Why India’s efforts to engage Global South is a forceful idea

Global South has taken on new undertones since it was first used in 1969, denoting the “Third World” or the majority of developing countries. The Global South includes the Next Eleven (N-11) comprising countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam, identified by Goldman Sachs in 2005, the ten Big Emerging Markets (BEM) that include Mexico, India and South Korea and rapidly growing economies known as the Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs).

The balance of economic power has evolved over the past four decades or more. Beginning the 1980s, especially with China modernising and opening up its economy, the traditional engines of economic growth have shifted towards Asia. In recent decades, growth and prosperity has spread to India, Indonesia and others across the Indo-Pacific. Today, about 40 per cent of global trade, 50 per cent of manufacturing and a significant share of high-tech products are accounted for by the Global South.

Lacking in definition

Even though the Global South is a common enough term, there is no common definition. There is no membership criterion nor are there any clear-cut economic benchmarks.

One of the early attempts at drawing a distinction between the rich and the poor nations was the “Brandt Line” of the 1980s. It was a visual representation of the wealthy Global North and the poorer Global South. Its shifting contours failed to anticipate or accommodate the extraordinary changes in the balance of economic power that emerged in subsequent decades, giving shape to new geopolitical realities.

The Brandt Line had other anomalies. Rich nations like Qatar, UAE and Singapore appeared in the Global South despite boasting some of the highest per capita GDPs in the world.

New Salience

The Global South acquired a new salience following the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crises of 2007-2008. The Asian meltdown devalued currencies especially in Southeast Asia, accompanied by tumbling GDPs and a commensurate rise in poverty and unemployment. The new vulnerabilities led to greater dependence of the regional countries on China, including through the Chiang Mai initiative for currency swap arrangements under the ASEAN Plus Three format. The economic and financial downturn in the West eroded its capacity to meet the growing infrastructure, connectivity and developmental needs of many developing nations. The US, in any case, was preoccupied in the noughties with the international war on terror. The economic void was quickly filled by China.

The resurgence of the Global South reflects a genuine frustration among developing countries with the inability of the multilateral framework to address key developmental challenges, including climate action and green transitions. The question is whether the Global South can succeed in achieving its goals when even structured groupings have failed in the past.

Overlaps

The Global South overlaps with the G-77 and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). The G-77 grouping, founded in 1964, now comprises 134 developing countries that, as a coalition, seek better terms of economic engagement with the richer nations. It has a permanent secretariat provided by the UN Headquarters., supported by contributions from G-77 member states. China has extended political support and financial support to the G-77 since 1994. The G-77 Plus China format is a unique modus vivendi to accommodate a major economic power that the G-77 regards as a member but which does not quite see itself as a member.

The genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in 1961, is anchored in political neutrality during the Cold War. It has a rotational secretariat funded by the country chairing the movement. The Global South, by contrast, is a non-structural, non-binding and informal community.

The Global South has received new impetus today through the G20 grouping which includes large economies of the Global South such India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Saudi Arabia and others, juxtaposed alongside the G7 nations. The G20, established in 1999 after the Asian financial crisis as a forum to address global economic and financial issues, and further elevated to the leaders’ level in 2008, has gradually emerged as a key platform for North-South issues. With the expansion of the G20 in 2023 under India’s Presidency to include the African Union, developing countries in the G20 are increasingly advocating the priorities of the Global South from within.

Future contours

As the Global South continues to evolve, there is much speculation about its future form and structure, especially considering the rise of economic and geopolitical powers like China and India within the non-West constituency.

Given the fluid definition of the Global South, it is difficult to imagine a permanent secretariat. It will prove impossible to work out criteria for membership. Countries should remain at liberty to associate with the Global South through a dynamic and fluid membership. It is a moot question if giving it a structure or secretariat would help because there already exist other structures focussed on the needs of the Global South. A permanent structure and membership in an era of major power contestation could give it an anti-West appearance. A loosely knit structure might wield greater moral authority.

In any case, countries of the Global South are not in a position to form a group to take on the richer countries on any issue because of the inherent inequities in the global order. For example, countries of the Global South that are most affected by climate change have failed at COP29 to get the richer nations to commit to the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance of US$ 1.3 trillion per year.

Unless the global order is reformed, including the UN Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, a formal grouping under the rubric of “Global South” would prove ineffective in advancing the collective objectives of poorer nations. Secretariats are expensive to maintain. Funding from member states would only add to the burden. Support for the Secretariat from the richer countries or permanent members of the UN Security Council would come with strings attached.

No place for hierarchy

The Global South should avoid hierarchy. It is a moot question if privileged veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, like China, would qualify for the Global South tag. China is the world’s second-largest economy with a per capita GDP above $12,000. Going by the G-77 experience, would developing countries be ready to countenance a “Global South Plus China” format? Dual identities of this nature may re-emphasise the very inequalities of the current global order that the Global South is seeking to eliminate.

At the same time, middle powers should play a bigger role in promoting regional economic growth and prosperity. They could take on a role akin to the G-24 in the G-77 process. Middle powers could set up Global South Development Cells within their governmental structures to promote South-South cooperation in a voluntary yet coordinated manner.

India’s efforts to engage the Global South through the Voice of the Global South Summit align with this vision. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has done well to repeatedly express India’s commitment to global welfare as a ‘Vishwa Bandhu’ (global friend) while eschewing any hints at unwelcome patronage.

The author is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.