How Tianjin SCO summit signals a shift toward a multipolar world

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, in 2025 marks a watershed moment in the history of geopolitics since World War II. The US has been at the helm of global affairs through democracy, liberalism, globalization, and international institutions, which have constituted a world order under its influence—or, more soberly, its stewardship—since the end of the Second World War.

Like every world order, the US-led world order has its time, impact, extension, and determinism. Every order had its time, and the one steered by the US is no exception. The unipolar world order is unsustainable at present, looking at the complexity and diversity of the emerging geopolitical realities.

Multipolarity is the new world order that finds its inauguration at the SCO 2025, with India, China, and Russia taking the lead. It also heralds the Asian century. Since the SCO 2025 plays a critical role in forging this convergence, which is optimistic and confident in striking a balance of power and where economic interests override ideology, it is important to dwell on the specifics of the SCO 2025.

Key Takeaways

Security and terrorism featured in the ‘Tianjin Declaration’ assumed prominence in the SCO 2025, wherein the Pahalgam terror episode was alluded to in unequivocal terms. Zero tolerance for terrorism and collaborative efforts to enhance security and eliminate terrorism were illustrated with serious emphasis.

Under economic cooperation, robust economic ties among the partnering countries were the key focus of the meeting. It will enable countries to exercise resilience against the US tariff shock and weaponisation. The asymmetric and coercive economic policies to secure concessions from certain countries will not inflict any significant anxiety.

The establishment of the new SCO Development Bank to accentuate multilateral projects was an important achievement in this direction. A resilient economy through multilateralism and diversification of dependencies attracted major attention. The roadmap for technology cooperation and critical emphasis on AI and cutting-edge technology also featured prominently in the summit. For the expansion of the platform, Laos was admitted as a new Dialogue Partner.

PM Modi’s Emphasis

In the summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s focus was on security, connectivity, and opportunity. He foregrounded zero tolerance for terrorism in his address while referring to the Pahalgam terror attack. He categorically mentioned the non-admittance of double standards or equivocation while addressing the issue of terrorism. The message was loud and clear. He innovatively defined the acronym SCO as Security, Cooperation and Opportunity.

Security is the hallmark of progress. If progress is the objective of SCO, security is compulsory. A collaborative approach to secure a peaceful ecosystem is progress-friendly. The connectivity pillar in PM Modi’s address refers to trade, supply chains, communication, transportation and infrastructural growth. They are the growth engines for which multilateral cooperation is necessary.

Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) assumed importance. He was emphatic on the necessity of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries where the connectivity projects were carried out.

This is non-negotiable while undertaking such projects. Youth empowerment, innovation and startups were covered under the Opportunity pillar of SCO. PM Modi proposed the Civilisational Dialogue Forum (CDF) to carry out cultural dialogues, people-to-people contacts, cultural cooperation, etc. This added a non-material or cultural dimension to the summit.

SCO’s Relevance

SCO, as an intergovernmental international organisation, was established on June 15, 2001. The Shanghai Five initially included Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The goals were cooperation among the member states, developing friendship and trust, and working in tandem for trade, technology, culture, education, energy, transport, tourism, ecology, etc, peace, stability and security. The above goals were celebrated as the Shanghai spirit.

Currently, the ten member states include Belarus, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The two observer states are Afghanistan and Mongolia. The fourteen Dialogue Partners are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Egypt, Cambodia, Qatar, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Sri Lanka.

Geopolitical Implications

The formation of this axis under the SCO framework will not be good news for the US. The inauguration of a parallel and alternative system that overrides the US-led one will definitely increase Donald Trump’s anxiety. This anxiety is manifest. His tariff obstinacy and coercion were no less hegemonic. He continues to indulge in the delusion that everything begins in the US and ends in it. There is nothing beyond that. This is a typical US attitude. But there was some subtlety or statesmanship to cover it under different administrations in the past in the US. This subtlety is totally lost in Donald Trump.

Unpredictability is Trump’s style of politics. He seriously took it as a political virtue and peddled it verbatim. This became his liability. He thought that this would work against India. Today’s India is very different. Its economy, demography, diaspora and democracy define its strength. It has become resilient and cast off the colonial hangover. The colonial determinacy manifested through preaching and tutelage will not work. It redefines itself, linking its civilisational past with the aspirational future.

It is undisputed that the US is important for India and the world. But it cannot be the way the US wants. The US has to realise this sensitivity and sensibility. Its past grandeur clouds its rational ability to cognise the ground and the emerging geopolitics of today’s world. It sleepwalks into the present using the lens of its erstwhile glory and hegemony.

India cultivated the US-India bilateral relationship over two decades. It has its ups and downs, but it worked. Trump’s coercive geopolitics and hegemonic proclivities ruined the relationship that was on the brink of solidification, and though the signs of normalisation have begun to appear, scepticism will persist. Inarguably, the role of the US in the global scheme of things is not going to disappear any time soon. Its global footprint through international institutions, the dollar system, SWIFT and other international institutions will not go away dramatically.

