South China Sea: How growing Chinese assertiveness finds strong Philippine response

For the past one year, the China-Philippines relationship has been simmering as a result of regular skirmishes between their navies in the South China Sea. During the ninth meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on July 2, the two sides reached a provisional understanding on avoiding miscalculation and miscommunication around the disputed islands in the Sea to allow for a moment of diplomatic respite. But does this provisional understanding indicate a temporary proverbial ceasefire or long-term rapprochement?

Recent developments, more specifically the collision between the two sides’ vessels near the Spratly islands on Monday (August 19) suggest neither.

The military build-up

For the past one year, Chinese coast guard (CCG) vessels deployed in the area around the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, in the Spratly islands, have increasingly engaged in threatening manoeuvres to deter movement of Philippine ships in the region. Largely, the targeted vessels are used for rotation and resupply (RORE) missions in collaboration with the Philippine coast guard (PCG). Their destination is the BRP Sierra Madre, a Philippine warship deliberately run aground in the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999 to assert the island country’s claim over the feature.

Since October 2023, the CCG has resorted to ramming into PCG ships accompanied by civilian RORE vessels if they approach the Second Thomas Shoal. Additionally, since November 2023, the CCG has regularly used water cannons to blast Philippine supply ships and harass personnel on board. When water cannons were similarly used against Philippine RORE vessel Unaizah Mae-4 on March 5, it shattered the vessel’s windshield and caused injury to four Filipino fishermen.

In early June, the Philippines changed tact and deployed aircraft to approach BRP Sierra Madre and conduct airdrop of food supplies. However, when CCG rigid hull inflatable boats intercepted the four-part airdrop, they caught one of the food packets and dropped it into the Sea, triggering a gun-pointing response from armed Philippine navy personnel aboard the Sierra Madre.

What is motivating such manoeuvres?

The China-Philippines dispute in the South China Sea is essentially a political conflict regarding the territorial ownership over features such as the Second Thomas and Scarborough shoals, and the resources around them. It has consistently been the Chinese position that these disputed regions have been part of Chinese territory since ancient times.

A white paper issued by the Chinese State Council Information Office (SCIO) in 2016 said: “China is the first to have discovered, named, and explored and exploited Nanhai Zhudao [the South China Sea islands] and relevant waters, and the first to have continuously, peacefully and effectively exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction over them.”

This indicates that the Chinese claim over the islands goes as far back as 2nd BCE — more than 2000 years ago. The solidification of its claims has been done through official maps wherein China depicts over 90 per cent of the South China Sea area as lying within its ‘9-dash-line’ territory.

However, the Philippines contends that Chinese claims impinge on its enjoyment and exercise of sovereign rights with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).

Hence, at the heart of the dispute is a fundamental faultline — while the UNCLOS guarantees that the areas around the disputed shoals —within 200 nautical miles of the Philippines’ coast— are part of the island nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), China objects to such an assertion on historical grounds. It must be noted, in this regard, that the Philippines’ claims have the legal backing of the UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which in its landmark 2016 ruling said clearly that the Chinese 9-dash-line has no legal basis, and that its obstruction of fishing or oil and gas exploration activities by Filipino vessels is in contravention to its obligations under the Convention.

As the conflict is non-kinetic in nature with no clear political winners, the two sides also engage in nomenclature warfare to assert claims over the disputed islands. As evident from China’s white paper, it refers to the South China Sea in most official documents as ‘Nanhai Zhudao’, and complements the usage with the assertion that China was the first to name and explore the Sea. The Philippines, on the other hand, claims its sovereignty over the area it refers to as the ‘West Philippine Sea’, which are parts of the South China Sea that lie within the country’s EEZ.

Since the Second Thomas Shoal is also at the centre of the conflict, it is often referred to in Chinese rhetoric as the Rén’ài Jiāo and by the Philippines as Ayungin Shoal. These are attempts at creating official records and setting narratives straight and the campaign accompanied by powerful public diplomacy wins.

What does the latest ‘understanding of principles’ mean?

Recently, China proposed a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) meeting in a bid to resolve tensions. The meeting took place on July 2 in Manila, and was co-chaired by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Xiaodong and Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Theresa Lazaro. The differing perceptions of the agreement reached at the meeting are evident from the two sides’ post-facto statements.

As per the statement issued by the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the two sides “reached an understanding of principles and approaches that will be observed by both sides in order to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in the conduct of the Philippines’ lawful and routine rotation and resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal”.

The Chinese statement claimed: “Both sides agreed that maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea is in the interests of China and the Philippines, and also the common goal of countries in the region. China reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Nansha Qundao and its adjacent waters, including Ren’ai Jiao, as well as its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters.”

Each party’s statement attempts to clarify their respective stances on their maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea. While from the Philippines’ perspective, China is causing “miscommunication and miscalculation” regarding the nation’s lawful RORE activities, the Chinese say the Philippines is violating Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction by continuing such activities. In this regard, the common element in both statements was that neither side agreed to concede their positions on the dispute or believe that the principles and understandings concluded will prejudice said positions moving forward.

On a broader level, the Philippines’ decision to lodge a case against the Chinese government at the PCA in 2013, under the Presidency of Benigno Aquino III, led to a drastic deterioration in the relations between the two countries. However, around the time the PCA delivered a judgement favouring the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency. His approach towards China was friendlier than his predecessor. In fact, in a speech he made in December 2016, Duterte argued, “In the play of politics, now, I will set aside the arbitral ruling. I will not impose anything on China.”

With Rodrigo Duterte stepping down as President in 2022, Manila has reinstated its firm stance on the South China Sea issue. Also the air of cooperation at the BCM has turned stale after years of its formation. In this context, policymakers on both sides have adopted a hardline stance on their national positions vis-à-vis the Sea.

Where are things headed?

In the seven years since the BCM was established, the Mechanism has seen little success in fulfilling its initial agenda of enabling “proper handling” of disputes bilaterally by creating room for cooperation. However, the above-mentioned developments indicate that the BCM may prove to be the right platform to avoid escalatory ladders and leave lines of communication open in an otherwise uncertain and hostile environment. The Mechanism demonstrates great potential for preventive diplomacy, and keeps deliberations on bilateral cooperation ongoing despite the existence of the maritime dispute.

However, from the Chinese perspective, a fundamental rethink of strategy is in order. Neither its deterrence tactics vis-à-vis an aggressive military posture, nor its proposal for a BCM with the Philippines, have kept tensions at bay. In fact, the most important red line the Chinese urge the Filipinos to not cross, which is to go beyond bilateral mechanisms and involve third parties in dispute resolution, has already been breached — most prominently with the involvement of the PCA.

Further, the renewal of Philippines’ Mutual Defence Treaty with the US indicates the shortcomings of China’s military deterrence — that there is little it can achieve just through brute force. In this regard, Beijing must prepare to face a vehement and assertive Manila, which can no longer be manipulated by a simple carrots and sticks approach.

Anushka Saxena is a Staff Research Analyst (China) with the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of Firstpost.