The recent attack and counter-attack between Israel and Iran have widened the scope of the conflict in West Asia. The long-simmering tension between them conflagrated into a condition that bordered on a full-blown war. The US and Israel’s collaboration in dismantling Iranian nuclear facilities through the use of critical and cutting-edge technology from the air has inflicted considerable damage on Iran.
It is difficult to assess the scope and nature of the damage to the nuclear facilities in an authoritarian country, where everything is guarded closely and access to information is not a right. Iran’s clandestine pursuit of nuclear enrichment in deep underground facilities makes it difficult to determine the gravity of damage. However, Iran threatens to attack American military bases in the region. Therefore, the recent hiatus is short-lived or a sort of preparation for something consequential in the near future.
The cycle of violence has already begun, and it may intensify sooner or later to a different level. Every move has seen a countermove in the past. For instance, Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites coincided with the latter’s attack on Tel Aviv and Haifa—critical areas from security, civilian, commercial, and defence perspectives. Israel’s impregnable air defence system, known as Iron Dome, was penetrated by Iranian missiles, causing considerable damage. These developments sent shockwaves worldwide concerning their possible escalation and concomitant ramifications.
The potential global economic consequences of a full-scale war—or even the persistence of the ongoing conflict—will have significant geopolitical implications for the region and beyond. To understand the character of the conflict, the following aspects assume salience:
Geographical Non-Contiguity
Israel and Iran do not share a common border. This geographical factor is a war-negative factor. Missile exchanges between the two countries are not new. Iran has disproportionately carried out air attacks on Israel in the past. Israel’s Iron Dome has usually prevented destruction. Tel Aviv has consistently directed its efforts to thwart Iran’s resolve to build a nuclear warhead. The former strikes the latter’s nuclear facilities to prevent the completion and test-firing of a nuclear bomb.Israel perceives an existential threat from Iran, which is determined to destroy Israel for ideological and religious reasons. Geography is a significant deterrent. Iran uses Iraqi and Jordanian airspace to attack Israel. Israel also uses Syrian and Iraqi airspace to carry out air offensives against Iran. Aerial war using other nations’ airspace is untenable and expensive in the long run. Air defence and AI-based disabling technology may render missiles imprecise and erratic. Israel has reportedly taken control of Iranian airspace, posing an enormous challenge to Iranian air power.
Sanctioned Iran and the Nuclear Issue
Iran is the most sanctions-affected country in the world. International sanctions were imposed and expanded against Iran for obstinately pursuing its nuclear programme, creating regional disorder, and for its debilitating human rights record. These chronic sanctions have proven economically disastrous. Today, China is the largest importer of Iranian crude. Sanctions have affected Iran’s crude exports to other countries. The barrage of sanctions has hit its economy. Funding proxies, uranium enrichment, and nuclear facilities have drained its resources. Domestic investment for progress and quality of life has shrunk abysmally.
Impact Shorts
View AllTehran continues its nuclear programme despite sanctions. Its nuclear issue is the most pressing one in the region. Iran enriched uranium up to 60% purity, prompting Israel to allege that Tehran is closer to producing nuclear weapons. It launched ‘Operation Rising Lion’, attacking Isfahan, Natanz, and other Iranian nuclear facilities. Fordow, Iran’s most fortified underground nuclear facility, has many centrifuges that remain immune to Israeli attack.
However, several factors constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambition. Iran, the P5, and Germany signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)/Iran nuclear deal in 2015, limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent, sufficient for electricity production. However, Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, citing inherent weaknesses in the treaty. After the US withdrawal, Iran further enriched its uranium. Tehran maintains that it has every right to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This is just a statement, contradicting Iran’s professed objective of Israel’s destruction.
On the other hand, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi, in a June 2025 address, said, “Unless and until Iran assists the agency in resolving the outstanding safeguard issues, the agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.” The first round of Iran-US nuclear talks was held in Muscat in April 2025 with Oman’s mediation. The sixth round of talks halted in the wake of the conflict. However, Iran has said it is ready for diplomacy with the US, provided Israel stops its aggression.
Understanding the regional geopolitical dynamics of West Asia through the lens of structural realism, one can ask: Will Iran weaponise nuclear power to checkmate Israel and intensify anti-West proclivities? Be that as it may, Iran’s ideological moorings and theological orthodoxy indicate the likelihood of using nuclear capacity for veto power and obstructionist politics.
Ideological Antithesis
Iran is ideologically anti-West. The Shia Islamism of Iran is an antithesis to Western liberalism, democracy, gender equality, and religious freedom. Israel is pro-West and pro-US. Iran does not acknowledge Israel as a state and treats it as an occupying power. There is a deep-seated ideological conflict between the two countries, proving Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the ‘clash of civilizations’, which posits that cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.
