Strategic autonomy, long game: Why India should stay the course

Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the six months there have revived a familiar blend of transactional diplomacy, unpredictable signalling, and a willingness to jolt the global order for short-term advantage. For many countries, this means heightened uncertainty. For India, it also means a renewed test of its most enduring foreign policy principle—strategic autonomy.

There will be temptations and provocations in the months ahead. Washington’s sharpening confrontation with both China and Russia will demand visible partners and demonstrable loyalty. Trump 2.0’s “America First” instinct will frame these demands less as long-term alliances and more as business transactions: “You back us when it counts, we reward you where it matters.” But this is precisely the environment in which India must double down on its own path—staying engaged with all major powers, aligning where interests converge, but resisting being pulled into conflicts or postures that do not serve long-term national objectives.

At the heart of those objectives is something far larger than day-to-day tactical manoeuvres: the steady and determined development of India’s comprehensive national power (CNP). This means building a military that deters and prevails, an economy that grows at sustained high rates, a technology base that rivals the best in the world, and a diplomatic voice that shapes global rules rather than merely reacting to them. Above all, it means narrowing the gap with China over the coming decades and creating a scale and quality of national capability that produces an overwhelming asymmetry with Pakistan.

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Through all the turbulence of the past six decades, India’s relationship with Russia has been marked by consistency and mutual trust. From the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 to the delivery of advanced defence systems today, Moscow has often stood by India in ways that others would not or could not. Recent comments by the Chief of the Air Staff underscored this reality. He pointed to the performance of Russian-origin systems in past combat operations, including the downing of Pakistani aircraft during Operation Sindoor, and offered unreserved praise for the S-400 air defence system now in Indian hands. Such capabilities are not just military assets; they are geopolitical signals that India will source its defence requirements from wherever it chooses, without fear or favour.

It is true that Russia’s growing closeness to China complicates the picture. But this makes Indian engagement with Moscow all the more important, not less. The goal is to keep channels open, remind Russia that multilateralism is India’s chosen framework, and wherever possible, work with Moscow to build limited but useful trust with Beijing.

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India’s strategic partnership with the United States has grown steadily over the past two decades, encompassing trade, technology, energy, and security. The two countries share concerns about China’s behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, and cooperation through the Quad has brought greater strategic depth to the relationship.

Yet, Trump 2.0’s approach will likely bring sharper demands. There will be moments when Washington acts in haste—especially towards Pakistan—and expects India to follow suit. Here, the risk is twofold. First, India could be dragged into a tit-for-tat cycle with Pakistan, where US backing tempts Pakistan to trigger yet more incidents to demonstrate its relevance. This offers no strategic gain for us but consumes political and military bandwidth. The prudent course is to engage with the US as energetically as before but to keep a steady hand on the tiller. Partnership, yes; alignment, only where it advances India’s core interests.

History shows that provocations from Pakistan—whether through terrorist incidents or military posturing—tend to spike when global attention is elsewhere or when major powers are in transition. A more impulsive US leadership could unintentionally amplify this by offering diplomatic or rhetorical cover for Indian retaliation. But the strategic equation with Pakistan is no longer symmetrical. India’s economic weight is already more than ten times that of its western neighbour; its military modernisation, though uneven, is accelerating; and its international standing is on a different plane altogether. To be drawn into frequent confrontation is to squander this advantage.

Every crisis that derails economic momentum or diverts military resources from long-term capability building is counterproductive. Yet, a policy of non-provocation does not mean passivity. It means maintaining readiness, preserving the right to respond decisively when national security is directly threatened, but resisting the urge to convert every spark into a blaze. The surest way to create the “huge and enduring asymmetry” with Pakistan is to invest relentlessly in India’s own growth—not in endless rounds of reactive sparring.

In a world of shifting coalitions, multilateral platforms have their distinct significance. India’s active role in Brics and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) alongside China and Russia gives it influence in forums the West often dismisses but cannot ignore. Its presence at the G7, albeit as an invited participant, offers the reverse: a seat in conversations the non-Western world views with suspicion. The United States sees Brics and SCO as rival constructs. But India’s participation should be framed not as an endorsement of any bloc, but as proof of a larger philosophy—the willingness to engage with all, and the refusal to be bound exclusively to one camp.

Indeed, India could even consider bold gestures—such as supporting observer status for the US in select Brics or SCO discussions—to soften rigid perceptions and demonstrate that these forums need not be closed clubs. Such moves would require deft diplomacy, particularly to reassure Russia and manage Chinese resistance, but they fit neatly into the long-term strategy of keeping India indispensable to multiple power centres.

Ultimately, the measure of strategic autonomy is not in the slogans it inspires but in the power it enables. The long game for India is clear: achieve sustained, inclusive economic growth that lifts per capita income into the ranks of the developed world; build a military-industrial base that is self-reliant, technologically advanced, and export-capable; become a central node in global supply chains, digital governance, and climate action frameworks; and cultivate a diplomatic culture that can mediate, propose, and lead on global issues—not merely vote or react.

This vision requires stability, patience, and above all, a refusal to be distracted by short-term theatrics. The gap with China will not be closed in a single decade, but every year of 7–8 per cent growth, of consistent defence investment, of expanding human capital, brings India closer to that goal. And every such year widens the gap with Pakistan beyond the point where it can meaningfully challenge India’s security, except through the most asymmetric and desperate means.

Trump 2.0’s world will not be a comfortable one nor a permanent one. The pressures to choose sides, to react quickly, and to join causes that are not our own will be intense. But India’s strategic success has always come from its ability to say “yes” and “no” in the same sentence—to cooperate without becoming dependent and to deter without becoming belligerent. The course is set: deepen ties with the US, preserve the Russian connection, manage the China relationship, and avoid being drawn into cycles of provocation with Pakistan.

We have done it reasonably well in the context of Ukraine. All the while, invest in the engines of national strength that will, in time, make India’s autonomy not just a policy choice but an unassailable fact. The wiser path is to measure responses against the yardstick of long-term national power. In that calculus, patience is not weakness; it is strategy. I think India’s national leadership has understood this well, although it will need to tolerate a lot of noise on it, with demands to be more decisive. I do perceive that the most decisive decision continues to be staying the course on strategic autonomy.

The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.