On April 13, Iran, breaking off the trend established for decades, launched a direct military attack from its soil against a nation—that too its sworn enemy, Israel—in a massive and simultaneous strike of drones and missiles, numbering in excess of 300.
This attack was a retaliatory response to an earlier Israeli strike on April 1, which targeted the Iranian Consulate in Damascus, resulting in the deaths of seven members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the senior commander in Lebanon and Syria. It is difficult to say whether Iran was provoked enough to take this unprecedented action due to the strike on its consulate or whether Iran was patiently waiting for an opportune moment to join the war directly for legitimate reasons.
Nonetheless, the retaliatory strike did two things. Firstly, it immediately expanded the scope of war much beyond Gaza, and secondly, it signalled to the world that Iran has finally crossed the threshold of patience and that it is no longer willing to fight the battle from the shadows, through its proxies in the region.
There were three more very interesting facts about the Iranian strikes. First, this was the first direct military engagement of Iran with any nation after the end of its war with Iraq in 1988. Second, this was the first time that Iran has entered into a direct military conflict with Israel, as it was not part of the Arab coalitions that fought Arab-Israeli wars in the previous century. Third, this is being called the largest simultaneous strike by aerial military platforms in modern history, with over 300 projectiles (including drones) descending on the targeted country at the same time.
Iran may have shed its strategic patience by striking Israel directly from its soil, however, the fact that it targeted only military sites clearly indicated a sense of caution, restraint, and non-escalation. Before we dwell into the reasons why Iran has finally shed its strategic patience, it may be worthwhile to take a brief recap of major provocations in the past and how Iran reacted to better understand this tectonic shift in Iran’s policy.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsRecap of Major Attacks on Iran
Iran has been in the eye of the storm of the West as well as the Sunni Muslim world in the region for more than two decades. Reasons vary, from the threats posed by its nuclear programme to its rivalry with Saudi Arabia to its sworn enmity with Israel. And therefore, the history of most of the previous attacks on Iranian interests is indicative of these factors.
Iran’s nuclear programme has been repeatedly targeted. In June 2010, the Stuxnet virus attacked the computers at the Bushehr nuclear plant. It soon spread to the Natanz enrichment facility, where almost 1,000 out of 9,000 centrifuges were destroyed. Investigations pointed the blame at Israel and the US; however, Iran undertook no overt retaliation.
Iran tightened its cyber security measures and thwarted many later attempts, including computer virus attacks like Stars, Duqu, Wiper, Flame, etc. Again, in July 2020 and April 2021, explosions struck the centrifuge production plant at the underground facility at the Natanz nuclear plant, the cause of which on both occasions pointed to sabotage.
Iran’s nuclear scientists were targeted too. In November 2010, Majid Shahriari, a professor of nuclear engineering at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, was killed in a car explosion on his way to work. In November 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, called the father of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, was killed in a roadside attack outside Tehran. Both these and many other mysterious deaths of nuclear scientists were blamed on Israeli intelligence services.
Among military sites, the Parchin military complex southeast of Tehran was targeted by explosives-laden quadcopter suicide drones in May 2022, killing an engineer and damaging a building. In January 2023, a weapons production factory in Ishafan was struck by drones. Incidentally, this factory is known to produce the Shahed or Kamakazi drones, which were being exported to Russia too.
Iran’s IRGC, too, has been repeatedly targeted and its senior commanders assassinated. Qaseem Suleimani, the IRGC commander and considered one of the closest advisers to the Supreme Leader, was killed in a US drone strike in Iraq on January 3, 2020. Seyed Radhi Mousavi, the IRGC’s most influential military commander in Levant, was killed in a suspected Israeli airstrike in Damascus on December 25 last year, and the most recent strike in Damascus on April 1 killed General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.
Iran’s commercial interests, too, have been targeted. In May 2020, a cyberattack impacted maritime traffic control at Shahid Rajaee port on Iran’s southern coast in the Gulf, creating a hold-up of ships waiting to dock. In October 2021, a cyberattack hit the computer systems at over 4,000 gas stations in Iran, preventing people from using government-issued cards to purchase fuel at a subsidised rate.
In February 2024, Iran’s leading south-north gas pipeline was hit by explosions, termed an act of “terrorist act or sabotage". Once again, the attacks were traced back to Israel.
Despite all such acts of sabotage or attack, Iran maintained restraint and avoided direct military confrontation, opting instead to retaliate in its own way through its proxies in the region. It therefore needs to be examined why Iran had to break its strategic patience this time after the attack on the Damascus consulate.
Why Break the Strategic Patience
There are a number of factors that could have led to this strategic decision, which promises to alter the landscape of any conflict with Iran in the future. Some of these are based on internal dynamics in Iran, while others owe their origins to recent global and regional geopolitics.
As regards the ongoing war in Gaza, Iran could have easily continued to hold off Israel through a combination of Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah, and others. With every passing day, Israel was getting impatient and making mistakes, for example, the attack on three cars of World Central Kitchen on April 1 or the strike on Iran’s consulate, etc.
