Tale of two elections: Pakistan’s flawed political journey versus India’s credible electoral process

As the campaign for the world’s largest electoral exercise came to an end, my mind turned to the election for the National Assembly held in Pakistan on February 8 this year. While Indian elections demonstrate the nature of its vibrant democracy, where the people’s choices cannot be derailed either prior to the polls or during the election process, in Pakistan, national elections are accused of being manipulated by the army that intervenes from behind the scenes, vitiating the polling process.

This was conclusively demonstrated during the February polls; however, these weren’t the only elections that were derailed by the military. Nor is the army’s intervention in politics confined to national elections. It is a constant factor. To appreciate how and why the army completely manipulated the February 8 exercise, it would be useful to look at the evolution of Pakistan’s political situation over the past decade. The events of these ten years establish the power the men in Khaki wield in their country’s national life, even when they are not directly in power.

The Pakistan Army was unhappy with the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML (N)) winning the 2013 election and forming the government with Nawaz Sharif, its leader, as prime minister. Looking at the political scene, it decided to push forward the fortunes of Pakistan-e-Tehreek-Insaaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan.

Till then, Khan, who had led the Pakistan cricket team to win the World Cup in 1992, had made no real political headway, though he had established the party in 1996. But he was charismatic and could be groomed. So, the army began to use him against Nawaz Sharif. In 2016, Sharif got involved in the scandal emanating from the Panama Papers. He and members of his family were accused of funnelling funds abroad, including to buy properties in London.

The matter went to court, and Sharif was found to be in violation of the constitutional qualifications required of a member of parliament. That led to his ouster in 2017 from the prime minister’s chair. Later, he was found guilty in a criminal case and imprisoned. With Nawaz Sharif gone, the PML (N) made Shahid Khaqan Abbasi prime minister until the remainder of the National Assembly’s term in 2018.

In the 2018 elections, the army, under General Qamar Bajwa, who ironically was appointed by Nawaz Sharif as the army chief, decided that Imran Khan should be assisted from behind the curtain to emerge victorious. PTI fell short of a majority but became, by far, the single largest party, and along with some independents and smaller parties’ support, formed the government. Imran Khan became prime minister in August 2018. He led what analysts called a hybrid government because of the role of the army in policymaking.

In autumn 2021, Bajwa and Imran Khan fell apart. The reason for this development was Khan’s unhappiness at Bajwa shifting the then DG ISI, Lt Gen Faez Hameed, from his job. No Pakistani army chief allows anyone to interfere in the running of the army. Bajwa also realised that Imran Khan had grown too big for his boots.

Consequently, he decided that the army would have to change its approach to PML(N) and mobilise a coalition—the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM)—with it and the Bhutto-Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s party—to oust Imran Khan from the prime minister’s chair. This occurred in April 2022. A PDM coalition government led by Nawaz Sharif’s younger brother, Shehbaz Sharif, was formed. However, despite being ‘dethroned’, Imran Khan remained enormously popular not only in his Pathan base in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) but also in Punjab. This was demonstrated by his success in the bye-elections in the latter province.

After the Shehbaz Sharif government was formed, Bajwa’s first task was to ensure that it continued until it appointed his successor. His extended term—again, ironically, Khan had given him a second term of three years in 2019 even though, under the Supreme Court’s decision, it required legislation to amend the Army Act—was coming to an end in November 2022. The PDM government confronted grave macro-economic problems that saw great inflation and Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves becoming precariously low, but it managed to survive. Under Nawaz Sharif’s insistence, who was in London—he went there in 2019 and continued to live there—Shehbaz appointed Asim Munir, who bore a grudge against Imran Khan, as army chief in Bajwa’s place.

Under the constitution, the term of the 15th National Assembly was to end in August 2023, and by May, the term of the PDM government had to conclude, and a caretaker government was formed until the elections. However, it became clear by early 2023 that unless the new army chief became certain that Imran Khan would not prevail in the elections, he would not let them take place. His determination was strengthened after the events of May 9, when the PTI members and Imran Khan supporters took out their ire against army installations and rampaged through some of the army’s sacred places, such as the Corp Commander’s residence, called Jinnah House, in Lahore. Khan was then in jail, and he became subjected to a number of cases to ensure that he would continue to remain in jail.

Shehbaz Sharif resigned in August 2023, but the Pakistan Election Commission kept delaying the polls on one pretext or another. It was bowing to the wishes of the army. The Commission, in a most significant move, declared that the PTI could not contest the elections as a party because it had not held intra-party elections as mandated by its constitution. It also declared that no PTI member contesting as an independent candidate could use the party symbol. The army also waited for Justice Faez Isa to become the country’s Chief Justice because it felt that he was not hostile to the generals.

By the time the election was held, Nawaz Sharif had returned to Pakistan, but he did not assume PML (N)’s leadership because the cases against him had not been quashed by the courts. (That happened only after the new government was formed in February, and he again became the party president on May 28.) With Imran Khan in jail and unable to contest because of his conviction in criminal cases, the election campaign’s focus was on Khan himself. This is because, despite being in jail, he remained popular in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. The PTI nominees were contesting as independents without the advantage of the party symbol. They were also under pressure from the army, which managed to ensure that some of the party stalwarts left it.

Driven into a corner, all that they pushed in the election campaign was that a vote for them meant a vote for the ‘Kaptaan’ i.e., Imran Khan. They also sent the message that he was removed from the prime minister’s chair as part of an international conspiracy. They blamed the traitors and also focused on the terrible economic situation. On the other hand, the PDM parties focused on the events of May 9 and the mess that Khan had left behind when he lost office. None of the candidates took up the real issues that confront Pakistan. In sum, the rivals in the election became Khan and Asim Munir. This was never explicitly said, but all Pakistanis knew that this was so.

Imran Khan’s independents emerged as the largest ‘group’, but having lost their party status, they had to join a small party to become eligible for the women and minority seats. Even though this was denied to them by the Election Commission, for the present, the matter is before the courts. Munir ensured that the PML (N) and the PPP arrived at an understanding to form the government. While the PPP did not join the government, it extended outside support, bargained, and got Asif Zardari elected as the president. In this arrangement, the army retains the ultimate clout.

The Indian election campaign, in sharp contrast to that in Pakistan, remains a poll battle in which the people exercise their decision on their representatives and, through them, on which party or alliance would form the government. Naturally, no institution in India can really come in between the political class and the people. The Modi government and the opposition projected their different visions of India and the policies and programmes to achieve these different visions. Also, in the past decade, which witnessed such turmoil in Pakistan, India moved ahead economically. Naturally, the opposition picked holes in the process of economic development and also in the social and political approaches of the government in the campaign. However, all this is part of the process of democratic elections.

The Indian election campaign profiled India’s democratic credentials, while that in Pakistan served to highlight the fundamental fact of Pakistani political life—the enduring influence and power of the military generals.

The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.