Why Israel must redefine notion of victory or else it risks losing war

Two days after Hamas launched a horrific attack on Israel, on 7 October 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his televised address announced five goals for his government and the IDF, which included among others destruction of Hamas.

Destruction of Hamas is a military task which the IDF is pursuing in conjunction with other security agencies. The task requires the IDF to capture and kill Hamas’ political and military leadership and as many members as possible, destroy the group’s command and control capability and degrade its logistical capability and ‘Gaza Metro’. Implicit in the tasks is securing the release of hostages and restoring deterrence against any further attack on Israel.

Like most other modern militaries, the IDF too has struggled to find an answer to how to deal with a terrorist organisation which has the support of its people and external agencies. Ever since Operation Accountability and Operation Grapes of Wrath against Hezbollah in the 1990s the IDF operations have followed a predictable pattern, barring few exceptions – the IDF operations commence with air force strikes killing a few terrorist leaders followed by a ground offensive when the group is still unbalanced, largely using standoff weapon systems. However, the terrorist groups recover soon and fight back.

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The IDF finds it difficult to keep the pressure and a negotiated settlement is sought, with international support, to terminate the war. Thereafter, Israel enjoys a limited period of peace before the next round of violence starts. The Israeli military doctrine is heavily biased in favour of the overwhelming use of air power and precision strikes, which the terrorist groups can counter by concealing fighters and resources, minimising electronic signatures, and using the Gaza Metro. The Israeli strategy euphemistically called the ‘ mowing the grass’ strategy could never find a permanent solution to the raids by Hamas and other terrorist groups.

To counter the predictability in operations, almost a decade ago, the IDF had conceptualised a plan involving large-scale ground manoeuvre and capturing the three largest cities in Gaza - Gaza City, Khan Younis and Rafah – in two weeks. For some reason, the plans were shelved and never implemented.

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During the tenure of Gadi Eisenkot, 21st Chief of Staff of the IDF, a plan codenamed, Operation Lightning Strike was also developed to overcome some of the challenges to ground manoeuvre. This was attempted in May 2021 with partial success, hence could not be repeated after the 7 October attack.

In the wake of the 7 October attack, the IDF had no plans for operations in the depth area, once the ground offensive began and had to hurriedly make one from scratch. On 20 October 2023, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant announced IDF’s three-phase plan – air and ground campaign to destroy Hamas and its infrastructure, followed by low-intensity operations to destroy pockets of resistance and finally the creation of a new security regime and withdrawal of IDF.

The IDF conducted air campaigns and standoff attacks before initiating ground operations on 27 October. By then the element of surprise was lost and the Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters had dispersed among the population and prepared defences. The ground offensive has been launched in three successive phases, starting with capturing, and clearing Gaza City on 27 October, followed by operations in Khan Yunis at the end of December 2023. The IDF is yet to commence ground operations in Rafah – a far cry from the plan of a decade ago which mandated simultaneous operations in the three cities to terminate within two weeks.

Within 48 hours of the attack on 7 October, Israel was able to mobilise 350,000 reservists,  and in the initial days of operations, there were five divisions, consisting of around 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers each operating in the Gaza Strip. In the first three months, the tempo of operations was fierce, which is reflected in the casualties suffered by Palestinians and infrastructure destroyed. After that, the operational momentum reduced and by February 2023, the last of the reserve units were withdrawn from Gaza and only two divisions - the 98th and 162nd — are still operating with reduced strength.

Four and a half months after Israel launched its ground offensive, the IDF has very few successes to show for all its efforts. By the second week of February 2024, as per the US assessment, the IDF had killed 30 per cent of Hamas fighters, out of the initial estimate of 25,000 to 30,000 fighters. During the same period, the support for Hamas has tripled among Palestinians which may have resulted in many joining or at least tacitly supporting the actions of the group.

The IDF is operating with a reduced number of formations and strength, resulting in its diminishing control over the Gaza Strip, as evidenced by a resurgence in Hamas’ activities. Reportedly Hamas fighters, police and bureaucrats are reasserting their authority even in the areas controlled by the IDF.

The IDF has neutralised a large number of lower-level military leaders of Hamas, but the top rung, including Yahya Sinwar has eluded the IDF. Hamas is reportedly working on contingency plans in case the IDF neutralises Sinwar.  In any case, terrorist groups are known to survive the loss of their leaders and members. It is quite likely that even if Israel destroys Hamas’s military wing, the idea of Hamas may survive.  It has also been empirically established only 7 per cent of terrorist groups have been terminated using military means.

The Netanyahu government needs to rethink its political and military objective of destroying Hamas.

The author is a Research Fellow at MP-IDSA. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.