It was also rapidly losing world support due to the reckless killing of civilians in Gaza, especially in hospitals, schools, and aid convoys. The US, its principal benefactor, too, was losing patience with Israel. Back home in Israel, the continued failure to get back the hostages, mounting casualties among the IDF, and the economic downturn were driving Netanyahu’s government into a corner with every passing day. Iran watched from the sidelines and was perhaps waiting for the opportune moment to join the battle, which the Consulate attack provided.
Also, repeated targeting of Iranian assets, IRGC commanders, and people in Iran without any direct response was painting a picture of weak leadership back home in Iran. The attack in the city of Kermen on January 3, during the ceremony to mark the death anniversary of IRGC commander Suleimani, which killed over 100 people, is a case in point too.
With the Supreme Leader Khamenei due to turn 85 years old on April 20, 2024, and no successor yet appointed, there was also a thought that Iran’s policy in the region needed to be set right before it was too late. The poor voter turnout in the parliamentary elections earlier in the year and the protests against the regime in 2021–22 must have also been playing in the minds of the leadership. And, as Iran has experienced in the past, there is no better method of rallying support for the regime and whipping up national fervour than a strategic, game-changing decision like this.
Within the region, Iran has been on a roll for the past few years. The Saudi-Iran peace deal in March 2023 buried decades of hostilities between the two regional rivals. Soon, reconciliation with countries like Egypt, the UAE, and Turkey followed. The Gaza war provided Iran with an undisputed leadership role in the region, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE took a back seat while Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar were busy negotiating a ceasefire.
The onus of fighting for the cause of Palestinians was fairly and squarely on Iran’s shoulders, and it successfully fought Israel, the US, and others through its proxies for over six months. Its 25-year strategic partnership with China and the increasing cooperation with Russia, including the supply of drones and missiles in the Ukraine war, meant that a very powerful anti-west pole in the form of Russia-Iran-China is challenging the decades-old world order. Plus, Iran’s influence across the Levant, with President Assad in Syria, Iraq under PM Mohammad Shia al-Sudani, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, has never been better.
Iran’s entry into the BRICS and SCO in 2023 provided Iran with added legitimacy in global discourse. Finally, repeated assertions by the US that it does not want to get into any conflict in the region, that it does not seek war with Iran, and the fact that the US has already entered its presidential election cycle made it evident that there is almost no possibility of a direct military conflict with the US.
Quietly and concurrently, Iran’s nuclear programme is continuing uninhibited after formal talks broke off in August 2022. Despite Iran officially announcing enrichment of uranium to 60 per cent in April 2021 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finding traces of even 84 per cent enrichment in February 2023, there were no punitive actions against Iran by the P5 plus 1 or the IAEA, and so Iran continues to enrich and accumulate highly enriched uranium, with the capability of weaponising the programme at short notice. Militarily, too, Iran is in a good space. Its ballistic missile programme is developing well; it has developed its own hypersonic missiles, and its killer drone programme is creating waves, even in the Russia-Ukraine war.
Plus, economically, despite continuing western sanctions, Iran is doing well. The IMF, in its quarterly report in January 2024, announced that the Iranian economy has outperformed many of the world powers in 2023 with a growth rate of 5.4 per cent. Iran’s crude oil exports of almost 1.6 million barrels per day are almost back to pre-May 2018 days, when President Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and imposed sanctions.
All the above facts cumulatively present a very positive picture for Iran, and a holistic overview from Iran’s point of view clearly indicated that there could be no better time than now to break free from the shadows and shed its strategic reluctance. The only thing required was an opportune moment, and the Damascus attack provided the perfect opportunity.
What Next
Having tasted success, Iran would be emboldened for the future. Mohammed Jamshidi, Political Advisor to Iran’s President, has declared that “the era of strategic patience is over” and that any Israeli assaults will be met with a “direct” response. Warning Israel, Iran’s President has issued a statement: “If the Zionist regime (Israel) or its supporters demonstrate reckless behaviour, they will receive a decisive and much stronger response.”
As the dust settles on Iran’s strike, it is becoming clearer that the entire swarm of drones and missiles were never intended to hit the targets, except a few. Also, the attack was more of a show of strength, especially with the kind of advance warning given by Iran to its allies and to the US.
Also, it once again shattered the myth of the invincibility of Israel’s defence systems as some of the Iranian missiles found their mark on one of the most closely defended air bases in Israel. With more potent weapon systems yet to be employed, Iran would feel satisfied with the result of its attack on April 13.
The Iranian retaliation may have lacked the desired punch in delivery, but the act has opened up a whole new dimension for consideration in future conflicts in West Asia. If Iran has decided to play from the front foot, it presents a whole new challenge to its adversaries in the region. Add the potency of proxies in the region, and Iran suddenly emerges as a power like no other in the region, with perhaps no equal. And, it has not yet gone nuclear!
The author is Assistant Director, MP-IDSA. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.