This civilisational and ideological enmity, rooted in deep history, is unlikely to resolve quickly. The seeds of conflict rarely die—even after centuries. They lie dormant, waiting for conditions to re-emerge. The dust of conflict hardly settles despite the heavy cost it inflicts. Constructivists also see the Iran-Israel conflict through an ideological lens and find their antagonism deeply rooted.
Iran’s Proxy Warfare
Iran has a well-developed proxy framework. It uses its proxies effectively to secure itself from direct confrontation with Israel and the US. Tehran employs such asymmetric warfare strategies through Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah, and Kataib Hezbollah to counter the growing geopolitical and geostrategic weight of Israel and the USA. It disrupts peace in the region through proxies and promotes religious radicalism.
The Israeli counter-offensive against Hamas and Hezbollah after the October 7 brutal episode has defanged their leadership. Top leaders among them include Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah; Fuad Sukr, top commander of Hezbollah; Nabil Kaouk, Deputy Head of Hezbollah Central Council; Ismail Haniyeh, leader of Hamas; Mohammed Deif, Commander of the Military Wing of Hamas; and Ibrahim Aqil, Commander of the Radwan Force. The US has also gone against the Houthis, known for disrupting Red Sea trade.
Iran is adept at grey warfare. It rarely confronts enemies directly but targets them through proxies. Since its proxies have been weakened by Israel’s concerted attacks, Iran is now exposed to direct confrontation.
Hegemony of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dates back to the 1979 revolution. It is Iran’s most powerful organisation, reporting directly to the Supreme Leader. It is anti-West and anti-Israel. Religious orthodoxy is its core value. It is reported that recent Israeli airstrikes eliminated top leadership, including Hossein Salami (Head of the IRGC), Gholami Rashid (Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters), Amir Ali Hajizadeh (Commander of IRGC Aerospace Forces), and Esmail Qaani (Commander of Quds Force).
Despite setbacks, the IRGC is a powerful organisation with political and economic hegemony in Iran. It can bypass the elected government and operates under the direct command of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (Velayat-e-Faqih). It has wings such as a ground force, Basij paramilitary, naval force (patrolling the Strait of Hormuz), air force (handling the missile programme), and cyber command (espionage and propaganda). It supports armed non-state actors to resist Western systems and views Israel as a perpetual enemy.
Its proxies include Al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain; Kata’ib Hezbollah, Badr Organisation, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyed al-Shuhada in Iraq; Hezbollah in Lebanon; Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine; Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainabiyoun Brigade, Quwat al-Ridha, and Baqir Brigade in Syria; and the Houthis in Yemen. The Quds Force handles external missions while Basij suppresses domestic unrest.
Regional Faultlines
Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia compete for Islamic leadership. Saudi Arabia is naturally positioned for this role due to its custodianship of Islam’s two holiest sites—Mecca and Medina. Turkey and Iran promote Islamic causes to assert leadership despite Shia-Sunni divides.
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) represents Islamic unity, yet tensions remain. The Iran-Saudi conflict is intensified by the Yemen war. Turkey, a NATO member, has its own regional vulnerabilities like Kurdish separatism and is unlikely to openly side with Iran.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have chosen a developmental path and avoid religious radicalism. They prioritise stability and trade, aligned with neoliberal and multipolar worldviews. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are diversifying their economies, investing globally, building infrastructure, and embracing AI. These states focus on delivering on their Vision Documents and maintaining regime security—hence, avoiding direct entanglement in conflicts.
The American Strategy
The US uses an offshore balancing strategy to check Iran’s rise. It is Israel’s unwavering ally, supporting it militarily to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Nuclear-armed Iran would destabilise the region and threaten Israel’s existence.
The US also supports GCC states—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain—against Iranian threats. It ensures energy security and free navigation in critical waterways like the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.
The US Central Command (CENTCOM) is headquartered in Bahrain, with bases in Kuwait (Camp Arifjan), UAE (Al Dhafra), Qatar (Al Udeid), Iraq (Erbil), etc., to deter geostrategic risks. The recent US-Israel joint strike against Iranian nuclear sites underscores this strategic resolve. If Iran retaliates against US assets, it may prompt further US strikes to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Tehran’s defiance suggests an escalation is imminent.
Russia’s Position
Russia may support Iran militarily or logistically, but not overtly. It could not intervene meaningfully in Syria after Assad’s ousting—Assad now lives under Putin’s protection in Moscow.
Russia is too mired in its Ukraine war to engage elsewhere. War fatigue limits its options. Any support for Iran will be covert and material.
China’s Transactional Approach
China may supply Iran with material and weapons. True to Sun Tzu’s thinking, China avoids direct confrontation, especially on others’ behalf. It excels in “grey zone” warfare, preferring ambiguity.
A transactional power, China prioritises its economic interests—particularly uninterrupted access to Iranian oil. While it may support Iran materially, it will do so discreetly, avoiding antagonism with Israel or the West.
Jajati K Pattnaik is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Chandan K Panda is an Assistant Professor at Rajiv Gandhi University (A Central University), Itanagar. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.