 "Strategic shield: Need to recalibrate defence diplomacy, role of military attachés in contemporary times")
Ever since ancient times, military officers have been employed in foreign lands as part of a politico-military approach to national security to safeguard national interests. There are references to such a role in Kautilya’s Arthashastra, in the history of the pre-Judean era, and in Roman history.
In those times, the role of military officers was largely focused on spying. In the 17th century, when the Prussians found ambassadorial reports neither sufficiently detailed nor updated for the purpose of decision making in war, they began to employ generals in diplomatic assignments. Napoleon frequently used generals as ambassadors. By the mid-nineteenth century, most European powers were assigning military officers to foreign countries, and in 1857, these military officers were designated as military attaches and given diplomatic status.
In more recent times, defence diplomacy has emerged as one of the most important tools of military statecraft. The term “defence diplomacy” was perhaps first used by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) to consolidate a bouquet of military activities being conducted by the MoD.
Although there is no universally accepted definition of defence diplomacy, it is generally considered the nonviolent use of a state’s defence apparatus to advance the strategic aims of a government through cooperation with other countries. Typically, the term includes activities such as officer exchanges, ship visits, training missions, and joint military exercises.
The significance of defence diplomacy dimmed for Indian decision makers post-independence, and it was in the early 1990s that India’s defence engagement began to gain momentum. C Raja Mohan, as late as 2015, lamented:
Impact Shorts
More Shorts…India’s military diplomacy has been severely limited by the lack of adequate political support and insufficient coordination between the armed forces, the ministry of defence, and the foreign office. While the services and the MEA see the value of leveraging India’s military strengths, the MoD has neither the aptitude nor the institutional capability to meet the growing international demand for defence cooperation with India.
Fortunately, things have begun to change. The MoD and the services are proactively involved in defence diplomacy, and as of date, the Indian Army is engaging with 110 countries through defence cooperation activities. In 2023, the Indian Army participated in 39 joint exercises with foreign armies, out of which it was lead service in 28 exercises.
In addition, the Indian Army and the US Army co-hosted the 13th Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC), the 47th Indo-Pacific Armies Management Seminar (IPAMS), and the 9th Senior Enlisted Leaders Forum (SELF).
The Army has been playing a crucial role in promoting multilateralism by organising the Inaugural India-Africa Army Chiefs’ Conclave (IACC) and AFINDEX (2023), themed on Humanitarian Mine Action & Peace Keeping Operations. Several high-level visits were conducted in 2023 in pursuit of the objectives of defence diplomacy.
Based on the recommendations of the MoD’s Study on Realignment of Defence Wings, new defence wings are being established in Algeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Poland by the end of 2024. Reportedly, new defence wings are also being established in Armenia, Djibouti, the Philippines, and Tanzania. These wings are being established through optimisation of the existing billets of the defence attaches in countries like Russia and the United Kingdom.
Although the establishment of new defence wings is a welcome development, there are certain issues that require institutional attention.
Among the varied tasks the military attaches would be undertaking, they would be expected to help achieve the target for defence exports set by the government, facilitate India’s defence procurements, secure supply chains, and mitigate causes of national security risks.
Defence exports require building a long-term relationship with the importing countries and their armed forces. Business also requires special aptitude, which goes beyond formal training and the learning of manuals and procedures. Military attaches are expected to navigate the realm of defence business, which is unlike any other.
In addition, they must be prepared for adverse PR from inimical interests and business competitors. India has supplied weapon platforms and radars to Armenia. Should the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia flare up again, Indian systems would be tested under extreme conditions. It is possible there would be some failures, like those of any other equipment produced anywhere in the world. Indian military attaches must be prepared to face the barrage of adverse PR in all forms of media.
The character of warfare is changing. If the Russia-Ukraine war is indicative of the wars of the future, India must prepare for a protracted war and secure supply chains against sanctions and export control regimes.
The export control measures imposed by the West on Russia are, perhaps, the most stringent applied against a single country since the Cold War. India may face a similar situation, which may include measures aimed at cutting off high-tech imports, restricting access to vital technological inputs, weakening its industrial base, and undercutting its influence on the world stage.
The defence sector may be subjected to sweeping restrictions due to the denial of sensitive technology. These measures may be aimed at denying semiconductors, telecommunications, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics, and maritime technologies, among others.
The defence establishment would be well advised to study how countries impose sanctions and export control regimes and plan mitigation strategies, which take years to mature and become implementable. Military attaches will be important cogs in the whole system to ‘sanction-proof’ India’s supply chain and defence imports. The services will have to take a de novo look at the pre-deployment training of the military attaches, which will have to go beyond the pro forma briefings of the various branches and directorates at the service headquarters and focus on well-defined objectives and measures to secure India’s defence supply chains.
The military attachés are the vanguard of MoD’s soft power in their respective countries. They, as highlighted earlier in the article, advance the strategic aims of the Indian government through the cooperation of the host country. The attaches would be expected to mitigate the causes of national security risks rather than letting India manage the consequences later.
The MoD will have to craft unique objectives, peculiarities, and strategies for each country. The MoD’s objectives, say in Djibouti, would be very different from those in Armenia or Poland. Intent cannot translate into action unless it is backed by capacities—necessary strategies, tools, including funds, and permission.
The MoD and the services need to draft country-specific strategies and resource them adequately, which includes training the attaches, well before their deployment, as serious work lies ahead.
The author is a Research Fellow at MP-IDSA. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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