Why collaboration model would work better for India in curbing Chinese footprints in neighbourhood

Power politics in the Indo-Pacific region is defined today by a few characteristics. First and foremost, the issue of ‘Taiwan on the boil’, which is the primary cause of confrontation between the US and China that affects the South and East China Seas and the western Pacific region directly, and the rest of the world because of the possibilities that a conflict over Taiwan could have for world trade and economy.

Second, the blatant show of force and disrespect for a ‘rule-based order’ at sea by China, as is evident from its non-compliance with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) award in favour of the Philippines and its subsequent strong-arm tactics against the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard units.

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Third, the attempts by China to polarise India’s maritime neighbourhood by engaging in activities that do not appear benign. Some are definitely not in the interest of India’s maritime security.

India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ Policy

It is this third aspect that is the subject of this discussion. India’s foreign policy has long been committed to a ‘Neighbourhood First’ philosophy. It is a bitter lesson of Indian history that the country’s growth and peaceful progress have been hindered several times in the past because of events emanating out of a hostile neighbourhood. India, therefore, does not seek conflict or confrontation and considers peace to be an essential prerequisite for progress.

It is with this intent that India wishes to resolve all disputes with neighbours amicably. However, this is problematic in two main areas: the lack of interest from China’s side in resolving boundary disputes with India and Pakistan’s continued support and sponsoring of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere through hostile religious indoctrination of radicals. These actions by the two countries in question are to keep a significant portion of India’s national security focus directed at these regular pinpricks so as to dilute it elsewhere. This is a game that India has read and understood well.

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Indian Ocean Region: A Zone of Stability

Tacking back to the maritime theatre, the Indian Ocean Region is a zone of relative peace and stability despite being heavily militarised. There are no major conflicts in the region. South and Southeast Asia have little appetite for conflict, and barring China (an East Asian player), with or without the collusion of Pakistan, the region would like peace to prevail so that precious resources can be expended on the well-being of its people. The US initiated the militarisation of the Indian Ocean because of the strategic sea routes that carry hydrocarbons from the Arabian Gulf and the need to protect them from interference.

The US Fifth Fleet is located in Bahrain, and the area comes under the geographical jurisdiction of the US CENTCOM, headquartered at Tampa, Florida. Of late, piracy has been a good excuse to continue and consolidate naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region, though its effect on the world economy has been negligible, until the recent Houthi-fuelled Red Sea crisis. It is, however, a win-win for navies that wish to remain ‘out of area’ and the maritime insurance community.

China’s Naval Presence and Strategic Interests

This gives other navies a valid excuse to be present in the area even if they do not have serious business. China, till a few years ago, even regularly sent its submarines, both nuclear and conventional, to the Indian Ocean Region for no apparent security reason. Even the most uninitiated layperson will know that a submarine can play no role in curbing piracy. Chinese warships, too, have been present for anti-piracy patrols since 2008, but they do precious little apart from being present.

They draw legitimacy from the many other navies that are present in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden that have very little to gain from such deployments other than showing solidarity with their alliance partners. One thing leads to another—China’s military logistics base at Djibouti was established to provide support to their forward-deployed anti-piracy escort forces. There is much more to this than meets the eye. When seen in conjunction with the rapid military and naval modernisation of China, it sets the stage for China’s future expansionist ambitions well beyond its immediate neighbourhood and perhaps a return to the Mahanian ‘big battle’ days some decades into the future, albeit hugely transformed by technologies of the time. The intentions seem clear—it is a matter of developing the capability to do so, the intent for which also appears manifest.

Shaping the Future: China’s Influence in Indian Ocean

For the time being, be under no illusion. China is shaping the environment for that future date. Its deep penetration into smaller and poorer nations of the Indian Ocean Rim and Southeast Asia has created enormous economic and military dependencies based on which China will undoubtedly extract concessions in the form of non-commercial returns, especially in times of conflict. Its political and economic influence on the ruling regimes of these small countries is aimed at pitting them against India and forcing an undesirable choice on feeble governments. The recent anti-India rhetoric in the Maldives government is a clear example of such a foreign policy.

Strategic Infrastructure and Belt and Road Initiative

Apart from Djibouti, the funding and execution of dual-use infrastructure at Gwadar and Hambantota ports under the convenient garb of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) betrays China’s expansionist and coercive influence upon countries in India’s neighbourhood. While Pakistan cooperates with China openly because of its deep-rooted enmity with India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, as well as other island and African nations, wilt under the political and economic influence of the dragon.

These moves are complemented by enormous volumes of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the waters of the Indian Ocean by Chinese trawlers and fishing vessels that obtain licences from weak coastal states that do not have the wherewithal to monitor their exclusive economic zones. To give the devil its due, China has emerged as the preferred alternative to American and European entities in areas of high-end research and exploration such as oceanography, seabed research, offshore exploration, and deep-sea fishing.

Small countries with large ocean resources cannot afford the services of Western entities, and China provides a cheaper option, which is yet another method of creating long-term dependencies. It is time that India moves into these segments and provides an alternative to China with a much higher ’trust’ factor.

India’s Trust-Based Approach

The Indian approach has been one of building trust and capacity-building of maritime neighbours without seeking favours in return. The Indian Navy, as the primary manifestation of India’s maritime and benign power, has been at the forefront of maritime and diplomatic engagements with its smaller neighbours. India’s proven commitment to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has never been doubted, and the Indian Navy has been the fastest responder to all calamities afflicting the region.

The stellar role played by the Indian Navy in delivering the national effort during Covid-19 has starkly contrasted with China’s role as the alleged perpetrator of the pandemic. The Indian Navy has been actively involved in training of navies in the region, providing assets, sharing maritime information, undertaking joint exercises and patrols, as well as engaging in bilateral mechanisms such as staff talks, high-level delegation visits, and inclusion of all maritime neighbours in constructs such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Milan series of exercises.

Building Capacity and Infrastructure

Other collaborative efforts by India have been in areas of training, providing resources, setting up businesses, and building infrastructure, both in non-military and military spheres. The Indian model of capacity-building and development, however, suffers from certain drawbacks that stem from its democratic form of government, slow decision-making, and slow pace of project execution as compared to China. That is not to say that the Chinese model is an all-singing, all-dancing one. Chinese overseas projects benefit Chinese industry almost entirely, with raw materials and even labour being sourced from China.

The long-term impact upon recipient economies would be one of debt and dependency; debts would be subsequently ‘restructured’ in return for tangible or intangible benefits. While it is for the recipient countries to evaluate China’s game, the Indian elephant needs to get much nimbler and move faster on all counts. Trust, by itself, can create goodwill, but it needs to be backed up by performance and efficiency. The ‘collaboration’ model has to get better than the ‘coercion and compromise’ model. Only then will India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy carry its true weight.

Rewriting the Fable

The race between China and India is straight out of Aesop’s fable, ‘The Hare and the Tortoise’—the hare is plainly ahead and unlikely to take a nap in the shade of a tree, allowing the tortoise to trudge ahead. This fable has to be rewritten—by India.

The author is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command. He is currently a commentator on military and maritime issues. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.