How Trump’s claim of ending the Congo conflict doesn’t hold ground

The recent massacre of more than 50 civilians at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-backed Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has exposed the persistent instability plaguing the country. In the previous month, ADF killed 40 people, including women and children, when it stormed a Catholic church during a vigil. The resurgence of ADF after a lull in their activities in previous months, coupled with the M23 suspending talks with the DRC government, showcases that the road to peace in the country is long and fraught.

M23, long viewed as a proxy of Rwanda, has entrenched itself in the eastern Congo region, especially in the mineral-rich North Kivu and South Kivu. As per UN experts, 3,000-4,000 Rwandan troops were fighting alongside the M23, and evidence also shows that ever since the M23 captured key towns in eastern DRC, illicit mineral trade has increased between DRC and Rwanda.

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Even though, on June 27, 2025, the US brokered a peace deal between Rwanda and DRC, with American President Donald Trump claiming credit for ending the three-decade war in the African region, the ground realities suggest otherwise. The peace deal does little to address the levers of the conflict: weak governance, strategic interests of DRC’s neighbours and political economy that sustains and entrenches the armed groups in DRC.

The roots of the weak governance can be traced back to Mobutu Sese Seko’s authoritarian rule. His rule from 1965 to 1997 hollowed out state institutions. Seko, the then Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, had overthrown the democratic government of the Democratic Republic of Congo in a coup with the support of the US and Belgium in 1960 and was a key player in installing the government in 1961; however, in 1965, he directly took power through a second coup. He allowed kleptocracy to seep in as his personal fortunes rose while the country suffered from inflation, large debt and massive currency devaluations.

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Although Seko installed a single-party system and rechristened DRC as Zaire in the 1970s, his writ did not extend to the eastern DRC, and ethnic tensions in Rwanda between the dominant Hutus and minority Tutsis in the 1960s, leading to 300,000 people from the Tutsi community migrating to neighbouring countries, mostly to DRC, also impacted the governance.

However, the economic dispatchment in the 1990s, along with the impact of the Rwandan genocide, further destabilised DRC. After the killing of approximately 500,000-1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—made up of Tutsis—ended the genocide by defeating the government and assumed power, which led to the exodus of over two million Hutu refugees, including those responsible for the genocide in neighbouring countries.

However, the refugee camps in Zaire were a unique case, as these camps were militarised and politicised by extremist Hutus. The militarisation and politicisation of camps, along with the fact that President Seko supported these Hutu leaders with arms, money laundering and diplomatic support, led to the First Congo War, where Rwandan troops attacked Zaire to expel Hutu groups.

The spillovers were also felt in the continent as Uganda, Burundi, Angola and Eritrea joined anti-Seko forces, while Sudan supported the regime. However, years of corruption and institutional decay, along with the end of the Cold War, led to Seko’s regime collapsing. The country was rechristened again as the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila replaced Seko. However, Kabila, backed by Uganda and Rwanda, could not live up to the expectations of his backers, leading to the Second Congo War.

The Second Congo War started in 1998 and ended in 2003 and was given the monicker of ‘Africa’s War’ due to the involvement of multiple countries, as Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and allegedly Sudan supported Kabila’s regime, while Rwanda and Uganda, along with Burundi and allegedly Libya, backed the rebels fighting the Kabila regime.

Beyond the formal state support, dozens of militia groups, warlords and armed groups also engaged in the conflict. The main theatre of conflict was the mineral rich Eastern DRC. The war led to the death of 3-5 million, with many dying due to starvation and disease. The conflict, although given a security lens, also showcased the angle between illicit mining, armed groups and the entrenched interests of states under the guise of security. The war ended with the 2003 Peace Accords, which led to a transitional government and withdrawal of most foreign troops; however, this did not lead to a lasting peace in the DRC.

Although the Second Congo War ended, eastern DRC again became embroiled in the new cycle of conflicts known as the Kivu Wars, which started in 2004, where armed groups with tacit foreign backing engaged in conflict. The Kivu Wars, which are continuing today, have led to groups sustaining themselves through illegal mining of gold, coltan and cassiterite.

Despite hosting one of the UN’s largest and longest-running peacekeeping missions in DRC, the government’s writ has not been established in the eastern part of DRC, as M23 controls the largest cities as well as profitable routes in the mineral-rich North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. The activation of ISIL-affiliated ADF is another headache for the government whose finances are stretched fighting the M23.

While President Trump may claim that he has ended the decades of conflict in DRC and would want American companies to take advantage of DRC’s huge mineral wealth (DRC has over half of the world’s cobalt reserves, 10 per cent of global copper reserves, is the largest diamond producer by volume and boasts substantial reserves of gold, coltan, cassiterite, tin, tungsten, tantalum and lithium), the recent developments question the claim. He would be advised to look at the deeper legacy of the conflict, not just simplify it in terms of profit and loss as he is prone to.

The writer is Research Fellow, India Foundation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.