Trump’s Ukraine playbook: Less Churchill, more real estate mogul

The Oval Office clash between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelensky, and JD Vance felt less like a diplomatic meeting and more like a bizarre boardroom showdown where one side thought they were negotiating security guarantees. The other was busy haggling over mineral rights. Zelensky came in expecting reassurances, only to find himself in a transactional free-for-all, with Trump treating Ukraine like a distressed asset and Vance playing the part of an annoyed executive demanding a “thank you” before any further discussion.

Trump downplayed security concerns casually. He tossed out that it was only “2 per cent” of the deal. One could almost see the disbelief on Zelensky’s face. Meanwhile, European leaders watched in stunned silence, likely realizing that if this was the new normal, they’d better start figuring out a Plan B. If diplomacy is usually an art, this was a demolition derby—loud, chaotic, and with a clear winner who had no intention of backing down.

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For Trump, U.S. interests come first. After years of pouring money and weapons into Ukraine’s defence, American leaders are now questioning whether endless support aligns with their strategic priorities. The war has strained global markets, driven up defence spending, and left Washington embroiled in a conflict with no clear endgame. Zelensky’s insistence on more aid without concessions ignores the changing political winds in the U.S., where there is growing scepticism about writing blank checks for a war that appears stalemated.

Europe is now grappling with the stark realisation that its security calculations may need urgent revision. For years, Europeans have largely followed Washington’s lead on Ukraine, assuming that US military and financial support would remain steadfast. But in Trump’s presidency, European capitals are reassessing their role in the conflict. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has already convened an emergency summit in London, signalling that Europe may have to step up if American aid diminishes.

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However, Europe lacks the military-industrial capacity to sustain Ukraine’s war effort at the scale that Washington has. While some leaders, like France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz, are pushing for greater European strategic autonomy, deep divisions remain over whether to fill the potential gap left by the US. With NATO’s backbone in question and no clear alternative in place. But the problem is that Europe has historically lacked a coherent foreign policy due to its structurally fragmented decision-making apparatus, competing national interests, and institutional constraints within the European Union.

Unlike unitary state actors, EU foreign policy operates through intergovernmental consensus, requiring alignment among 27 sovereign nations with divergent strategic imperatives. France, historically advocating for European strategic autonomy, often finds itself at odds with Germany’s economic pragmatism, while Eastern European states prioritize security ties with the United States over intra-EU defence initiatives.

Will Europe be successful in coming up with a unified foreign policy? Only time will tell. However, recent foreign policy interventions by Trump will have five key structural changes globally.

First and the most significant shift is the reconfiguration of US-Russia relations. Historically, periods of US-Russia rapprochement, such as détente in the 1970s and the brief post-Cold War cooperation of the 1990s were either transactional or short-lived, often giving way to renewed rivalry. The collapse of the Soviet Union created an opportunity for integration, but the eastward expansion of NATO and Western intervention in Russia’s near abroad, including the 2014 Ukraine crisis, entrenched hostility.

The current thaw under Trump, however, differs in its overtly transactional nature, prioritising economic concessions over ideological confrontation. The exclusion of Ukraine from US-Russia negotiations, particularly in Istanbul and Saudi Arabia, signals a power shift where Washington is willing to bypass historical alliances to secure direct gains. If sustained, this shift could fundamentally alter the European security order, diminishing NATO’s centrality and reviving a 19th-century-style balance-of-power diplomacy where major powers dictate settlements without the involvement of smaller nations.

Second, China, which has been the greatest beneficiary of US-Russia hostility, now faces strategic recalibration. The Sino-Russian relationship, often framed as an “axis of convenience,” was strengthened by Western sanctions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The US-led economic blockade pushed Russia closer to China, leading to deeper energy ties, military cooperation, and greater alignment in global institutions. However, a US-Russia détente could weaken Beijing’s leverage over Moscow, potentially reversing the asymmetric dependence Russia has developed on China for energy exports and geopolitical backing.

Historically, China has leveraged Russian resources to buffer against Western pressure, most notably in securing discounted Russian oil and gas following the Ukraine invasion. A pivot in US-Russia relations could force China into a more precarious position, where its strategic autonomy is challenged, particularly in areas like Taiwan, where Beijing has counted on Moscow’s tacit support to deter Western intervention.

Third, Europe now faces an urgent test of its long-discussed, but rarely realized, aspiration for strategic autonomy. The European security framework has historically relied on American military leadership, from the formation of NATO in 1949 to U.S. interventions in Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011). Even after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Europe remained dependent on the U.S. for military aid and intelligence, failing to develop indigenous capabilities to counter Russian aggression.

Trump’s direct engagement with Moscow and his clear reluctance to commit unconditional aid to Ukraine shatters the assumption that Washington will indefinitely underwrite Europe’s security. While leaders like Emmanuel Macron have long advocated for European strategic autonomy, the EU’s fragmented defence capabilities and divergent national interests, make a unified security response unlikely.

Fourth, the shift in US priorities also has profound implications for global resource and economic structures. The demand for critical minerals, central to contemporary industrial and technological supply chains, has historically driven geopolitical conflicts, from European colonialism in Africa to Cold War-era interventions in Latin America. Trump’s insistence on securing US access to Ukraine’s mineral resources reflects a reversion to economic realism, where territorial disputes and military conflicts are resolved not through ideological commitments but through economic carve-outs. This approach aligns with historical patterns—similar to Britain’s post-WWI oil interests in the Middle East or Cold War-era US control over Latin American commodity markets. If successfully executed, such a deal would reshape global supply chains, reducing Europe’s access to Ukrainian resources and limiting China’s ability to dominate rare-earth production.

Finally, the weakening of Western-led multilateral institutions, particularly NATO, the EU, and the broader rules-based order, marks a structural shift in global governance. Since 1945, the US has been the principal architect of multilateralism, using institutions like the UN, WTO, and Bretton Woods financial system to maintain economic and military hegemony. The Ukraine war initially reinforced this system, as the US and its allies coordinated economic sanctions and military aid through a unified framework. However, Trump’s willingness to bypass these mechanisms in favour of direct US-Russia negotiations undermines this post-WWII order. This move parallels historical instances of unilateralism, such as the 19th century Concert of Europe, where major powers dictated international settlements without institutional oversight.

If this trend continues, smaller states may find themselves increasingly vulnerable, as global decision-making becomes the domain of a few dominant actors rather than a broad-based institutional consensus. The implications extend beyond Ukraine, such a shift could redefine how territorial conflicts, economic disputes, and geopolitical crises are managed in the decades to come.

Aditya Sinha (X:@adityasinha004) is a public policy professional. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.