The Euro-American hegemony in these institutions may be reduced with the formation of an axis of opposition. The US’s hegemony emanates from the absence of opposition. The new axis formation, as visualised through SCO 2025, will accentuate competition. This competition may create some conflict in the beginning. It will settle down in the long run and force the US to be more accommodating and inclusive. The ivory tower of unchallengeable eminence will soon experience the reality bite.

The dust will settle down to renew and reform relationships. The US needs India, and vice versa. In this interdependent world, India and the US are not expendable. It is counterintuitive to think along this line. The SCO 2025 will inaugurate the era of a respectful relationship despite differences. The US will learn it the hard way. But it will learn nevertheless.

One of the takeaways of the SCO 2025 is the inauguration of a multipolar world order where India, China and Russia will play a decisive role. The power centre will no longer remain one. Cooperation will be the core philosophy, not diktat, coercion and subservience. The multipolar world order has its problems too, but it is democratic, decentralised and not top-heavy.

The Chinese and Russian polity and the deficit of political cultures of democracy embody apprehensions of possible conflict. However, the doctrines of liberal democracy under the US monopoly since 1945 have also created enough chaos and clutter. It was no different despite its forceful promotion of democracy.

The multipolar world order will enforce reforms in the United Nations. The international institutions will give space to other countries and expand their membership. India is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council despite being the world’s largest democracy and the fourth-largest economy and soon securing the third position.

To refer to the list, apart from the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, India is also not in the Group of Seven (G7), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Western hegemony continues to exist through these institutions despite a declining economy.

The West is averse to change. It does not want any structural change, which may reduce its importance. Restructuring in the IMF and the World Bank is required. China and India will secure prominence. Western hegemony in these institutions will be negligible. New institutions of global economic management and cooperation will be built to streamline the global economic order.

Dedollarisation may take place, which will deorbit the US from the global economic scheme of things, especially as the only modality of global transaction. The centripetal model of currency conversion into dollars for global transactions or modes of payment will witness deceleration, giving space to alternative conversion models.

The global trade dependencies on the dollar system to conduct international trade and commerce will be diversified through the rupee-ruble-renminbi model. This will genuinely diversify the global payment and transaction, giving more space for choice to countries to select the mode of payment. It will definitely facilitate global financial reforms.

China has already built a robust supply chain system. Global trade will see more unrestricted flow in the event of the India-China-Russia model working in tandem to augment its outreach. India and China are energy-dependent countries. Russian supply will keep the manufacturing running in India and China in the event of American sanctions on Russian oil.

More importantly, India’s rise in the global decision-making from the Global South is a story of confidence, resilience, and persistence despite undergoing centuries of domination by imperial and colonial forces. It will inspire the Global South and help the latter to rise to prominence beyond colonial stereotypes.

The Brics is SCO’s mirror image. It comprises ten countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, the Russian Federation, and the United Arab Emirates. Its objectives are largely similar to those of the SCO. The SCO-Brics collaboration strengthens the conceptions of the multipolar world order.

Limits of Multipolarity

The multipolar order may look like a refreshing change from the US’s unipolarity, but the reality may prove otherwise. Any decoupling from an existing system, however problematic it may be, will involve structural conflicts. The US may muddy the environment before giving it away to the contrary power centres. Multipolarity embodies diversity of interests. Factionalism is likely to grow.

Russia is a time-tested partner. The relationship is complex but predictable. China, on the other hand, is a very difficult partner. It is unpredictable and difficult. The relationship with China has never been that encouraging in the past. It sits in India’s neighbourhood. It has expansionist streaks. India has to be more cautious given the chequered history it has with China.

Border issues and territorial claims of China have not given India any impression of great friendship. China hardly opens its market to others but effectively uses the markets of other countries to dump its overproduction. China tactically protects its interests. The US is inarguably an adversary, but China is no friend. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and debt-trap formulations and its interference with the countries in the Indian subcontinent cannot be underestimated.

On the contrary, the US holds, metaphorically, the patent on causing regime change. None seems to be India’s friend. This is the nature of international relations. The line between an adversary and a friend is very thin. However, the above antecedents cannot be ignored.

India has to make serious calculations to make its move on the chessboard of power. India has always preferred a non-confrontational approach to the conflict model. This is not its weakness, but it was construed as one. The US learnt it the hard way.

However, India is indispensable for its demography, economy, geography and democracy for both the unipolar and multipolar world orders. The US will come back to India sooner or later. It is just a matter of time. The Western false sense of superiority will soon find the reality check.

India has shrugged off the weight of quiet indifference and has become more assertive to safeguard its interests. It wants to protect its interests without subletting them to some other player. This expression of confidence will definitely take India to greater heights. It will forge its future without any intermediaries.

Jajati K Pattnaik is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Chandan K Panda is an Assistant Professor at Rajiv Gandhi University (A Central University), Itanagar. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.