In addition to quickly signing the above-mentioned Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Bill into law, over the past week, the Biden administration has also engaged with counterparts in Taipei over the ‘US-Taiwan Trade Initiative on Trade in the 21st Century'.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsDuring this latest round of negotiations, concluded on May 3, the two sides reportedly discussed agriculture, environment, and labour issues with the hope of progressing the initiative to its second stage. After the first stage plan was signed by Washington and Taipei in May last year and brought into force through a ‘First Agreement Implementation Act’ in the US in August 2023, the Chinese foreign ministry regarded the move as a violation of the US’ ‘One China policy’. Nonetheless, the US and Taiwan have remained undeterred in their commitment to the pact.
Further, Antony Blinken’s latest remarks, urging the World Health Organisation (WHO) to invite Taiwan as an observer in the upcoming World Health Assembly (WHA) session starting May 27, have drawn China’s ire. More specifically, it has led Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, to argue that by supporting Taiwan’s observer status in the WHA, the US is indulging in “separatist” activities to enable “Taiwan independence”. China has deployed coercive diplomatic tactics to restrict Taiwan’s international space, including regularly objecting to Taiwan’s WHA membership in addition to conducting dollar diplomacy with Taiwan’s current and previous diplomatic allies. In this light, with China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other, the battle to defend values and interests is also playing out at the multilateral stage.
What can China do next?
Given that there is no let-up in either Taiwan’s defence preparedness posture or the US’ backing of the island, China is likely to dig into its coercive toolkit to respond to Lai’s swearing in. As per daily reports from the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, Chinese aircraft and naval vessels are already operating in record numbers in the Taiwan Strait, crossing the regional median line and performing sorties close to the island’s northern and southwestern Air Defence Identification Zone. The military’s pressure on Taiwan’s defences is supplemented by economic manipulation tactics involving trade and tourism relations. Not long ago, the Chinese State Council Customs Tariff Commission decided to suspend preferential tax rates for Taiwanese chemical imports into the country as granted under the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Now, China has announced that it is willing to resume imports and expand direct passenger tourism from Fujian province to Matsu island and Taiwan proper, as a sign of “goodwill” to the island.
So far, Taiwan has shown no signs of accepting this “goodwill”, and the February 2024 decision of island authorities to ban group travel from China remains intact. Further, in the past few days, both Lai and his vice presidential counterpart Bi-Khim Hsiao have applauded the US for its commitment to Taiwan, all the while urging China to gain the “confidence to talk” to them. Hence, with neither Taiwan nor the US willing to signal weakness and teaming up to create deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific under Lai, Beijing’s woes are only likely to exacerbate.
The author is a research analyst with the Takshashila Institution, a public policy think tank based out of Bengaluru, India. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.